Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A child, J.B., was born while both of his parents were incarcerated for the homicide of J.B.'s older sibling. The Department of Family Services (DFS) placed J.B. with Becky and Jay Whipple, friends of J.B.'s grandmother, who were not licensed foster parents at the time. The district court affirmed this placement, designating the Whipples as J.B.'s "fictive kin," a term referring to individuals who are not blood relatives but have a significant emotional and positive relationship with the child.Months later, after J.B.'s father's paternity was established, he requested that J.B. be placed with his own father, Miles Sr., in Illinois. The district court ordered J.B.'s placement with Miles Sr., asserting that blood relatives have a legal placement preference over fictive kin. The court made no factual findings related to J.B.'s best interest.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada granted a petition challenging the district court's decision. The Supreme Court clarified that the term "fictive kin" requires an evaluation of the relationship from the perspective of both the child and the adult. The court emphasized that placement decisions must be based on a child’s best interest. The court found that the district court had erred in asserting that blood relatives have a legal placement preference over fictive kin. The court also noted that the district court had abused its discretion by proceeding with a change in J.B.'s placement when J.B.'s counsel was absent. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order placing J.B. with Miles Sr. and ordered the case to be reassigned to a different judge for further proceedings. View "In re Matter of J.B." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, N.C.-F., who appealed a decision by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, regarding the placement of her children, M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3. The children's father had admitted to killing M.F.-3's mother, leading to an abuse and neglect case. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) placed M.F.-3 with his maternal aunt, S.M., while M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 remained in N.C.-F.'s physical custody, but their legal custody was with the DHS. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudicated M.F.-1, M.F.-2, and M.F.-3 as abused and neglected children based on the father's actions. The court terminated the father's parental rights and restored legal custody of M.F.-1 and M.F.-2 to N.C.-F. However, it denied N.C.-F.'s request for placement of M.F.-3 with her and his half-siblings, determining that maintaining M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. served his best interests.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the circuit court did not err in its rulings, including the decision to maintain M.F.-3’s placement with S.M. The court also found that the circuit court did not violate N.C.-F.'s constitutional due process rights by placing custody of her children with the DHS during the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court concluded that the circuit court's decision to place M.F.-3 with S.M. was in the child's best interest and that the court had properly facilitated regular visitation between M.F.-3 and his half-siblings. View "In Re M.F.-1" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Christopher P. (Father) and Amanda C. (Mother) over the custody of their two children. The Family Court of Upshur County was set to hold a final hearing on the matter, but a scheduling conflict arose for Mother's counsel, who was also due to appear in the Circuit Court of Webster County at the same time. Despite Mother's counsel notifying the courts of the conflict, the family court proceeded with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel. The family court then ruled that the children should primarily reside with Father.Mother appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the family court had wrongly failed to yield its hearing time to the circuit court. The ICA granted Mother a new custody hearing, but based its decision on the conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of West Virginia Code § 48-9-206. Father then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the ICA's decision in part, agreeing with the ICA that Mother is due a new hearing in family court, but disagreeing with the ICA's conclusion that the family court had applied the wrong version of the law. The Supreme Court found that the family court had abused its discretion by proceeding with the hearing in the absence of Mother and her counsel, and remanded the case back to the family court for a new hearing. View "Christopher P. v. Amanda C." on Justia Law

The case involves the paternal grandparents of a child, M.F. III, who sought to intervene in an abuse and neglect proceeding following the fatal stabbing of the child's mother by his father. The grandparents, who lived in Baltimore, Maryland, but had a second home in Charleston, West Virginia, filed three motions to intervene in the proceedings, seeking placement of the child and/or visitation rights. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied all three motions. The grandparents appealed, arguing that the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) failed to conduct a home study to determine their suitability as adoptive parents, as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3).The Circuit Court of Kanawha County had previously reviewed the case. The court denied the grandparents' motions to intervene in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The court also did not order the DHS to conduct a home study to assess the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents, despite the termination of the father's parental rights and the child's placement in the DHS's permanent custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the lower court's decision to deny the grandparents' motions to intervene, as they did not fall within the class of individuals who may seek permissive intervention under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(h). However, the court found that the DHS had failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) to consider the grandparents' suitability as adoptive parents. The court remanded the case with directions for the DHS to comply with the statute and for the circuit court to determine the child's best interests for permanent placement following the DHS's compliance. View "In Re M.F. III" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

