Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a personal injury claim and the question of whether an adult child can claim loss of parental consortium when the parent has not died but has entered a persistent vegetative state and will not recover. The plaintiffs, including the adult child of the individual now in a persistent vegetative state, argued that a previous case, Masaki v. General Motors Co., allowed for a parent to recover damages for the loss of filial consortium of an injured adult child, and that this should extend to an adult child's claim for loss of parental consortium. The defendants, a group of healthcare providers, argued that a previous case, Halberg v. Young, held that no action exists in favor of a child for injuries sustained by the parent not resulting in the parent’s death.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the reasoning of Masaki would apply to the loss of parental consortium presented in this case. The court also found that the Halberg case was distinguishable factually from the current case, as it involved a parent who would recover from their injuries, unlike the parent in the current case who was in a persistent vegetative state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i affirmed the lower court's decision, overruling Halberg to the extent that it held that a child cannot claim loss of parental consortium where a parent is severely injured but not killed. The court held that a child, whether a minor or an adult, may bring a loss of parental consortium claim for severe injury to a parent. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "HELG Administration Services, LLC v. Department of Health" on Justia Law

The case involves Ling Mueller and Paul Mueller, a married couple who separated in 2017. During their marriage, they cultivated cannabis and buried the proceeds on their property. They initially attempted to use a collaborative law process to dissolve their marriage. They signed an agreement that outlined the collaborative process, including a confidentiality clause. However, the agreement also explicitly stated that it did not create any legally enforceable rights or obligations. During the second collaborative session, Ling became angry and left the meeting abruptly when asked about investments she had made using the proceeds from the couple's marijuana operation. She subsequently initiated divorce proceedings in family court.In the family court, Paul subpoenaed both parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about statements Ling made during the second collaborative session. Ling argued that the confidentiality clause in the agreement shielded her statements from disclosure. However, the court found the agreement, including the confidentiality clause, to be unenforceable. It also found that Ling had waived the confidentiality provision. As a result, it allowed the parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about the second collaborative session. The court found Ling to be not credible and ordered her to make a $161,077 equalizing payment.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five, the sole issue on appeal was the admissibility of testimony about the second collaborative session. This depended on whether the confidentiality clause was enforceable despite the agreement's multiple statements that it created no enforceable rights or obligations. The court found that the agreement unequivocally stated that it did not give either party enforceable legal rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the family court's decision that the confidentiality clause was unenforceable. View "Mueller v. Mueller" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Kevin Rawlings (Father) and Michelle Rawlings (Mother) who separated in 2015. The main point of contention was the primary physical custody of their two children. The district court referred the case to a domestic relations hearing officer who recommended joint legal custody and primary residence with the Father in New Mexico. Mother objected to over forty points in the hearing officer's recommendations and requested a hearing with the district court. The district court did not hold an in-person hearing but adopted the hearing officer's recommendations in its final decree of dissolution of marriage.The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, arguing that Rule 1-053.2 (2017) required an in-person hearing and that the district court did not adequately address Mother's objections. The Court of Appeals also held that the district court failed to establish the basis for its decision.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Rule 1-053.2 (2017). The Supreme Court held that the rule does not require an in-person hearing. The court also concluded that the district court provided a reasoned basis for its decision when it independently reviewed the record and adopted the hearing officer's recommendations in the final order. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the district court had jurisdiction to clarify the record and amend the final decree while the case was on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Rawlings v. Rawlings" on Justia Law

