Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

H.C. appealed an order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and public policy require the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence, or at least a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interests of the child. H.C.'s son, John, has significant medical and developmental needs, which H.C. failed to address. John was taken into custody at age two after numerous incidents of abuse and neglect. H.C. struggled with addiction, mental health issues, and was often absent from her group home. The State filed a petition to terminate H.C.'s parental rights, citing continuing CHIPS and failure to assume parental responsibility.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court found H.C. unfit and determined that terminating her parental rights was in John's best interests. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that the circuit court did not err in its discretion. However, the court of appeals also asserted that due process requires the child's best interests to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof shared by all parties.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the best interests of the child during the dispositional phase of a TPR proceeding constitute a discretionary determination by the circuit court, with no burden of proof placed on any party. The court concluded that neither the Due Process Clause nor applicable statutory law imposes a burden of proof during the dispositional phase. The court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, agreeing that the circuit court committed no error in terminating H.C.'s parental rights but rejected the court of appeals' due process analysis. View "State v. H. C." on Justia Law

Marilyn Wilson and Milton Wilson were married in 1980, and Milton was employed as a police officer. They divorced in 1998, and their property settlement agreement stated that Marilyn would be the irrevocable beneficiary of Milton's survivor pension benefits. Milton later married Diane Wilson in 2007 and passed away in 2020. After his death, Marilyn sought survivor benefits from the City of Providence, which were being paid to Diane.The Family Court declined to rule on Marilyn's motion to compel the city to pay her the benefits, leading her to file a suit in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Diane, ruling that she was the surviving spouse entitled to the benefits under Rhode Island General Laws § 45-21.3-1 and the Providence Code § 17-189(m)(6).The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the terms "surviving spouse" and "dependent spouse" in the statute and ordinance refer to the person lawfully married to the retiree at the time of death. The Court found that the property settlement agreement between Marilyn and Milton, which was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce judgment, could not override the statutory provisions. Therefore, Diane, as Milton's spouse at the time of his death, was entitled to the survivor benefits. View "Wilson v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in a marital dissolution action against her former husband, Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition, his attorney refused to turn on his webcam, prompting Shawn to file a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and request sanctions. Before Shawn filed her reply brief, she and Frank settled the dissolution action, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew her motion but argued that sanctions were still warranted due to Madick’s and his counsel’s conduct during the deposition. The trial court granted the request for sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay Shawn $9,981.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and imposed sanctions on Madick. The court concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. However, the Supreme Court granted Shawn’s petition for review and deferred further action pending consideration of a related issue in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The Supreme Court held that a trial court may invoke its independent authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for unusual forms of discovery abuse not addressed by method-specific sanctions provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reconsidered the case in light of PwC and concluded that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions against Madick. The court affirmed the order, holding that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for the unusual form of discovery abuse that frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function. The court found that the trial court’s order was supported by substantial evidence and that Madick’s arguments were unconvincing. View "Agnone v. Agnone" on Justia Law

In this child abuse and neglect case, the mother, A.L., challenged the circuit court’s failure to rule on her motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period and the subsequent termination of her parental rights to her four children. She also appealed the denial of post-termination visitation. The case involved prior incidents where Child Protective Services (CPS) intervened due to lack of supervision, including two separate incidents where her children were injured by firearms. Despite services provided by the Department of Human Services (DHS), the mother failed to comply consistently, leading to the filing of a new petition in August 2021 after another gunshot incident involving her child.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudicated the mother as an abusing and neglectful parent and terminated her parental rights. The mother appealed, and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia vacated the initial dispositional order due to insufficient findings and remanded for a new order addressing the improvement period and providing detailed findings. On remand, the circuit court again terminated her parental rights, citing her failure to rectify the conditions of abuse and neglect despite extensive DHS involvement and services.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination of parental rights, finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion given the mother’s history of non-compliance and the recurring issues of lack of supervision. However, the court vacated the denial of post-termination visitation, noting that the circuit court failed to consider the children’s best interests and the potential emotional bond with the mother. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether post-termination visitation would be in the best interests of the children. View "In re Z.D.-1" on Justia Law

Abby G. Poitier, now known as Abby G. Cullins, filed a complaint in the district court for Douglas County to modify a previously entered paternity decree, seeking increased parenting time with her child, S.B. On the day of the trial, she sought to voluntarily dismiss her complaint. The trial court granted the dismissal without conditions and proceeded to trial on the counterclaim filed by Brian P. Beatty, which included a request for attorney fees. Although Brian was not successful on his counterclaim, the district court awarded him a portion of his attorney fees, finding Abby's complaint to be frivolous and interposed solely for delay or harassment.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order. The appellate court reasoned that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-603, the district court retained jurisdiction to consider Brian's counterclaim for attorney fees even after Abby dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of attorney fees, noting that Abby had not made efforts to have a relationship with S.B. since 2019 and had dismissed her complaint on the day of trial without notice.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Brian's counterclaim for attorney fees and that the award of $1,500 in attorney fees was reasonable. The court found that Abby's actions were frivolous and interposed for delay or harassment, supporting the lower courts' decisions. View "Beatty v. Poitier" on Justia Law

