Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A couple, married in 2001, had three children and lived in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The husband worked in his family's steel business and later managed his own company, while the wife initially stayed home with the children and later took over her father's consulting firm. They separated in October 2020, with the husband moving to Colorado and the wife staying in the marital home with the children. The wife filed for divorce in September 2021, and the husband counterclaimed. By May 2022, their eldest child turned 18, and by July 2022, their middle child began living with the husband.The District Court of Laramie County held a two-day bench trial in January 2024. The court granted the divorce, awarded shared legal custody of the children, and split physical custody. The husband was ordered to pay $67.79 in monthly child support. The court divided the marital property, valuing the husband's business interests and awarding the marital home to the wife, along with all associated debts. The husband was ordered to pay the wife $400,000 to achieve an equitable distribution of assets. The wife appealed, challenging the denial of retroactive child support and the valuation of the marital home.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying retroactive child support, noting that both parties had jointly provided for the children's needs during the separation. The court also upheld the district court's valuation of the marital home, affirming that the mortgage was accounted for in the property division. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Christopher Shelton, Vicky Costa, and Todd Costa appealed two orders from the First Judicial District Court dismissing their claims against the State of Montana, Susan Ridgeway, and Axilon Law Group. The case arose from the adoption of L.S., Shelton's biological child, by a Utah couple. Melissa Surbrugg, L.S.'s biological mother, arranged the adoption before L.S. was born. After L.S.'s birth, Surbrugg and L.S. tested positive for drugs, leading to a report to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS). Surbrugg relinquished her parental rights, and the adoptive parents took temporary custody of L.S. The Utah court later terminated Shelton's parental rights and finalized the adoption.The District Court dismissed the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, ruling that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs as they represented Surbrugg, not the plaintiffs. The court also granted summary judgment to the State, finding that the Utah courts had already determined that Montana complied with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), thus precluding the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the claims against Ridgeway and Axilon, agreeing that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the summary judgment in favor of the State, applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It concluded that the Utah courts had already decided the issue of ICPC compliance, and the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue in Utah. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim, as the alleged misrepresentation related to a future event, not a past or existing fact. View "Shelton v. State" on Justia Law

Cynthia Maldonado and Martha Amaro, who lived on both sides of the Oklahoma-Kansas border and in Mexico, appealed a trial court's order that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over a juvenile deprived proceeding under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The trial court found that Maldonado's child, L.A., had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the commencement of the proceeding, making Oklahoma the child's home state. The court also adjudicated the children deprived as to Maldonado.The Texas County District Court of Oklahoma ordered that N.A. and L.A. be taken into emergency custody by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (OKDHS) after Maldonado and N.A. tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Maldonado filed a motion arguing that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, claiming that Mexico and Kansas were the children's home states. The State argued that Oklahoma had jurisdiction under the Oklahoma Children's Code. The trial court found that L.A. had lived in Oklahoma for six months before the proceeding and adjudicated the children deprived.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's findings. The court held that the Oklahoma district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile deprived proceeding and that the UCCJEA applied to such proceedings. The court found that the trial court's determination that L.A. had resided in Oklahoma for six months preceding the proceeding was not clearly erroneous. The court also affirmed the trial court's order adjudicating the children deprived as to Maldonado, finding competent evidence to support the order. The appeal was not considered moot due to ongoing collateral consequences. View "IN RE: N.A.; STATE OF OKLAHOMA vs MALDONADO" on Justia Law

H.B., III, a minor, needed a guardian after his father's death. He temporarily lived with his mother, Lasandra K., on the streets of Las Vegas before moving in with his uncle, Marques B. Marques petitioned the district court to be appointed as H.B.'s guardian, disclosing his felony conviction for attempted murder. The district court ordered a criminal background check, which confirmed the conviction. During the hearing, H.B.'s paternal grandmother supported Marques's petition, and Marques claimed Lasandra also supported it via text messages.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, denied the petition, concluding that Marques's felony conviction automatically disqualified him from serving as a guardian. Additionally, the court found that Marques failed to serve the petition and citation on all required relatives and interested parties, and did not meet the notice requirements or allege facts to support a waiver of notice. The petition was denied with prejudice, and the matter was closed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a felony conviction does not automatically disqualify a potential guardian under NRS 159A.061(3). The statute requires the district court to consider various factors, including a felony conviction, but no single factor is dispositive. The district court erred by not considering all relevant factors. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition based on Marques's failure to properly effectuate service. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, and the district court was instructed to amend its order accordingly. View "IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF H.B. III" on Justia Law

Hub Alan Freeman and Rod Alan Freeman were domestic partners and then spouses for over 15 years before separating. After their marital dissolution trial, the family court ordered Hub to pay Rod $2,100 a month in permanent spousal support. The court also determined that the community had a 60.2 percent interest in a rental property that Hub had purchased prior to their domestic partnership. The court found Rod’s expert opinion on the rental property’s value more persuasive and used it to determine the property’s value.The Superior Court of Riverside County entered a status-only judgment dissolving the marriage and domestic partnership but reserved jurisdiction over other issues. The trial addressed the amount of spousal support and the value of the community’s interest in the rental property. The family court applied the relevant support factors under Family Code section 4320 and found that Rod had the need for spousal support. The court also found that the community had a 60.2 percent interest in the rental property based on the amount of principal paid and improvements made during the relationship.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the family court’s order, finding no abuse of discretion in the spousal support award. The appellate court held that the family court properly considered the section 4320 factors and did not solely rely on the Xspouse software or the temporary spousal support order. The court also found that the family court correctly valued the rental property closer to the time of trial, as required by section 2552 of the Family Code. The appellate court rejected Hub’s due process claim, noting that he did not object to the time allocation during the trial. View "In re Marriage of Freeman" on Justia Law

