Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a decision from the bankruptcy court in a case involving unpaid child support. The debtor, Justin Gary LaMonda, petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. He was married to Natalia LaMonda, and after they divorced, he was ordered to pay child support. The case has been converted multiple times, from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, and then back to Chapter 7 again. Natalia LaMonda filed an unsecured priority claim for unpaid child support, which the Chapter 7 Trustee objected to. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's objection, leading to this appeal.The Appellate Panel found that Natalia LaMonda's claim for unpaid child support arose after the order for relief and before the case was converted under section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to the Panel, her claim should therefore be treated as if it arose before the petition date, making it eligible for treatment as a priority unsecured claim. Thus, the Panel held that the bankruptcy court erred by disallowing Natalia LaMonda's claim based on the Trustee's objection. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "LaMonda v. Harder" on Justia Law

In a case involving the Department of Child and Family Services of the County of Los Angeles and individual social workers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mixed ruling. The case arose from the removal of two minor children from their parents' custody following an anonymous report that the parents were using medical marijuana to treat one child's severe autism. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment.The Circuit Court reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants on the parents' claim of judicial deception. The court concluded that the application submitted by the defendants in support of the warrant for removal contained misrepresentations and omissions and a reasonable trier of fact could find these misrepresentations material.The Circuit Court also reversed the district court's summary judgment for defendants on the parents' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and their Monell claim, which argued that the county had an unofficial policy of encouraging social workers to omit exculpatory information from warrant applications.However, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim concerning the social worker's interview of one child at her school, finding that the social worker was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no error in the district court's handling of a jury question during trial.The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the claims of judicial deception, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the Monell claim.The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. View "SCANLON V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Barni A., appealed against an order from the District Court in Lewiston, Maine, terminating her parental rights to her older child. The child was born prematurely with a genetic abnormality that led to several medical issues, including tumors on his brain, leading to seizures and affecting his executive functioning, vision, and visual processing. The child qualified for 24/7 private nursing care under Maine's Medicaid program, MaineCare, but never received it. Barni A. argued that the State of Maine's failure to provide the child with the required care resulted in the trial court erroneously finding her unfit because she could not address her child's complicated medical needs.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Barni A., stating that the trial court's findings did not address important issues that needed to be answered before determining whether the record supports a finding by clear and convincing evidence that she is unfit. The court noted that the child's right to full-time private nursing care under federal and state law had not been provided by the Department of Health and Human Services, and this failure affected the mother's ability to care for the child. The court further explained that while the mother had made significant progress in dealing with her personal challenges, her visitation time with the child was substantially limited, and she was never afforded the assistance necessary to care for her child.The court therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court, instructing it to consider whether the mother has an intellectual disability, whether the mother is or would be unfit regardless of the Department's failure to meet its MaineCare obligation regarding skilled nursing care, and whether there is an alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights that meets the best interest of the child. View "In re Child of Barni A." on Justia Law

In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a dispute between Heather Keep and Christopher Indorf regarding the division of real estate they owned jointly. Keep and Indorf were unmarried domestic partners who had one child together. They purchased a house in Saco together, with Indorf contributing the down payment and both parties being liable for the mortgage. When their relationship ended, Keep moved out and Indorf assumed sole responsibility for the house. Keep filed a complaint for equitable partition in 2019. During the litigation process, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement, which was placed on the record during a judicial settlement conference. The agreement stated that for the valuation and division of any expenses associated with the home, they would use the date of May 1st, when Indorf had fully assumed all responsibility for the residence.The District Court (Biddeford, Tice, J.) eventually entered a partition judgment, setting aside the partial settlement agreement and dividing the real estate. Indorf appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by setting aside the settlement agreement.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed with Indorf. It found that the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement, which the lower court could not simply disregard because it appeared unfair in light of subsequent events. The supreme court held that the agreement was ambiguous and remanded the case back to the District Court to determine the meaning of the agreement and to divide the property accordingly. The supreme court also dismissed Keep's cross-appeal as untimely. View "Keep v. Indorf" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, criminal mischief in the first degree, and threatening in the second degree, among other crimes. The defendant had unlawfully entered his brother's residence and caused significant damage within it. Upon appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had committed plain error by not identifying the specific crime or crimes he allegedly intended to commit when he entered the residence during the jury instruction on first-degree burglary.However, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had not committed plain error. The trial court's instruction accurately recited the elements of the burglary charge and clarified that the intent to commit a crime within the building is a distinct element. Furthermore, the court noted that although it is the better practice for trial courts to name the crime or crimes and define such elements in its instructions, it has never been clearly held to be mandatory.Additionally, the court found that even if there was a patent error in the court’s instruction, the omission did not result in a manifest injustice. The evidence presented at trial established that the defendant had violently forced his way into the residence and caused extensive damage, which satisfied the intent element. View "State v. Kyle A." on Justia Law