Nicole Costin, individually and on behalf of her minor son, filed a lawsuit against Glens Falls Hospital and several of its staff members. Costin alleged that the hospital discriminated against her due to her substance-abuse disorder, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. She also raised state-law claims. Costin's allegations included the hospital conducting drug tests without informed consent, reporting her to the New York State Child Abuse and Maltreatment Register based on a false positive drug test, withholding pain relief, accelerating her labor without consent, and refusing to correct their actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Costin’s action, concluding that she failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against due to her disability. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court agreed with the lower court's dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the denial of an epidural, acceleration of labor, and treatment of her newborn. However, the court disagreed with the dismissal of Costin’s claims related to the hospital's instigation of a Child Protective Services investigation and its administration of a drug test. The court found that Costin had plausibly alleged that these actions were based on discriminatory policies, not medical decisions. The court also vacated the lower court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Costin’s state-law claims. View "Costin v. Glens Falls Hospital" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Andrew P. Sabatine (plaintiff) and Colleen K. Sabatine (defendant) over the modification of a temporary custody order. The couple had two children and lived together in Traverse City until September 2020 when the defendant moved with the children to Fenton. The defendant switched the children's primary-care doctors and school enrollments without the plaintiff's knowledge. In January 2021, the trial court granted the parties joint legal custody, with the defendant having primary physical custody and the plaintiff having parenting time every other weekend and two nonconsecutive weeks during the summer. The plaintiff sought to have the children returned to the Traverse City area.The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing, issued an order granting the parties joint legal custody, with the defendant having primary physical custody. The court determined that the children had established custodial environments with both parents and that the parenting-time order would not upset these environments. The court's decision was based on the circumstances that existed at the time of its decision. In March 2022, the trial court entered a judgment of divorce that incorporated this custody and parenting-time order. Both parties appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's analysis of the best-interest factors but reversed the trial court's holding that the custody order would not change the children's established custodial environments. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to reassess its decision using the proper standard. The defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court held that the question of whether a parenting-time provision modifies a child's established custodial environment should be answered based on the circumstances that exist at the time the trial court renders its custody decision. The court found that the Court of Appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial court's findings of fact and that the facts did not clearly preponderate against the trial court's factual findings that the parenting-time provision in the judgment of divorce did not alter the children's established custodial environments. The Supreme Court reversed part of the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sabatine v. Sabatine" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Sheena Hayes and Morgan Lawrence-Hayes, and Richard Penkoski. The dispute arose from Penkoski's social media posts, which the Hayes couple claimed were harassing and stalking. Penkoski, a public figure who identifies as a pastor, activist, and street preacher, posted content on Facebook criticizing the Hayes couple's church and their organization, Oklahomans for Equality. The Hayes couple, who are also public figures, claimed that they and their minor child were pictured in the posts, which they found offensive and threatening.The Hayes couple obtained a protective order against Penkoski from the District Court of Washington County. The court issued a permanent order of protection for five years, prohibiting Penkoski from posting any pictures, images, videos, or any likenesses of the Hayes couple or their minor child on any social media, making reference to them, or coming within 500 feet of them.Penkoski appealed the decision, arguing that his actions did not meet the requirements of stalking or harassment as defined by the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, and that his posts were protected by his constitutional right to free speech.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Penkoski's actions were not directed toward an individual person, but rather were public Facebook posts that named two organizations, not individuals. The court concluded that Penkoski did not direct his posts or comments toward the Hayes couple, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the order of protection. The court vacated the order of protection. View "Hayes v. Penkoski" on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

The case involves Elsy and Isai Diaz-Hernandez, siblings from El Salvador who illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. They claimed that they had suffered harm or fear of harm in El Salvador from their maternal uncle, who abused them to avenge his earlier deportation from the United States, for which he blamed their mother. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that revenge was not a central reason for the uncle’s abuse of Elsy and Isai but at most a “tangential reason.” The IJ concluded that Elsy and Isai failed to establish the required nexus between their harm and a protected ground and therefore the requirements for either asylum or withholding of removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. The BIA rejected the petitioners’ argument that the evidence showed that their relationship to their mother was “at least one central reason” for the uncle’s abusive behavior against them. The BIA noted that the IJ’s finding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the necessary nexus between the harm and a protected ground was “a classic factual question,” and after reviewing the facts, concluded that the IJ did not clearly err.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that the petitioners failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm they feared and their family tie. The court also rejected their argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard for assessing whether they met their burden to prove the required nexus with respect to their withholding of removal claims. View "Diaz-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law