A husband appealed a final divorce order that set aside a prenuptial agreement and instead allocated an equitable division of property. The family division found the agreement unconscionable because it would prevent the wife from receiving any significant property settlement or spousal maintenance. The husband argued that the court applied an incorrect standard of unconscionability and made errors in the property settlement proceedings.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Family Division, initially found that both parties had made full financial disclosures and entered the agreement voluntarily. However, the court later concluded that the agreement was unconscionable because it left the wife in the same financial situation as if they had not married, which the court believed undermined the status of marriage. The court also quashed subpoenas for the wife's father and sister and incorrectly calculated the length of the marriage.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the family division applied the wrong standard for assessing unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that prenuptial agreements are enforceable if they are entered into voluntarily, with full financial disclosure, and are not unconscionable at the time of execution. The court found that the agreement's terms, which left the parties in the same financial situation as before marriage, were not inherently unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the family division's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the wife's alternative arguments regarding the enforceability of the agreement, including whether the husband's behavior constructively forced her to file for divorce. View "Lacroix v. Rysz" on Justia Law

Nancy and Carlos Sistrunk were married in 1984 and separated in 2021. Nancy filed for divorce citing irreconcilable differences or, alternatively, adultery. They have four adult children, including Emily, who has Down syndrome and other health issues, making her incapable of self-support. Both parties agreed to proceed with the divorce based on irreconcilable differences. In 2023, Nancy filed a motion regarding the marital residence and child support for Emily, which Carlos opposed.The trial, primarily focused on financial issues and property division, was held in September 2023. The chancery court granted the divorce, divided the real and personal property approximately equally, and declined to award alimony, child support for Emily, or attorneys’ fees. The court failed to make specific findings of fact regarding the factors required for equitable distribution of assets, and many of its findings were unsupported by the record.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that the chancery court did not make sufficient findings of fact regarding each applicable Ferguson factor, which is necessary for equitable distribution of marital property. The court noted that the chancery court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding the parties' incomes and the dissipation of marital assets. The Supreme Court also highlighted the lack of consideration for the emotional value of the marital home and the financial needs of the parties, especially Nancy's role as Emily's primary caregiver.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancery court's judgment on the equitable distribution of assets and related matters and remanded the case for further consideration. The chancery court was instructed to make specific findings of fact regarding each applicable Ferguson factor and to rectify unsupported findings. The court may also reconsider issues related to alimony, child support for Emily, and attorneys’ fees on remand. View "Sistrunk v. Sistrunk" on Justia Law

Katrina Danforth appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, SLD. The case began when Ryan Hansen, the child's father, filed a petition to terminate Danforth's parental rights, citing her felony conviction for a murder-for-hire plot against him. Danforth counterclaimed, seeking to terminate Hansen's parental rights, and requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for SLD. The Department of Family Services conducted a social study, which Danforth argued was inadequate because it did not include her input.The District Court of Sheridan County held a bench trial and terminated Danforth's parental rights. The court found that Hansen adequately represented SLD's interests and that a GAL was unnecessary. Danforth's counterclaim was dismissed without a separate evidentiary hearing, as she did not present evidence to support it during the trial. Danforth appealed, arguing that the social study was prejudicial, the denial of a GAL was erroneous, her counterclaim should not have been dismissed without a hearing, and that the termination of her parental rights unjustly extended her punishment for her past crime.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found that the social study complied with statutory requirements and did not prejudice Danforth, as she had the opportunity to testify about her situation. The court also held that the district court did not err in finding a GAL unnecessary, as Hansen adequately represented SLD's interests. The dismissal of Danforth's counterclaim without a separate hearing was upheld because she failed to prosecute it during the trial. Finally, the court concluded that the termination of Danforth's parental rights was based on statutory grounds and SLD's best interests, not as an extension of her criminal punishment. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights To SLD v. Hansen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law

The case involves the foster parents of a minor child, J, who were initially granted intervenor status in neglect proceedings concerning J. The trial court later removed them as intervenors based on the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., which concluded that nonrelative foster parents are precluded by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. The foster parents appealed this decision, arguing that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided. While their appeal was pending, the trial court held a hearing on a motion to revoke J's commitment to the Commissioner's custody and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents also filed a writ of error challenging this decision.The trial court initially granted the foster parents' motion to intervene in the neglect proceedings. However, after the Appellate Court's decision in In re Ryan C., the trial court removed them as intervenors. The foster parents appealed this removal, claiming that the decision in In re Ryan C. was incorrect. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke J's commitment and transferred guardianship to J's biological father. The foster parents were not allowed to attend the entire hearing or give a sworn statement after hearing the evidence, which they claimed violated their right to be heard under the statute.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that In re Ryan C. was wrongly decided and must be overruled. The court held that the statute does not bar a trial court from granting a foster parent's request for permissive intervention in the dispositional phase of a neglect proceeding. The court reversed the trial court's order removing the foster parents as intervenors and granted the writ of error, remanding the case for a new revocation hearing. The court also concluded that the foster parents' right to be heard includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding and to argue at the appropriate time as to the child's best interest in light of the evidence presented. View "In re Jewelyette M." on Justia Law