The case involves Petitioner Victoria Deschamps who sought a writ of supervisory control over the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, in Montana due to the court's denial of her request to waive court costs and fees for inability to pay. Deschamps filed a petition for dissolution with a proposed parenting plan in the District Court and also filed a Statement of Inability to Pay Court Costs and Fees, requesting waiver of the filing fee. However, the District Court denied her fee waiver stating that her statement was incomplete.Deschamps submitted another statement which was again denied by the District Court. She then moved the court for reconsideration of its denial, explaining that she had checked boxes on the form indicating that she received certain benefits and thus did not need to include additional information, as stated on the form. This motion was also denied.Deschamps petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in denying her request to waive court costs and fees. The Supreme Court held that the District Court erred as a matter of law by requiring Deschamps to provide information beyond that which the Department of Justice requires. The court concluded that the District Court was incorrect when it deemed Deschamps’s fee waiver application “incomplete” because she completed the form by checking the boxes for specific benefits and signing the declaration.The Supreme Court accepted and granted Deschamps' petition for a Writ of Supervisory Control and remanded the matter to the District Court for the purpose of granting Deschamps’ request for waiver of court costs and fees and allowing her case to proceed without payment of filing fee. View "Deschamps v. 21st Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three, the mother (B.S.) appealed the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over her child (R.M.) under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and (g), based on her and the father's incarceration.The parents were arrested on murder charges, and no prior arrangements had been made for the care of their minor child. The child was taken into protective custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The court exercised jurisdiction over the child because it believed the parents had not made plans for the child's care prior to their arrest.However, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the court's exercise of jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the parents' incarceration alone was not sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court stressed that the law does not require parents to make an appropriate advance plan for the child's ongoing care and supervision to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal found that the Department didn't prove that there was something more than the mere fact of the parents' incarceration to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court found that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that jurisdiction was appropriate. Therefore, the court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders were reversed. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

The appellant C.B., the biological father of minor A.K., appealed from the January 2023 order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights. The appellant argued that the juvenile court and the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) denied his due process rights to notice and an opportunity to participate in dependency proceedings to establish presumed father status. T.K., the minor’s mother (mother), joined in C.B.’s arguments. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed, finding that the juvenile court and the Agency did not comply with duties to try to identify all of the minor’s alleged fathers, to give adequate notice to C.B. that his parental rights were at stake in the proceedings, or to give C.B. notice of specific important hearings. Thus, it reversed the order terminating parental rights. The facts of the case reveal that when the minor was born, the Agency received a report that the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and sexually transmitted diseases. The mother did not inform C.B. about her pregnancy and initially identified D.C. as the alleged father of the minor. However, paternity testing later showed that D.C. was not the biological father, and C.B. was identified as the potential father. Despite this, C.B. was not given proper notice of the proceedings or properly informed about their importance, and his due process rights were violated. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed a lower court’s decision to terminate a biological father’s parental rights to his child. The father, Jack Mitchell, had consented to the child's guardianship by Rachel and Joshua Thayer, following the unexpected death of the child's mother. Six months later, the Thayers petitioned to terminate Mitchell’s parental rights on grounds of intentional abandonment. The Family Court granted their petition, finding clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and deciding termination was in the child’s best interests. However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence did not meet the high standard of clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment required to terminate Mitchell's parental rights. The court noted that Mitchell had expressed a desire for reunification with his child and had taken steps toward that goal. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Family Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding Mitchell's petition to rescind the Thayers' guardianship. View "Mitchell v. Thayer" on Justia Law

The case involves Adrian Lamont Brooks, who was found guilty of inflicting corporal injury on his domestic partner, R.J., and committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, Brooks argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that R.J. had invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because she was never called and sworn. He also asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to replace a juror who was allegedly biased. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The appellate court found that R.J. had validly asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege through her counsel and that the juror's potential bias did not warrant removal. The court also held that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding R.J.'s refusal to testify. View "People v. Brooks" on Justia Law