Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) issued in favor of a child's father (Jacob G.) against the child's mother (Savanah F.) following an incident of custodial interference that involved the mother taking the child from Alaska to Texas without the father's knowledge and in violation of a custody order. The father had sought attorney's fees, which were denied by the Superior Court without explanation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a person who successfully petitions for a DVPO is entitled to seek attorney’s fees from the respondent, and these can only be denied in exceptional circumstances. The Court held that neither of the arguments made by the mother in opposition to the fees - that her act of custodial interference was justified by the father’s substance abuse, and that she could not afford to pay the fees - constituted exceptional circumstances. The Court noted that the mother's argument fails to recognize the harm caused by custodial interference, and that her financial circumstances did not justify denial of the fees, given she had paid her own legal fees and had the ability to earn income. View "Jacob G. v. Savanah F." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the appellant, Joey Green-Remache, who was charged with interstate violation of a protective order, following a jury trial. Green-Remache was also charged with first-degree burglary and kidnapping, but the jury hung on these charges. He later pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary, and the Government dismissed the kidnapping charge. The charges were based on the Government's claim that Green-Remache broke into his on-again-off-again girlfriend's apartment and forcibly transported her from D.C. to Maryland, contrary to a civil protective order. At trial, the Government presented a Clinical Psychologist who testified about the characteristics of coercive control relationships between sexual partners. The appellant claimed that the jury was likely heavily influenced by this "opinion testimony," which he argues was not connected to the circumstances of this case. Therefore, he requested that the case be remanded to determine whether counsel's failure to object to the Psychologist's testimony constituted ineffective assistance that prejudiced him.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the appellant's request for a remand. The court held that the record conclusively demonstrated that the appellant was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged errors. The court noted that the Government introduced considerable evidence to support its theory that the appellant caused his girlfriend to travel with him to Maryland by force, coercion, duress, or fraud, apart from the Psychologist's testimony. This evidence included the girlfriend's grand jury testimony, recorded interviews, a 911 call, testimony from a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, and testimony from two eyewitnesses. The court concluded that this "overwhelming" evidence against the appellant undercut his claim that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "USA v. Green-Remache" on Justia Law

A mother appealed from juvenile court orders denying her petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The mother argued that the proceedings violated her substantive due process rights because the juvenile court was not required to consider her potential for further brain development, or her capacity to change, given her status as a teenager.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three affirmed the juvenile court orders. The court rejected the mother's arguments, concluding that sections 366.26 and 388 did not violate her due process rights. The court found that the focus of the proceedings shifted to permanence and stability for the child once reunification efforts failed. This shift did not violate the mother’s rights, even though she was a teenage parent. The court reasoned that the mother’s youth did not change or lessen the child’s need for permanence and stability.The court also dismissed the mother's reliance on cases concerning juvenile offenders in the criminal context, stating that the objectives and interests of the criminal justice system are vastly different from those of the juvenile dependency system. The court noted that the legislative choices to shift focus from reunification to permanency, require a parent to demonstrate changed circumstances, and prefer adoption as a permanent plan, were not intended to punish the parent, but to focus on the child's rights in proceedings where expediency is critical to the protection of their interests. View "In re S.G." on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the case involved a mother contesting the juvenile court's decision concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July 2019, A was made a ward of the court and placed in substitute care under the Department of Human Services (DHS). Despite DHS's efforts, the juvenile court determined that the mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A's safe return home.The mother argued that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard, asserting that she had made significant progress. The court, however, determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother's progress was inadequate for A’s safe return home.The court held that the juvenile court's "sufficient progress" determination is a legal conclusion rather than a factual finding. It concluded that the record developed in this case was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's legal conclusion that the mother's progress was insufficient to make possible A's safe return home. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B." on Justia Law

In this case heard by the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the appellant, Benjamin David Wilson, was charged with second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, following allegations involving his stepdaughter, K.P. The jury acquitted him of the second-degree charge but found him guilty of the third-degree charge. Wilson appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient for a conviction on the third-degree charge.The facts presented to the court included K.P.'s testimony that Wilson had inappropriately touched her during a family event. Wilson denied the allegations, providing an alternative account of the incident. Despite this, the jury found him guilty of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor, leading to a sentence of 10 to 15 years in prison.In response to Wilson's appeal, the court affirmed the conviction. It stated that the jury's acquittal on one charge did not necessarily impact the verdict on the other charge. The court indicated that each charge was treated as a separate indictment, and verdicts on multiple charges did not need to be consistent. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, affirming Wilson's conviction based on K.P.'s testimony. