Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Tristan Tanner, an employee of Stryker Corporation of Michigan, who appealed against the district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Stryker. Tanner had filed claims for interference with his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and for retaliation for his exercise of those rights. Tanner had requested paternity leave for the birth of his child and had taken time off work before the birth of his child, during which he accrued "occurrence points" under Stryker's attendance policy. He was terminated after accruing more than the allowed number of points.The district court had granted summary judgment in favor of Stryker, finding that Tanner was not entitled to FMLA leave for his absences before his child's birth. The court also found that Stryker had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Tanner, namely his accrual of eight occurrence points due to repeated unexcused absences.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the days Tanner spent in Connecticut waiting for his child to be born were not covered under FMLA. The court also found that Tanner had not provided evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stryker's reason for his termination was pretextual. Therefore, the court concluded that summary judgment in Stryker's favor was appropriate for both Tanner's FMLA retaliation and interference claims. View "Tanner v. Stryker Corporation of Michigan" on Justia Law

The case involves Wesley Castle's petition to adopt his stepchildren, I.V.E., C.A.E., and L.A.E. The children's biological father and ex-husband of Wesley's wife, Isaac Ellsaesser, objected to the petition, arguing that he does not consent to the adoption and that his consent cannot be waived under SDCL 25-6-4. The children's mother, Frances, had previously divorced Isaac due to a toxic and abusive relationship. Isaac had struggled with alcohol addiction and had faced domestic abuse charges. After the divorce, Isaac completed treatment for his addiction and attempted to reestablish a relationship with his children.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Lawrence County, South Dakota, held an evidentiary hearing on whether Isaac’s consent could be waived. The court determined that Wesley did not prove any of the statutory grounds for waiver by clear and convincing evidence. The court entered an order denying Wesley’s petition, and Wesley appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Wesley failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Isaac had substantially and continuously neglected his children or willfully neglected to pay child support. The court noted that Isaac had made several concerted efforts to reestablish a parental relationship with his children and had begun making child support payments after determining the amount he owed in arrears and how to pay. The court concluded that Isaac's failure to pay child support could not be considered willful under the circumstances. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of I.V.E." on Justia Law

The case involves Mariya Stephens and Kevin Lee, who were married in 2017 and have a child together. After their divorce in 2020, Stephens was granted primary residential responsibility of their child, with Lee receiving parenting time. The divorce judgment stated that if Stephens had a permanent change of duty station, the child would relocate with her. In 2021, Stephens married Charles Stephens and they had two children together. In 2022, the Stephens family contracted to build a home in Virginia and informed Lee of their plans to relocate. Stephens believed she had Lee's consent to relocate either under the divorce judgment or his text messages and emails. In April 2023, Stephens filed a motion for relocation and relocated before the district court could act on the motion.Lee objected to Stephens's relocation and requested the district court to deny her motion to relocate to Virginia. He also moved to amend the divorce judgment to give him primary residential responsibility for their child and filed a motion for contempt due to Stephens's alleged violations of the judgment. In May 2023, the district court required the Stephens family to return to North Dakota with their child. In October 2023, the district court denied Stephens's motion to relocate, awarded Lee primary residential responsibility, and granted his motion to amend the judgment.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Stephens argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to relocate. She claimed that she did not need Lee's consent due to language in the divorce judgment and, alternatively, that Lee consented to the relocation through text messages and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the divorce judgment did not provide Stephens with Lee's consent for her to move their child out of state, and did not err by denying her motion and by granting Lee's motion to change primary residential responsibility. View "Stephens v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over primary residential responsibility for two minor children between Casey Kubal and Kari Anderson. The couple lived together in North Dakota, but Anderson moved to South Dakota with the children in March 2022. In April 2022, Anderson initiated litigation in South Dakota to establish primary residential responsibility. In August 2023, Kubal served Anderson with a summons and complaint in North Dakota, which were filed with the district court in October 2023. Anderson moved to dismiss the case, arguing that North Dakota was an inconvenient forum as she had already commenced litigation in South Dakota and the children continued to reside there.The District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because North Dakota was not the children's home state when Kubal commenced the case. The court also ruled that even if it had jurisdiction, North Dakota would be an inconvenient forum. The court made its decision based on the pleadings and motion papers, noting that the parties failed to provide information regarding the South Dakota proceeding.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the record was inadequate to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under the UCCJEA. The court noted that the district court did not address the three other grounds for jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and that the nature of the rulings in South Dakota and the status of those proceedings were necessary to determine whether the district court has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that granting Anderson's motion to dismiss without understanding what has occurred in the South Dakota proceeding was contrary to the purpose of the UCCJEA. View "Kubal v. Anderson" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding between Maria Del Carmen Rendon Quijada and Julian Javier Pimienta Dominguez. The couple, originally from Mexico, moved to the U.S. in 2007. Pimienta held a TN visa, allowing him to work temporarily in the U.S., while Rendon held a TD visa, reserved for spouses and minor children of TN visa holders. Rendon's TD visa expired in March 2020, and she began seeking lawful permanent resident status in December 2020. In May 2022, Rendon filed for divorce in Arizona. Pimienta argued that Rendon could not establish domicile in Arizona due to her expired TD visa, which precludes her from intending to remain in the state indefinitely. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that Rendon's TD visa did not prevent her from establishing a U.S. domicile, as she had begun seeking lawful permanent resident status. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not preempt Arizona jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding.The Supreme Court of Arizona disagreed with the lower courts' focus on federal immigration law. It held that the question was not whether federal immigration law divested Arizona courts of jurisdiction over a divorce sought by an expired TD visa holder, but whether the visa holder could meet the domicile requirements under Arizona law. The court concluded that federal immigration law did not prevent Rendon from establishing domicile in Arizona, and thus, the state courts had jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, reversed the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF QUIJADA/DOMINGUEZ" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the eligibility of a married individual, Costa Tingos, for Medicaid long-term care benefits. Costa and his wife, Mary, had been married for over 50 years, but had kept their finances largely separate due to Costa's history of gambling and financial mismanagement. When Costa moved into a nursing home, he applied for Medicaid benefits. However, Mary refused to provide information about her income and assets, which was necessary to determine Costa's eligibility. Costa argued that Mary's refusal to cooperate should not affect his eligibility.The case was initially heard by the Massachusetts Medicaid program, MassHealth, which denied Costa's application. Costa appealed to the MassHealth board of hearings, which also denied his appeal. Costa then sought judicial review in the Superior Court, which vacated the board's decision and remanded the case back to the board. After two more rounds of hearings and appeals, the Superior Court affirmed the board's decision to deny Costa's application.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The court held that the board's interpretation of the phrase "refuses to cooperate" in the relevant regulation was reasonable. The court found that Mary's refusal to disclose her financial information did not constitute a refusal to cooperate within the meaning of the regulation, given the couple's long history of cooperation in other aspects of their marriage. The court also rejected Costa's argument that the board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Freiner v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

