Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a legal dispute involving a man named Mitchel Wolfgram and a woman named Nadirah Davis-Perkins over the custody of a child, Genevieve, who Wolfgram helped raise but was later proven not to be the biological father. Wolfgram sought shared custody, arguing that it would be detrimental to the child's welfare to deny him custody. The Superior Court found him to be the child’s psychological parent but declined to consider his relationship with the child in its decision to award sole custody to the biological mother, Davis-Perkins.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska found that the Superior Court had erred in its application of the third-party custody framework by failing to consider the relationship between Wolfgram and Genevieve when determining whether it would be clearly detrimental to her to deny him custody. The Supreme Court made it clear that when a court finds that a third party qualifies as a psychological parent, it must consider evidence of the child’s relationship with the psychological parent when evaluating a custody claim.The Court therefore vacated the custody award given by the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to determine if Wolfgram had proven by clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to Genevieve to deny him any level of custody or visitation. The court was also instructed to consider evidence of Genevieve’s relationship with Wolfgram in addition to evidence of her relationship with Davis-Perkins in making its determination. View "Wolfgram v. Davis-Perkins" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the plaintiff, David Beavers, brought civil claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation against his ex-wife’s alleged lover, John McMican. The main issues revolved around the interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 52-13 which specifies that post-separation conduct cannot give rise to liability, and whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of McMican.The court determined that the Rodriguez v. Lemus decision, regarding what evidence is relevant to prove pre-separation conduct, was consistent with the legislative intent of N.C.G.S. § 52-13. The court held that evidence of post-separation conduct may be used to corroborate pre-separation conduct, as long as the pre-separation conduct gives rise to more than mere conjecture.However, the court found that the evidence of pre-separation conduct in this specific case did not rise above mere conjecture regarding the identity of Mrs. Beavers’ paramour. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. McMican. No sufficient evidence was presented to support the essential elements of Beavers’s claims against McMican, namely the sexual intercourse element of the criminal conversation claim, or the malice prong of the alienation of affection claim. View "Beavers v. McMican" on Justia Law

This case arises from a parental rights termination appeal in Texas. The father had been the primary caregiver for his three children, including one-year-old twins and a three-year-old daughter. However, the father tested positive for methamphetamine and the children were removed by the Department of Family and Protective Services due to the father's drug use and homelessness. Although the father initially complied with a service plan, which included drug testing and treatment, he eventually refused further treatment and missed subsequent drug tests. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the Department had failed to prove harm to the children as a direct result of their father's drug use.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of "endanger" in the context of illegal drug use. It held that a parent's endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to the child. Instead, endangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that exposes a child to loss or injury, or jeopardizes the child's physical or emotional well-being. The court argued that the father's pattern of drug use, coupled with his homelessness, employment instability, and almost complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding the trial, posed a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. Therefore, legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that the father's conduct endangered the children. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination. View "In re R.R.A." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of sisters Tierzah, Charis, and Elisa Mapson in connection with a shooting incident. The victims were Joshua Thornton, the father of Tierzah's daughter, and his wife. The government charged the sisters with interstate domestic violence, interstate stalking, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The jury found that the shooting was part of a scheme by the sisters to kill Mr. Thornton over a child custody dispute.In their appeal, the sisters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Charis also challenged the admission of testimony that she once owned a firearm, claiming it was prejudicial hearsay. Elisa and Charis contested the admissibility of data obtained from automated license plate readers (ALPRs), arguing that its acquisition constituted a warrantless search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. The court also rejected Charis's challenge to the hearsay evidence, ruling it was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court further concluded that the ALPR data was admissible because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and its introduction did not require expert testimony. View "United States v. Mapson" on Justia Law

In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG. View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law

Christine M. Nordgren's parental rights were terminated in a Minnesota state court. Instead of appealing this decision, she filed a federal lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hennepin County, and various other parties involved in her case, alleging a range of constitutional, federal, and state claims. She sought multiple forms of damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The district court dismissed all federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Nordgren then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court interpreted as a request to reconsider and amend her pleadings, and denied it. Nordgren appealed this decision.The Hennepin County defendants moved to dismiss Nordgren's appeal as untimely, arguing that she did not appeal the judgment in a timely manner and that the district court's order denying her motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable and did not extend the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with the defendants, determining that Nordgren's motion did not qualify as an appealable motion under Rule 59(e), which is designed to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence. As such, the appeal period began on the date the judgment was entered, and Nordgren's notice of appeal, filed beyond the 30-day appeal period, was untimely.Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Nordgren's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Nordgren v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

