Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple with two children entered into a legal separation after signing a settlement agreement that addressed property division, child custody and support, and alimony. The agreement was incorporated into a legal separation decree by the District Court for Scotts Bluff County, which found the agreement fair and not unconscionable. The husband did not appeal this decree. Several months later, the wife filed for dissolution of marriage, and both parties again signed a settlement agreement, which referenced the prior separation decree as resolving all substantive issues. After the husband discovered an undisclosed retirement account, the parties agreed to modify the equalization payment to the wife, and the court approved this modification.The first dissolution decree was entered before the statutory 60-day waiting period had elapsed, rendering it void. The wife moved for a new dissolution decree, and the court entered an operative dissolution decree after the waiting period, incorporating the prior agreements and the modified equalization payment. The husband, now represented by counsel, sought to vacate both the separation and dissolution decrees, arguing the separation decree was void for lack of a required written certification that the parties would live separate and apart, and that the agreements were unconscionable. He also argued that the dissolution decree was barred by issue preclusion and that the settlement agreements should be set aside.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the absence of a written certification under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-361.01 was not a jurisdictional defect and did not render the separation decree void. The court further held that the separation decree was a final, appealable order, and because it was not timely appealed, its terms could not be collaterally attacked except under limited circumstances such as fraud or gross inequity, which were not present. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements and affirmed the judgment. View "Benda v. Sole" on Justia Law

A newborn child, A.R., was removed from her parents’ custody by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) due to neglect and abuse. Two relatives, a paternal aunt (Aunt Mary) and a maternal grandmother (Grandma Ericka), each sought to care for A.R. Initially, A.R. was placed with Aunt Mary, with Grandma Ericka’s cooperation, and later spent alternating weeks with each relative. After parental rights were terminated, both relatives sought to adopt A.R. DFS recommended placement with Aunt Mary, citing the child’s strong bond with her cousin in that household and the benefits of a “nuclear family” environment, though it acknowledged both homes were loving and appropriate.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada held evidentiary hearings and found that both Aunt Mary and Grandma Ericka were equally capable of providing for A.R.’s needs. The court ultimately placed A.R. with Aunt Mary, giving “due weight” to DFS’s recommendation, and incorporated a post-adoption contact agreement to ensure ongoing contact between A.R. and Grandma Ericka. The court clarified that while it considered DFS’s preference, it retained authority to override that recommendation if it was not in the child’s best interest.Grandma Ericka petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court improperly relied on DFS’s recommendation, failed to make sufficient findings, and prioritized a nuclear family contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. The court reaffirmed that, under Nevada law, the district court must consider but is not bound by the agency’s placement preference, and the child’s best interest remains paramount. The court found the district court’s written findings and process sufficient and consistent with applicable law. View "Destin v. District Court" on Justia Law

A child, B.M., was born to Cheryl Melius and Lakota Songer, who were no longer in a relationship at the time of birth. Cheryl initially had sole custody and did not inform Lakota of the birth immediately. After B.M. was diagnosed with failure to thrive, Cheryl voluntarily placed the child with her brother, Miles, and his wife, Tori (the Meliuses), who were later granted guardianship. Lakota established paternity and sought custody, but the Meliuses initiated a third-party custody action, leading to a combined proceeding. During the litigation, the Meliuses were granted temporary custody, and Lakota was given stepped-up visitation. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was found to apply after Lakota disclosed his tribal status.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Gregory County, South Dakota, held a trial and found that while the Meliuses had a significant relationship with B.M., they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances existed to rebut Lakota’s presumptive right to custody under SDCL 25-5-30. The court awarded Lakota sole custody but granted the Meliuses ongoing visitation and ordered Lakota to use a specific daycare provider. The court also assessed attorney fees against Lakota for his late disclosure of tribal status and for contempt related to violating court orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s finding that the Meliuses did not establish extraordinary circumstances to overcome Lakota’s parental rights and affirmed the denial of non-parent custody. The Supreme Court reversed the award of permanent visitation to the Meliuses, holding that such visitation cannot be granted absent a finding of extraordinary circumstances rebutting the parent’s rights. The Court also reversed the attorney fees related to the tribal status delay, finding the lower court erred in assigning responsibility to Lakota. The issue regarding the daycare provider was deemed moot. The case was remanded to determine attorney fees solely attributable to contempt. View "Melius v. Songer" on Justia Law