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming heard an appeal by Rodger William Dillard, who contested the termination of his parental rights to his three minor children. Dillard had initially adopted his grandchildren after their biological parents' rights were terminated. After Dillard's wife, who had custody of the children, passed away, allegations of sexual abuse were made against Dillard by two of the children. Dillard was then charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor.The Department of Family Services initially aimed to reunify the children with Dillard. However, after more than a year in the Department's custody, the plan was changed to adoption due to Dillard's lack of progress in meeting the requirements of his Family Service Case Plan. Dillard was eventually sentenced to concurrent sentences of three to five years for two counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Following this, the Department filed a petition to terminate Dillard's parental rights.The district court found that termination was in the best interest of the children, as Dillard was unfit to meet their ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs. Dillard appealed this decision, arguing that the Department had not made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children.However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decision to terminate Dillard's parental rights. The Court held that Dillard's incarceration due to his felony convictions for sexual abuse of a minor demonstrated his unfitness to have custody and control of the children. The Court therefore affirmed the termination of Dillard's parental rights under the provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iv), which allows for termination of parental rights if the parent is incarcerated due to a felony conviction and is shown to be unfit for custody and control of the child. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To: Mmd, Jid and Drd v. State, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a dispute between two Honduran nationals, Dennys Antonio Reyes Molina and Eny Adamy Mejia Rodriguez, over the wrongful removal of their daughter from Honduras to the United States by the father, Reyes. The mother, Rodriguez, petitioned for the child's return under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the United States in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). Reyes conceded wrongful removal, but argued that returning the child to Honduras would put her at grave risk of physical harm.The District Court found that Reyes had failed to prove such grave risk by clear and convincing evidence and ordered the child's return to Honduras. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court affirmed this decision. The court found that while Rodriguez had physically punished the child in the past, it was not "highly probable" that such punishment would continue upon the child's return to Honduras. The court also held that the injuries inflicted on the child by Rodriguez's past physical punishment did not indicate that the child would face a magnitude of physical harm that would allow the court to lawfully decline to return the child to Honduras.Reyes argued that the District Court erred by considering his actions in deciding the case. However, the Appeals Court concluded that the District Court did not rely on Reyes's actions in determining that he had not met his evidentiary burden. Therefore, the Appeals Court affirmed the District Court's decision to order the child's return to Honduras. View "Rodriguez v. Molina" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the conviction of John Ishmael Bradley, III, who was charged with second-degree assault and felony domestic assault for striking his girlfriend over the head with a broom handle. Bradley challenged his convictions, claiming the broom handle was not a dangerous weapon and that his two convictions for one assaultive act was improper.The court ruled that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the broom handle was a dangerous weapon. The court determined that an object is "likely to produce death or great bodily harm" if it is used in a manner where death or great bodily harm is a probable or reasonably expected result. Given the manner in which Bradley used the broom handle, the court found there was enough evidence to sustain this claim.The court also examined whether Bradley could be convicted of both second-degree assault and domestic assault for the same criminal act. The court rejected Bradley's argument that domestic assault is a "lesser degree" of second-degree assault. The court concluded that the term "degree" in the phrase "lesser degree of the same crime" in Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1(1), is an unambiguous technical term referring to offenses within an ordinal statutory scheme. Therefore, domestic assault is not a lesser degree of second-degree assault, and the court affirmed both convictions. View "State of Minnesota vs. Bradley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled in a case involving allegations of child sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic priest. The plaintiffs alleged that the abuse occurred between 1971 and 1979 when they were aged between eight and fourteen. The defendants argued that the claims were subject to the one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions under former La. Civ. Code art. 3536(1).While this case was pending, the legislature amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 to revive certain prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period. However, the court found that the statutory enactment was contrary to the due process protections enshrined in the Louisiana Constitution and must yield to that supreme law. The court reversed and vacated the trial court's decision to the extent it found the statutory enactment to be constitutional.The court determined that once liberative prescription accrues, it becomes an accrued, vested right. It noted that the right to plead prescription in defense to a claim on the obligation itself is "property that cannot be taken from [the defendant]." Hence, when a party acquires the right to plead the defense of accrued prescription, his right becomes a vested property right protected by constitutional due process guarantees.The court concluded that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the prescribed claims set forth under the facts alleged in this case. However, the court remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the exception anew after plaintiffs have had an opportunity to raise any additional arguments regarding contra non valentem and the timeliness of their claims. View "BIENVENU VS. DEFENDANT 1" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Tony Rogers, convicted of sexually assaulting his daughter, DAR, appealed his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rogers claimed his trial lawyer failed to move for in-camera review of DAR’s medical records, which he believed contained information about her mental health that could have impacted the credibility of her testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Rogers's claim, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Rogers then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. He contended that his trial counsel's failure to obtain DAR’s medical records or at least file a motion for in camera review violated his rights. The district court denied Rogers's petition, concluding that the state court decision did not contravene federal law and that the state court's application of the federal standard to Rogers's case was not unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. It found that Rogers's counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion for in camera review of DAR’s medical records. The court held that such a motion would have been meritless because Rogers could not make the preliminary showing of the records’ materiality required under state law. The court also found that Rogers's claim that he made a plausible showing for in camera review of DAR’s medical records was based on speculation and devoid of context. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Rogers v. Wells" on Justia Law