Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In early 2022, a three-year-old child, L.C., was taken from his mother, D.C., after she was arrested for transporting fentanyl pills with L.C. in the car. After the juvenile court removed L.C. from his mother's care, D.C. returned to Mexico on the advice of her criminal defense attorney. Despite being in Mexico, D.C. maintained a relationship with L.C. through weekly video calls and completed necessary programs as part of her case plan, including a drug treatment program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. However, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services expressed concerns about the validity of her drug tests performed by Mexico's child protection agency. At a 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated D.C.'s reunification services, citing her failure to return to California for drug testing and other services, speculation about L.C.'s developmental services in Mexico, and D.C.'s refusal to surrender herself in response to an arrest warrant.L.C. sought relief, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that returning him to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety or well-being. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven agreed with L.C. and found that the mother had complied with her case plan, maintained a bond with L.C., and that Mexico's child protection agency could provide services to the mother and L.C. Therefore, the court granted the petition, vacated the juvenile court's termination of reunification services, and ordered a new review hearing to consider any developments since the last hearing. View "L.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Office of Children’s Services' (OCS) decision to take emergency custody of a baby who tested positive for drugs at birth, and the subsequent legal proceedings that ensued. Both parents initially expressed interest in voluntarily relinquishing their parental rights, but the court found that the relinquishments were not valid because the forms were not dated or signed by an OCS witness. The foster parents opposed OCS's plan to move the baby from their home to her maternal aunt’s home and were granted permission to intervene for a placement review hearing. After the hearing, the court concluded that OCS had abused its discretion in deciding to move the child and granted the mother's motion to withdraw her putative relinquishment. The foster parents then filed a motion to reconsider the order allowing the mother to withdraw her relinquishment. The court granted the foster parents’ motion and reversed its order withdrawing the relinquishment. The court then terminated the parental rights of both parents without holding an evidentiary hearing. OCS and both parents appealed the superior court’s decisions. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that it was error to allow the foster parents’ continued intervention, to reinstate the relinquishments, and to terminate parental rights. The court vacated all the orders relating to those errors and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings. The court clarified that it was an abuse of discretion to permit the foster parents to continue to intervene regarding the validity of the parents’ relinquishments, to revisit the validity of the relinquishments, and to issue termination orders without providing the parties with notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as a legal error to issue a termination order without making a best interests finding. View "Tara R. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Iowa, the case involved a dispute between divorced parents who held joint legal custody of their children. The parents disagreed on whether their children should receive the COVID-19 vaccine. The mother filed an application for vaccination determination after unsuccessful mediation, seeking the district court's authorization to vaccinate the children. The district court dismissed the case, concluding it lacked the authority to act. The court of appeals reversed the decision, instructing the district court to hear the mother's application on the merits.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case. The Supreme Court held that the language of Iowa Code section 598.1(3) provides parents with equal participation in decisions affecting their children's medical care. The court found that the mother's application for vaccination determination attempted to circumvent the dissolution decree that gave the parents joint legal custody. Without a request for a modification of the custody agreement, the district court did not have the authority to resolve the parents' dispute. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not have the authority to resolve the parties' conflict over vaccinating their children against COVID-19. View "In re Marriage of Frazier" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt with an appeal by George Hawkins who was convicted for sexual battery of a minor under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-95(2). This law requires the State to prove that the defendant was in a position of trust or authority over the minor when the crime was committed. Hawkins' appeal was based on the argument that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of him being in such a position over the victim, as he had no legal authority over her.In 2014, Hawkins began dating Tonya Ingram and gradually became a part of her and her children’s lives, to the point where they even considered themselves to be common-law married. In the spring of 2015, Tonya and her children moved into Hawkins's home "as a family". Hawkins and Tonya filed their taxes jointly, claimed Tonya’s children as dependents, and contributed equally to the family’s finances. The victim, Jane, one of Tonya's children, trusted Hawkins, which ended when he sexually assaulted her one night.The court found that while Hawkins did not possess any legal authority over Jane, a reasonable jury could have concluded that he was in a position of trust or authority over her based on the totality of the circumstances and their relationship. The court held that the list of individuals who are typically in positions of authority provided in Section 97-3-95(2) serves only as examples, and does not limit this to persons in positions of legal authority over the child. Therefore, the court affirmed Hawkins' conviction. View "Hawkins v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Todd Andrew Domenico and Josie Daniel, formerly married, were in a dispute over custody of their two children. The couple divorced in 2018, with the court awarding joint legal custody to both parents and primary physical custody to the father. In 2020, the mother filed for a modification of the decree, requesting primary physical custody of the children. The district court maintained primary physical custody with the father and increased the mother's visitation rights. Both parents appealed this decision.The Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in several aspects. First, it erred in denying a psychological evaluation of the mother and prohibiting inquiry into her mental health. The mother's mental health was directly relevant to determining the best interest of the children. Second, the court's factual conclusions were insufficient to support its visitation determinations. The findings did not provide enough specifics or detail to clarify the reasoning behind the decisions, particularly regarding the extension of the mother's summer visitation and the removal of the requirement for the mother to provide qualified caregivers for the severely autistic child. Third, the court erred in failing to designate one parent as the final decision-maker on issues of the children's welfare, particularly medical decisions. The court's refusal to resolve the parents' impasse over medical decision-making was harmful to the children. Lastly, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider allegations of the mother's psychological abuse of one child after the evidence had closed.