The case concerns two young siblings, E.H. and R.H., whose parents brought E.H., a three-week-old infant, to the hospital with a fractured arm. Medical examinations revealed multiple acute fractures on E.H.’s body, which doctors concluded were caused by nonaccidental trauma, likely from shaking or similar abuse. Both parents denied any knowledge of how the injuries occurred and provided no plausible explanation. They were E.H.’s sole caretakers, and there was no evidence that anyone else had access to the child. The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened, taking both E.H. and his older brother R.H. into custody.The District Court of New Hanover County adjudicated E.H. as abused and neglected and R.H. as neglected, finding that the parents’ inability to explain E.H.’s injuries and refusal to accept responsibility created an injurious environment for both children. The court found that, given the parents’ lack of accountability, there was a substantial risk of similar harm to R.H. The parents appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the adjudication for E.H. but, in a divided opinion, vacated the neglect adjudication for R.H., reasoning that the trial court relied solely on E.H.’s abuse without specific findings predictive of probable neglect for R.H. The majority remanded for further findings, while the dissent argued the trial court’s findings were sufficient.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding R.H. The Supreme Court held that when a child is severely abused and the parents cannot plausibly explain the injuries or assure that abuse will not recur, a trial court may find that other children in the home are at substantial risk and thus neglected. The Court also emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. The adjudication of R.H. as neglected was reinstated. View "In re E.H. & R.H." on Justia Law

A mother and father, after separating, entered into a consent order in 2017 granting them joint legal and physical custody of their two children, one of whom has a serious medical condition. The order required cooperation regarding the child’s medical care. In 2020, following ongoing disputes and allegations of contempt by the father, the parties agreed to a modified custody order that maintained joint custody but appointed a parenting coordinator to help manage escalating conflict, particularly regarding the children’s medical needs.Subsequently, the father repeatedly disagreed with the parenting coordinator’s decisions, refused to comply with directives about the children’s therapy and medication, and engaged in hostile conduct toward the coordinator. The mother moved to modify custody again, alleging the father’s actions endangered the children’s welfare. The District Court, Wake County, found that the father’s conduct—including failure to administer medication and interference with therapy—adversely affected the children’s health and welfare. The court issued temporary and then permanent orders granting the mother primary physical custody and final decision-making authority on major issues.The father appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate majority held that the findings did not support a conclusion of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children’s welfare, reasoning that the children were insulated from parental conflict.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that an escalating pattern of conflict and a parent’s unwillingness to communicate or cooperate regarding the children’s health, education, and welfare can constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of a custody order. The Court found the trial court’s findings supported both the existence of such a change and that modification was in the children’s best interests. The case was remanded to reinstate the trial court’s modified custody order. View "Durbin v. Durbin" on Justia Law

After the death of David Balandran in August 2021, his wife Felicia became the sole parent of their two young daughters. David’s parents, Juan and Cindy, had previously enjoyed regular contact with the children, both before and after David’s passing. Felicia continued to allow the grandparents to visit, though the frequency and scheduling of visits varied due to family circumstances, including therapy and illness. In July 2022, the grandparents sought a formalized visitation schedule, requesting overnight and weekday visits. Felicia opposed a court-ordered schedule, preferring to maintain flexibility and asserting her willingness to facilitate reasonable visitation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a trial on the grandparents’ petition under California Family Code section 3102. The court found Felicia to be a fit parent but granted the grandparents’ request for structured visitation, ordering visits on the first and third Sundays of each month and weekly Wednesday dinners. The court reasoned that the grandparents could provide unique insights and support related to the children’s deceased father. Felicia appealed, arguing that the order infringed on her constitutional rights as a fit parent.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. Applying the constitutional principles established in Troxel v. Granville and subsequent California decisions, the appellate court held that a fit parent who allows reasonable grandparent visitation is entitled to a presumption that her decisions are in the children’s best interests. The court found that the trial court failed to give “special weight” to Felicia’s preferences and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that her voluntary visitation schedule was detrimental to the children. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to deny the grandparents’ petition for court-ordered visitation. View "Balandran v. Balandran" on Justia Law