The case involves Sandi Taylor and Mary Taylor, a mother and daughter duo who operated a licensed daycare in Portales, New Mexico. In July 2017, they transported twelve children to a nearby park for lunch and playtime. Upon returning to the daycare, they failed to notice that two children, less than two years old, were still in the vehicle. The children were left in the vehicle for over two-and-a-half hours, resulting in one child's death and severe neurological injuries to the other due to heat exposure. The State charged each defendant with reckless child abuse by endangerment resulting in death and great bodily harm, both first-degree felonies.The case was initially tried in the district court, where the jury convicted each defendant of reckless child abuse resulting in death and great bodily harm. Each defendant was sentenced to eighteen years for each count, totaling thirty-six years each. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a precedential opinion.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico. The court found that the jury instructions used at the defendants' joint trial were confusing and misdirected due to the use of an inappropriate conjunctive term in the complex, essential-elements instructions. The court held that the misuse of the term "and/or" in the jury instructions required the reversal of the defendants' reckless child abuse convictions. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to permit a retrial without violating the defendants' right to be free from double jeopardy. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over child support between the biological father and the paramour of the child's deceased mother. The biological parents of the child never married, and the mother began a romantic relationship with the paramour while she was pregnant. After the mother's death, the child moved in with the biological father. The paramour, who had been living with the mother and child, filed a complaint for partial physical custody, claiming he stood in loco parentis to the child. The court granted him partial physical custody but no legal custody rights. The biological father then filed a complaint seeking child support payments from the paramour.The trial court dismissed the father's support action, holding that under the precedent set by A.S. v. I.S., the paramour had no obligation to support the child. The Superior Court reversed, holding that the paramour's actions represented a proactive pursuit to assume parental duties of the child that would otherwise belong to the father, and therefore, he had an obligation to support the child.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that the paramour is not a "parent" obligated to pay child support. The court held that the paramour does not fit into the class of third-parties obligated to pay support pursuant to the rule announced in A.S. because he does not have legal custody of the child. He has partial physical custody only, which is akin to the visitation rights obtained by the former stepfather in Drawbaugh. The court emphasized that the policy consideration in this case is that expressed in McNutt and Drawbaugh: acts of generosity should not be discouraged by creating a law which would require anyone who begins such a relationship to continue financial support until the child is eighteen years old. View "Caldwell v. Jaurigue" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, J.C. (Jan), who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with psychotic features. The New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) became involved with Jan and her family in 2018 when she was involuntarily hospitalized for manic and paranoid behavior. The Division implemented a safety plan that mandated temporary supervision of Jan’s contact with her children. After a series of referrals and investigations, the Division filed a complaint in 2020, and the Family Part granted the Division care and supervision of the children. In 2021, the Law Guardian sought to dismiss the Title 30 action due to Jan’s lack of cooperation with the Division. The court discontinued the Division’s care and supervision of the children but dismissed the litigation with restraints, considering Jan's mental health issues.The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. The Appellate Division held that the family court could dismiss a Title 30 action while maintaining restraints on a parent’s conduct. The court reasoned that the family court did not enter permanent restraints but continued the restraints that existed during the litigation.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the family court does not have the authority under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 to dismiss a Title 30 action and continue restraints on a parent’s conduct. If the family court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to continue the restraints on a parent’s conduct, it must keep the case open to facilitate judicial oversight of the Division’s continued involvement, while safeguarding a parent’s right to counsel. The case was remanded to the Family Part to reinstate the Title 30 action or dismiss the case without restraints. View "New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. J.C. and K.C." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Darren Findling, a professional guardian, and Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Findling was appointed as the guardian for two individuals, Mary Ann Malloy and Dana Jenkins, who were incapacitated due to automobile accidents. Findling, along with employees of his law firm, provided various guardianship services to Malloy and Jenkins, and sought reimbursement from Auto-Owners for these services under the no-fault act. Auto-Owners declined to reimburse for the services performed by the employees of Findling’s law firm, arguing that the services were not lawfully rendered.The Oakland County Probate Court granted Findling’s motions for partial summary disposition, ruling in favor of Findling. Auto-Owners appealed, but the Court of Appeals initially denied the appeal. The Supreme Court then remanded the cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a guardian is only required to comply with certain statutory provisions to lawfully delegate guardianship powers, but not duties, to employees.The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a unanimous opinion, held that a professional guardian cannot, without executing a power of attorney complying with certain statutory provisions, lawfully delegate to employees their final decision-making authority over a guardianship “power” that is explicitly listed in the statute or over any guardianship task that alters or impairs the incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations. However, a professional guardian may lawfully have employees assist in exercising a guardianship power and may have employees perform any other guardianship task on behalf of the professional guardian. The Supreme Court vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "In Re Guardianship Of Mary Ann Malloy" on Justia Law

The case involves Christopher Vargas Zayas, who was convicted for malice murder and a related crime in connection with the shooting death of his girlfriend, Carly Andrews. The shooting occurred in September 2018, and Zayas was indicted for multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, family violence, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Zayas was found guilty on all five counts and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.Zayas appealed his convictions, arguing that the circumstantial evidence at trial was insufficient to exclude the alternative hypothesis that the pistol discharged accidentally as Andrews grabbed it. He also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress statements he made to investigators at the police station before he received Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circumstantial evidence authorized the jury to reject Zayas's alternative hypothesis as unreasonable, that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to seek to suppress Zayas's statements, and that Zayas suffered no prejudice from any instructional error. View "ZAYAS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case involves an appellant, G.G., who sought renewal of a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former partner, G.S. The original DVRO was issued based on stalking. The appellant and respondent were former romantic partners and parents of two young children. The appellant testified that the respondent had repeatedly attempted to control her during their relationship, including planting a listening device in their home, taking her phone, and following her to work. After the relationship ended, the respondent continued to stalk the appellant, appearing at her home uninvited at least 70 times. The appellant filed a request for a DVRO, which was granted for a two-year period.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially issued the DVRO. After the DVRO was issued, the appellant's unwanted contact with the respondent was reduced, but not entirely eliminated. The appellant filed a request to renew the DVRO two weeks before its expiration, asking that the order be made permanent. The trial court found no evidence that the respondent had intentionally violated the DVRO and concluded that the appellant's fear, while genuine, was not reasonable. The request to renew the DVRO was denied.The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Four. The court found that the trial court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying the renewal of the DVRO. The court held that a DVRO can be renewed based on the original facts, regardless of whether they involved physical or non-physical abuse, and renewal is not conditioned on the presence or absence of "ongoing" events. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing, directing the trial court to reconsider the request for renewal consistent with the legal framework outlined in the decision. View "G.G. v. G.S." on Justia Law