Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In February 2022, Gracia Bovis, an elder woman, signed documents transferring the title of her house to her daughter, Marina Casey. According to Bovis, Casey had misled her into signing the documents to protect her from rising property taxes. However, the documents transferred the property into Casey's name. Casey argued that the transfer was meant to protect the property from tax reassessment under Proposition 19. Bovis sought an Elder Abuse Restraining Order (EARO) against Casey, alleging financial abuse. The trial court granted the EARO and subsequently declared the deed transferring the property void ab initio (invalid from the outset). Casey appealed these decisions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, affirmed the issuance of the restraining orders, finding sufficient evidence of financial abuse, but reversed the order declaring the deed void. The appellate court concluded that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03 in declaring the deed void. The statute allows for the issuance of restraining orders to protect elders from further abuse, but does not provide the court with the authority to declare a deed void. The court noted that other permanent remedies, such as the return of property, can be pursued through a civil action under other provisions of the Elder Abuse Act. View "Newman v. Casey" on Justia Law

In Delaware, a father challenged the termination of his parental rights over his youngest child, J.M., who was born in November 2021. The mother, V.H., passed away a few weeks after giving birth, leaving the father, Jack Mitchell, to care for J.M. and his two older siblings. Due to various circumstances including Mitchell's brief incarceration and struggles with housing and employment, J.M. was placed in the guardianship of Rachel and Joshua Thayer, who were also the petitioners in the termination of parental rights case. The Thayers filed for termination of Mitchell's parental rights six months after assuming guardianship, asserting that Mitchell had intentionally abandoned J.M. The Family Court of the State of Delaware granted the petition, finding that the Thayers had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mitchell had intentionally abandoned J.M. and that it was in the child's best interest for his parental rights to be terminated.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found the evidence insufficient to support the Family Court's conclusion that Mitchell intentionally abandoned J.M. The Supreme Court noted situations where Mitchell expressed a desire and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of J.M., and evidence that showed Mitchell's improvements in his personal circumstances, such as creating his own business, moving into a house, and caring for his other children. Consequently, it determined that the Family Court erred in its decision to terminate Mitchell's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the Family Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Thayer" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was tasked with determining whether multiple periods of separation prior to filing a paternity action were enough to preclude the application of the presumption of paternity. The presumption of paternity is a legal doctrine which presumes that a child conceived or born during a marriage is a child of that marriage. The court held that a marital couple's separation prior to the filing of the paternity action does not, per se, preclude the application of the presumption of paternity.In this case, a woman (Mother) and her husband (Husband) were married and separated multiple times. During one of their separations, the woman had unprotected sexual intercourse with another man (B.C.). After the woman became pregnant and gave birth to a child, B.C. filed a paternity action. The woman and her husband, who had since reconciled, argued that the presumption of paternity should apply because they were married at the time of the child's conception and remained married at the time of the paternity action.The lower courts held that the presumption did not apply due to the couple's multiple separations. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed this decision, finding that although temporary separations are a factor to consider in determining whether a marriage is intact, they are not dispositive. The court concluded that the couple's marriage was intact at the time of the paternity action and the presumption of paternity applied, effectively dismissing B.C.’s paternity action. View "B.C. v. C.P. & D.B." on Justia Law

In this case, a couple, Kelley L. and Richard L., sought to have Richard adopt Kelley's daughter, Kate S., without the consent of the child's biological father, Dustin S., alleging that Dustin had abandoned Kate. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the County Court's decision, which denied the adoption petition, holding that Dustin had not abandoned Kate. The Supreme Court found that, although Dustin could have done more to be involved in Kate's life and did not fully comply with court-ordered reunification therapy and child support payments, the evidence suggested that Kelley had hindered Dustin from having meaningful contact with Kate. Therefore, they found that Dustin had not demonstrated a "settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims" to Kate. The court also noted that the county court's reference to unresolved proceedings in the District Court did not constitute an error, as it simply acknowledged another potential route to adoption without Dustin's consent if his parental rights were subsequently terminated in those proceedings. View "In re Adoption of Kate S." on Justia Law

Patrick S. White appealed a judgment from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, which determined parental rights and responsibilities concerning his minor child with Darcy L. Howard. The main issue on appeal was whether the court erred by including the cost of White's employer-provided health insurance in his gross income when calculating his child support obligation. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with White that this inclusion was erroneous.The court explained that under Maine law, gross income for child support calculations includes in-kind payments received by a parent if they reduce the parent's personal living expenses. However, the court clarified that the burden is on the party seeking to include the value of such a benefit to prove that it actually reduces the other parent's personal living expenses and the amount of that reduction. In this case, Howard did not provide evidence showing that White's receipt of health insurance from his employer reduced his personal living expenses by the full cost of the insurance to his employer. The court concluded that it is the value to the employee, not the cost to the employer, that matters for purposes of determining gross income for child support calculations.As a result, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to recalculate White's child support obligation based on his gross income without the inclusion of his employer's cost of providing health insurance. View "Howard v. White" on Justia Law