Roger Contreras and Nancy Bourke were involved in a marriage dissolution proceeding in Cochise County, Arizona, with a decree entered in 2011. The case saw extensive post-decree litigation. In February 2020, all Cochise County Superior Court judges, including Judge Timothy Dickerson, recused themselves from the matter without providing reasons on the record, and the case was reassigned to a Pima County judge. In 2021, Judge Dickerson became the presiding judge of Cochise County Superior Court and subsequently appointed Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore. In December 2022, Contreras moved to have Bourke declared a vexatious litigant, and Judge Dickerson, despite his prior recusal, ruled on the motion without explaining his re-entry or giving the parties an opportunity to object.Judge Dickerson designated Bourke a vexatious litigant. Bourke appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Bourke had waived any challenge to Judge Dickerson’s participation by failing to timely seek disqualification under relevant statutes and rules. The appellate majority did not address Bourke’s argument regarding Judge Dickerson’s appointment of Contreras as a justice of the peace pro tempore as a potential conflict, while the dissent argued that waiver should not apply under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that once a judge recuses from a case, the judge remains disqualified from further participation unless the judge articulates the reasons why recusal is no longer required and allows the parties an opportunity to object. The court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, reversed the superior court’s order declaring Bourke a vexatious litigant, and remanded for a different judge to rule on Contreras’ motion. View "CONTRERAS v BOURKE" on Justia Law

A divorce and child-custody case between two parents was initially filed in 2019 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, where a guardian ad litem was appointed for their minor children. The parents made partial payments toward the guardian ad litem’s fees, but a motion for payment of the remaining fees was pending when the mother requested, and the court granted, a dismissal of the case without prejudice. Shortly after, the parents refiled for divorce, and the guardian ad litem sought payment for services rendered in both the dismissed and refiled cases. The trial court ordered both parents to pay their respective shares of the outstanding fees.The father appealed the trial court’s order to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the court erred by ordering payment of fees incurred in the dismissed case. The appellate court initially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that such an order was interlocutory and not final or appealable. Upon reconsideration, however, the appellate court reversed its position, finding that under the specific circumstances, the order was final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) because it affected a substantial right in a special proceeding. The appellate court then vacated the trial court’s fee order.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that an interlocutory order requiring payment of guardian ad litem fees in an ongoing divorce and child-custody proceeding is not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B). The court reasoned that such orders do not, as a category, affect a substantial right requiring immediate appeal, and parties must wait for a final judgment before appealing. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, finding it lacked jurisdiction to review the fee order. View "E.A.K.M. v. M.A.M." on Justia Law

A married couple, who wed in 2020 and share a young child, purchased an engineering business together using loans secured by the wife’s premarital home. After their separation in 2023, the wife petitioned for divorce. The parties entered into interim agreements regarding custody, child support, and business management, but the husband repeatedly violated these orders by failing to make required payments, misusing business funds, and withholding financial disclosures. The wife raised concerns about the husband’s substance abuse and erratic behavior, providing evidence of his alcohol and marijuana use, as well as incidents of intoxication during child exchanges and at work. The husband denied these allegations but admitted to some problematic behavior in written communications.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, held multiple hearings, finding the husband in contempt several times for violating court orders. At trial, the court heard testimony and reviewed evidence regarding the husband’s parenting, financial conduct, and the parties’ competing proposals for the business. The court found the wife more credible, sanctioned the husband for discovery violations, and ultimately awarded her primary custody of the child, with the husband’s parenting time to be phased in only after he completed chemical dependency and mental health evaluations. The court also awarded the wife sole ownership of the business and her premarital home, requiring her to assume all related debts.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decisions. It held that the finding regarding the husband’s failure to make full financial disclosures was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court also found no abuse of discretion in conditioning the husband’s parenting time on completion of evaluations or in awarding the business to the wife, as these decisions were equitable and consistent with Montana law. View "In re Marriage of Boeshans" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married in 2016 and have one child together. After their separation in 2019, the mother experienced mental health issues, and in December 2020, the parents signed a marital settlement agreement granting the father sole legal and physical custody of their daughter, with the mother receiving visitation rights. This arrangement was formalized in a dissolution judgment in July 2021. In October 2021, the mother requested a change in custody, citing improved circumstances and alleging that the father had relocated, was not complying with court orders, and was restricting her contact with their child.The Superior Court of San Luis Obispo County held a three-day evidentiary hearing in November 2022. The trial court made detailed factual findings, including that the father was uncooperative, had violated court orders, denied visitation and communication, and was not credible. The court found the mother to be more capable of facilitating contact and noted her sobriety and efforts to co-parent. Based on these findings, the court ordered that the mother have sole physical custody of the child, while both parents would share joint legal custody. The father did not object to the tentative decision before judgment was entered in January 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the father forfeited his due process arguments by failing to raise them in the trial court and found that he was not denied due process, as he had notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court also rejected the father's claim regarding the separation of siblings, noting that two were stepsiblings and one was a half-sibling, and found no legal error. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s custody order and awarded costs to the mother. View "In re Marriage of R.K. & G.K." on Justia Law