In the matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three, the defendant, W.K., appealed the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting his wife, N.M., and their daughter. The court was asked to consider whether a party who had already responded to a petition for a DVRO was entitled to a continuance of the hearing "as a matter of course" under Family Code, Section 245, subdivision (a).The court ruled that the trial court did not have a mandatory duty to grant a continuance under these circumstances and did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the hearing. The court found that W.K., having already responded to the petition, was not entitled to a continuance to allow him to respond to the petition. The court also concluded that denial of a continuance did not deprive the defendant of a fair hearing, as he had declared himself prepared to proceed at an earlier hearing and was aware at least four days before the DVRO hearing that the text message exchanges between himself and his wife would be at issue.N.M. had alleged several incidents of domestic abuse. The court found her testimony credible and W.K.'s explanations not credible, concluding that the text messages alone, which W.K. acknowledged he wrote, provided sufficient basis for the DVRO. The trial court issued a restraining order for three years, with N.M. retaining custody of their child and W.K. granted supervised visitation twice a week. The court rejected W.K.'s remaining challenges to the DVRO, denied N.M.'s request to dismiss the appeal, and denied both parties' requests for sanctions. View "N.M. v. W.K." on Justia Law

The case pertains to a marital dissolution dispute in Indiana where the husband's police pension constituted the majority of the couple's marital estate. The husband was reluctant to share his pension with his wife, expressing his intention to disregard any court order mandating him to do so. As a response, the trial court ordered the husband to secure and subsidize a life insurance policy to ensure the wife received her share of the marital estate. The husband challenged the trial court's authority, arguing that the court did not consider the tax implications of his future pension payments.The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision. It ruled that the trial court had broad statutory authority to order a security or other guarantee, such as a life insurance policy, when necessary, to secure the division of property. The court also held that the husband had waived his challenge regarding the tax consequences of his future pension payments.The facts of the case reveal that the husband and wife had been married for nearly twenty-six years. The husband's police pension had a market value of over $1.1 million, constituting over 85% of the marital estate. The husband was unwilling to share his pension with his wife, and the wife expressed concern that she might not receive anything. The trial court ordered the husband to make monthly payments and obtain a life insurance policy that named her as owner and beneficiary. The husband contested this order, leading to the appeal. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, maintaining that the court had the authority to secure the wife's share of the marital estate through a life insurance policy. View "Cooley v. Cooley" on Justia Law

This case involves a minor plaintiff, identified as S.W., who suffered severe injuries inflicted by her father's girlfriend. The State of Montana's Department of Public Health and Human Services was sued based on claims that it negligently failed to remove S.W. from her father's home prior to the injuries. The District Court ruled that the state's child abuse investigation was negligent and had led to S.W.'s injuries. A jury awarded S.W. over $16 million in damages.Several issues were raised on appeal, including whether the District Court was correct in deciding that the state's immunity provision did not cover the State, but only individual persons, whether the state was negligent as a matter of law, and whether the assault on S.W. was foreseeable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court was correct in its interpretation that the state's immunity provision did not extend to the State. However, the Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in its summary judgment that the State was negligent as a matter of law and that the assault on S.W. was foreseeable as a matter of law. The Court ruled that these issues contained material factual disputes that should be left to a jury. The Supreme Court also held that the District Court abused its discretion by imposing a disproportionate sanction on the State for spoliation of evidence. The judgment was reversed, the jury’s verdict was vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "S. W. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, F.K. (the Mother) filed a petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate her reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing regarding her daughter, A.R. The Mother contended that the Santa Barbara County Department of Child Welfare Services (the department) did not adequately consider her grief over the death of A.R.'s twin sister and did not provide reasonable reunification services. She also claimed that six months of services were insufficient.The Mother had a history of untreated alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and criminal convictions related to these issues. The juvenile court ordered her to receive reunification services after finding the dependency petition true and removing A.R. from her custody. The services aimed at addressing her substance abuse and its impact on her ability to safely parent A.R.The juvenile court decided to terminate the reunification services at the six-month review hearing after concluding that the Mother failed to make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan. The court reasoned that it did not have discretion to extend services unless the Mother showed substantial compliance with the case plan. The court also found that the department had made reasonable efforts to return A.R. to the Mother's custody by providing reasonable services.The Court of Appeal agreed with the Mother's contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating the reunification services. The court noted that, at the six-month review, the juvenile court had the discretion to continue the case and forego setting a hearing to terminate parental rights even if it did not find a substantial probability of the child returning to the parent. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not exercise its discretion because it incorrectly believed it was bound to terminate services due to the Mother's lack of substantial progress. The Court of Appeal ordered the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.21 hearing. View "F.K. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law