Zachary Oxley and Tiffani Davis are the natural parents of MC1, born in June 2011. They were never married and had a brief relationship. After their separation, Davis had another child, MC2, with an unknown father and later married Patrick Davis. In 2016, during their divorce proceedings, Larry Lumpkins intervened, seeking custody of MC1 and MC2, claiming in loco parentis status. The court granted Lumpkins temporary custody, and Oxley later intervened to establish paternity of MC1, which was confirmed through DNA testing.The Lonoke County Circuit Court awarded custody of MC1 and MC2 to Lumpkins in 2018, granting Oxley visitation rights. Oxley did not appeal this initial custody order. In 2020, Oxley filed a petition to modify custody, alleging Lumpkins failed to comply with the visitation schedule and neglected MC1’s hygiene and care. The circuit court held a hearing in 2021, where Oxley presented evidence of Lumpkins’s neglect and obstruction of visitation. Despite expressing concerns, the court denied Oxley’s petition, citing the ad litem’s recommendation to keep MC1 and MC2 together and reinstated visitation for Oxley.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred by not applying the presumption in favor of Oxley as MC1’s fit, natural parent. The court held that a fit, natural parent is entitled to custody unless proven unfit, which was not established in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision, remanded with instructions to award Oxley sole primary custody of MC1, and vacated the court of appeals opinion. The mandate was issued immediately to facilitate MC1’s transition to Oxley’s custody. View "OXLEY v. LUMPKINS" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce between Clayton LeGault, Jr. (Husband) and Lisa LeGault (Wife). The key issue is the division of marital assets, specifically the treatment of Husband's defined benefit pension plan, which he had been contributing to for six years before the marriage. The parties separated in May 2022, and both filed for divorce. Wife proposed a division of assets that included her receiving 100% of her 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan, as well as 50% of the marital portion of Husband's pension. She also sought an offset of other assets to account for the premarital portion of Husband's pension.The Circuit Court (Manchester) divided Wife's 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan equally and applied the Hodgins formula to divide Husband's pension. The court acknowledged Wife's argument that RSA 458:16-a, I, which includes all property acquired prior to the marriage as subject to distribution, might conflict with the Hodgins formula. However, the court felt bound by precedent and did not separate the premarital portion of the pension for division or offset by other marital assets. The court's final decree awarded Wife a significant portion of the marital estate, including half of the marital portion of Husband's pension.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court clarified that RSA 458:16-a, I, includes all property, including premarital portions of pensions, as subject to equitable distribution. The court held that Hodgins provides a default rule for pensions earned entirely during the marriage but does not address pensions with premarital portions. The court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure the premarital portion of Husband's pension is considered in the equitable distribution of assets. View "In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parents, Bharathan Jeevanandam and Vanikala Bharathan, regarding child support payments. The parents divorced in 2012, and the father was ordered to pay child support to the mother, who had primary physical custody of their child. In 2021, the father filed a complaint for modification, seeking to terminate his child support obligation because the child was enrolled in a full-time residential program paid for by the municipalities. The Probate and Family Court terminated the father's child support obligation retroactively to January 1, 2022.The father then sought reimbursement from the mother for the child support payments made after the retroactive termination date. The Probate and Family Court ordered the mother to repay the father at a rate of $80 per week through the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division. The department, however, contended that it lacked the authority to enforce the reimbursement order because it was not an order for child support. The judge denied the department's motion for reconsideration, leading to the department's appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the Department of Revenue does not have the authority to enforce a judgment requiring one parent to reimburse the other for overpayment of child support when the reimbursement does not go to support the child. The court held that the department's enforcement authority is confined to judgments, decrees, and orders that are "for the support and maintenance of a child" as defined by G. L. c. 119A, § 1A. Since the reimbursement in this case did not go to support or maintain the child, the court vacated the portion of the second amended judgment that required the department to enforce the reimbursement obligation through wage assignment. View "Jeevanandam v. Bharathan" on Justia Law

A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2019 and have one son together. Plaintiff moved out of the marital home in January 2023 and initiated divorce proceedings in March 2023. In April 2023, defendant was arrested and charged with weapon offenses after threatening a process server with a handgun. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in July 2023 under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on allegations of stalking and harassment. The court issued a TRO prohibiting defendant from contacting plaintiff, granting her temporary custody of their son, and denying defendant parenting and visitation time.During the final restraining order (FRO) hearing, plaintiff called defendant as a witness. Defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the trial court ordered him to testify. Defendant refused to answer questions beyond stating his name, invoking the Fifth Amendment. The trial court ruled that defendant could not invoke the privilege and that an adverse inference could be drawn from his refusal to testify. Defendant appealed the decision.The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. While defendant's motion for leave to appeal was pending, the Appellate Division published T.B. v. I.W., addressing a similar issue. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted defendant leave to appeal.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that while the Fifth Amendment does not provide blanket immunity in PDVA FRO hearings, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that pose reasonable risks of self-incrimination. The court ruled that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of this right. The PDVA immunity provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and does not adequately protect a defendant's rights. The trial court's ruling was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "M.A. v. J.H.M." on Justia Law