This case involves a divorce dispute between Randall Thomas Bailey and Sara Elizabeth Bailey, now known as Ms. Larson. The couple married in 2005 and have three minor children. Ms. Larson filed for divorce in December 2022. The main issues in the case revolve around the district court's decisions on child custody, child support, and property division.The district court granted joint legal custody of the children, with the children's primary residence set with Ms. Larson. The court also calculated child support, imputing income to Mr. Bailey, and divided the couple's property, which was valued at approximately $2.2 million. The division required an equalization payment of $475,000 from Mr. Bailey to Ms. Larson.Mr. Bailey appealed the district court's decisions, arguing that the court abused its discretion in determining custody, calculating child support, and dividing the parties' property. He also contested the valuation of his gun collection, the valuation of accounts at the date of separation, and whether two properties in South Carolina should have been included in the marital estate.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues of custody, child support, and property division. The court also found that the evidence presented supported the district court's findings and conclusions, and that the property division was not so unfair or unreasonable as to shock the conscience. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Damon Graham and Isiwat Adekoya over the primary parental rights and responsibilities (PRR) and parent-child contact (PCC) schedule for their child. The couple met in February 2021 and had a child in October 2021. After a strained relationship and a series of altercations, Adekoya moved to Texas with the child. Graham filed a parentage complaint in February 2022, and the parties agreed to a temporary PCC schedule of alternating two-week increments. The family court approved this arrangement. However, Graham appealed the family court's decision, arguing that it allowed Adekoya to control his PCC time with the child and that the provision requiring renegotiation of PCC as the child reached school age was premised on Adekoya's decision to enroll the child in preschool.The family court had awarded Adekoya primary PRR and set forth a PCC schedule. It found that the alternating biweekly schedule was in the child's best interests but recognized that maintaining this schedule indefinitely was not feasible due to the considerable physical distance separating the parents. The court ordered that the current PCC schedule would continue until the child entered preschool, at which point the schedule would automatically change. Graham argued that this decision gave Adekoya unilateral control over when the change in PCC would occur.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family court's decision. It found that the family court did not suggest that Adekoya could dictate how Graham spends his PCC time with the child or control the child's daily routine or Graham's choice of childcare. The court also found that the family court had an evidentiary basis to conclude that the child's entrance to a certified preschool program was a proper future point for the parties to reconsider the PCC schedule. The court disagreed with Graham's claim that the family court improperly ruled on a future PCC schedule, stating that the language of the PCC order expressly left that task to a future court should the parties fail to agree on a PCC arrangement once the child is in preschool, turns four years old, or alternatively, enters kindergarten. View "Graham v. Adekoya" on Justia Law

Arious Turner, the biological mother of a four-year-old girl (AT), was convicted of kidnapping her daughter. In June 2019, the Bolivar County chancery court had awarded Turner’s former step-mother, Sharetha Kimber, primary physical custody of AT, granting Turner limited visitation rights. In September 2020, Turner failed to return AT to Kimber after the court-ordered visitation period, and AT's whereabouts were unknown for forty-four days. U.S. Marshals located AT in Greenwood, Mississippi, with the help of an informant.The case was initially tried in the Bolivar County Circuit Court, where Turner was indicted for felony kidnapping under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-53. Turner sought a directed verdict after the State rested its case, but the trial judge denied her motion. After deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial judge sentenced Turner to a term of one year in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, suspended Turner’s incarceration, and reduced her sentence to one year of nonreporting probation. Turner filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial, which were denied.The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. The main issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Turner of kidnapping. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that a rational juror could reasonably find each element of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. The court rejected Turner's argument that the legislature did not intend for Section 97-3-53 to apply to her because she is AT’s natural parent, citing a precedent that a natural parent may be criminally liable for kidnapping their own child when a court decree denies them custody. View "Turner v. State" on Justia Law