In this case, Alden Satas, the petitioner, sought parenting rights for his ex-wife's biological child from a previous relationship. The couple, Satas and Courtney Crabtree-Satas, the respondent, had married when the child was about two and a half years old. They divorced in 2017 and Satas never adopted the child, but the child continued to live with him for some time after the divorce. In December 2020, Satas filed a petition seeking a parenting plan concerning the child. Crabtree-Satas moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Satas' status as the child's stepparent ended when the parties divorced. The trial court found that Satas had standing to request parenting rights and responsibilities.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to consider three questions in this case. The first question was whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas was the stepparent of the child, given that the definition of a stepparent implies a current marital relationship, and Satas and Crabtree-Satas had been divorced since 2017. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed that Satas is not a stepparent for the purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V because he was no longer married to the child's mother at the time he filed his petition for visitation privileges. The court thus found that the trial court had erred in ruling to the contrary.The second question asked whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas had standing to bring a petition for parenting rights and responsibilities on the basis that he had established an in loco parentis status with respect to the child. However, since the court had already found that Satas was not a stepparent, it did not need to address this question.The third question concerned whether the trial court violated the respondent's constitutional rights. However, the court did not need to answer this question as it had already resolved the appeal on statutory grounds.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petitioner's petition. View "In the Matter of Satas & Crabtree-Satas" on Justia Law

This case involves a minor, J.H., whose father is in jail and whose mother passed away when he was less than three years old. The child's maternal grandmother was appointed as his guardian. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to review an order by the Circuit Court, which prohibited the grandmother from testifying against the father's release from prison at any parole or similar hearings without first obtaining permission from the Circuit Court.The grandmother appealed this order, arguing that it violated her right to freedom of speech. The Circuit Court denied her motion, reasoning that J.H.'s best interests outweighed the grandmother's free speech rights.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Circuit Court's decision in part. The Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court exceeded its statutory authority by restricting the grandmother's ability to testify at the father's parole hearing. The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute, RSA chapter 463, and determined that while it does grant the Circuit Court the authority to limit or restrict the powers of a guardian or impose additional duties in the best interests of the minor, it does not permit the court to restrict the guardian from speaking at a parole hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that this restriction was unrelated to the grandmother's role as guardian and was therefore not within the scope of the court's authority. As a result, the case was remanded back to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of J.H." on Justia Law

In this case, Shaun T. Kobielusz appealed his convictions of three counts of voyeurism. Kobielusz contended that there was insufficient evidence of the element of “looking” for the jury to convict him of voyeurism, that the jury instruction given on the elements of voyeurism was improper, and that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress videos on a memory card given to law enforcement by his wife. The Supreme Court of Wyoming disagreed with Kobielusz's claims. They determined that the voyeurism statute does not require proof of “looking” at the captured images for a conviction. They also found that the jury instruction did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Lastly, they affirmed the district court's decision to deny Kobielusz's motion to suppress the videos, concluding that his wife had common authority over the memory cards and had the right to consent to their search. Therefore, the court affirmed Kobielusz's conviction. View "Kobielusz v. Wyoming" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the defendant, Laurie Cronan, challenged a divorce judgement entered by the general magistrate of the Family Court. She primarily disputed the magistrate's authority to preside over the contested divorce trial. Additionally, she disagreed with the magistrate's decisions regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the valuation of premarital assets, and the denial of her request for alimony.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the decision of the Family Court. The court found that the issue of the magistrate's authority could have been raised at the trial level but wasn't, hence it was waived on appeal. Regarding the distribution of marital assets, the court found that the general magistrate did not err in determining the value of the plaintiff's equity interest in his medical practice based on the binding shareholder agreement, rather than its fair market value. The court also upheld the general magistrate's decision to deny the defendant's request for alimony, finding that he properly considered all requisite statutory elements and that the defendant would be financially independent and self-sufficient without alimony. Lastly, the court found no error in the general magistrate's valuation of the plaintiff's premarital assets. View "Cronan v. Cronan" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded a juvenile court order that terminated the parental rights of T.W. to her children, J.C. and M.W. The children had been placed in foster care by the Ward County Human Services Zone due to child abuse by T.W. and A.W., and T.W. was sentenced to four years in custody after pleading guilty to three counts of child abuse. The State later filed a petition for termination of T.W.'s parental rights.The Supreme Court found that the juvenile court had abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of and considered evidence beyond the evidentiary record. The court also found that the juvenile court had made clearly erroneous findings, including incorrectly stating that the children had been in foster care for 1123 nights when they had actually been there for 877 nights. Although there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of T.W.'s parental rights, the court was unable to discern whether the juvenile court had relied on inadmissible evidence in its decision.As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the juvenile court to issue an order based only on the evidence received at trial. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and requested that the juvenile court issue its new order within 20 days. View "Interest of J.C." on Justia Law