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to not modify physical custody of the children, and it did not exceed its jurisdiction when it prohibited the mother from obtaining a psychological evaluation of the children. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Daniel v. Domenico" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, Wilmot Yalartai, the plaintiff and appellant, appealed against an order dismissing his case against Jamesetta Miller, the respondent. The two are married with minor children and Yalartai had filed two cases against Miller - one for parenting responsibility and the other for divorce. After a hearing, a judicial referee dismissed the parenting responsibility case, stating that issues concerning parenting responsibility could be resolved in the divorce case. The referee's dismissal order was given without notice to the parties, and Yalartai appealed against this order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, in its decision, stated that the dismissal order is not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02 because it was issued without notice. Thus, the court dismissed Yalartai's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(7), orders issued without notice to the parties are not appealable and litigants must first seek relief in the district court from an order made without notice. The court further explained that an adversarial record, which does not exist in this case, is required for their review. Hence, Yalartai's failure to seek relief from the dismissal order as required by law led to the dismissal of his appeal. View "Yalartai v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County terminating a father's parental rights to his child. The father had been convicted of two felony violations, each involving a child victim. The father appealed the decision, arguing that his felony violations were not statutory grounds justifying the termination of his parental rights, that these grounds should be declared unconstitutional, and that there was insufficient evidence to declare him an unfit parent. However, the Supreme Court found that the father's first two arguments were not preserved for appeal and therefore declined to address them. The court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the father's parental rights, upholding the lower court's decision. The court found the termination was in the best interest of the child. View "In the Interest of: E.G. v. Juvenile Officer" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, five minors, aged between one and fourteen years, challenged the juvenile court's decision to order reunification services for their parents, identified as A.B. (mother) and A.S. (father). The minors were adjudged dependent children due to ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse in their home. The court had to interpret and apply the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), which allows a court to bypass reunification services for parents with a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol who have resisted prior court-ordered treatment in the three years prior to the filing of the petition.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District concluded that the juvenile court had misapplied the law when it decided it could not deny reunification services to the parents while they were participating in treatment. The court emphasized that the statute requires proof of the parent’s resistance during the three years preceding the petition, regardless of their engagement in treatment at the time of the disposition hearing.The court reversed the juvenile court's dispositional order providing reunification services to the parents for all five children and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing based on the family's present circumstances. This decision was made despite subsequent events that rendered the case potentially moot, as the court deemed the issue of statutory interpretation important. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

The case involves Billie S., who appealed from a judgment by the District Court (Bangor, Roberts, J.) which terminated her parental rights to her children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2023). The mother argued that the judgment did not provide sufficient independent findings of fact to support the termination of her parental rights. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the mother's contention.The trial court based its decision on evidence from various sources including the Department of Health and Human Services caseworker's testimony, guardian ad litem reports, and the petitions for termination. However, the judgment simply incorporated the entirety of these sources as its "specific findings" instead of providing an independent articulation of the specific facts that formed the basis of the court’s ultimate findings regarding the mother’s parental unfitness and the best interests of the children.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that these were not the “specific findings of fact” required by Rule 52(a) or prior decisions. The court could not infer factual findings in a termination case when the adequacy of the findings was the issue at hand. As a result, the court vacated the judgment due to its lack of adequate findings that would sufficiently inform the mother and the court of the reasoning behind the decision. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Children of Billie S." on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Jessica Banks sued the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) for removing her four-year-old son R.B. from her custody without parental consent or a court order, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied DFPS's motion for summary judgment, finding that its employees were not entitled to qualified immunity as they had violated clearly established law.DFPS appealed the decision, but the appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the removal of R.B. violated the constitutional rights of both the child and Banks, as there were no exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless removal from his mother. The court emphasized that the mere possibility of danger in the future was not enough to constitute exigent circumstances. The court also held that the law was clearly established that removing a child from their home without consent, a court order, or exigent circumstances was a constitutional violation.However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Linda Juarez, an Investigation Supervisor at DFPS. The court ruled that Juarez was not the ultimate decision-maker and was not actively involved in the decision to remove R.B., thereby entitling her to qualified immunity. View "Banks v. Herbrich" on Justia Law