Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The superior court determined that an unmarried couple lived for a time as domestic partners and, in connection with the dissolution of the domestic partnership, that a residential property one party purchased was intended to be domestic partnership property. The court ordered a 50/50 division of the partnership equity by way of an equalization payment. The property owner appealed both determinations and the resulting equalization payment. In this opinion, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed only the superior court’s property ruling, concluding that the court erred by determining the residential property was intended to be domestic partnership property. "Even assuming Kristy and John’s relationship rose to the level of a domestic partnership, the factors used to determine intent for property to be domestic partnership property do not support an intent to share ownership, and based on the evidence in the record finding an intent to share ownership of the Rose Lane property was clearly erroneous." The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the equalization payment judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "McConville v. Otness" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's ruling that Iowa Code chapter 411 ordinary disability benefits are marital property, holding that chapter 411 ordinary disability benefits replace income that an individual would have earned if not for an injury causing the disability and should be treated as income rather than as property.The district court entered a dissolution decree dissolving the marriage of Matt and Karri Miller. The district court determined that Matt's chapter 411 ordinary disability benefit was marital property subject to division. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Matt's future disability benefit was income or property. The Supreme Court vacated in part the court of appeals' decision and let the rest of the court of appeals' opinion stand on the remaining issues, holding that Matt's future disability benefit is a replacement for income and not part of the marital pot to be divided upon dissolution. View "In re Marriage of Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the disposition order of the circuit court terminating Father's parental rights to his infant child, holding that the circuit court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights in lieu of granting him an improvement period.The circuit court adjudicated Father of being abusive and neglectful because his incarceration rendered him unable to care for the child and unable to protect the child from Mother's substance abuse. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the circuit court's analysis under In re Cecil T., 717 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 2011), was insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court failed to conduct an appropriate Cecil T. analysis; but (2) under this Court's own Cecil T. review, Petitioner's parental rights should be terminated. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

Blizzard invested in a tire pyrolysis project in Kansas and subsequently sued Schaefers. A Kansas jury returned a $3.825 million fraud judgment, which was entered in California. The California court added a judgment debtor (BKS) pursuant to the “outside reverse veil piercing” doctrine, which arises when the request for piercing comes from a third party outside the targeted business entity. The targeted entity was BKS. Schaefers owns a 50 percent interest in that LLC. Schaefers’ wife, Karin, owns the other 50 percent. Neither Karin nor BKS was a defendant in the Kansas action. The California court found that BKS is Schaefers’ alter ego.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that BKS is Schaefers’ alter ego. The court remanded for further proceedings so that the trial court may weigh competing equities that bear on the veil-piercing issue. Blizzard is entitled to recover the damages awarded by the Kansas judgment, but Karin may be an innocent third party who would suffer substantial harm if recovery is accomplished through the reverse veil piercing; there is no indication that she was involved in the fraud committed by Schaefers. Karin may not be responsible for debts incurred by Schaefers after their separation in 1996. View "Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers" on Justia Law

In 2015, Betsy filed a petition for the dissolution of marriage from Stephen. The parties married in 2000 and had no children. In 2016, the circuit court entered judgment for dissolution of marriage, which incorporated a marital settlement agreement, stating that Betsy would receive monthly of $5,000.00 for 48 months and thereafter would receive 48 months of payments in decreasing amounts. “Said maintenance payments shall be nonmodifiable pursuant to Section 502(f) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.” In 2018, Stephen filed a petition to modify the judgment to terminate or modify his maintenance obligation. Stephen asserted that the maintenance obligation was not truly nonmodifiable because it did not specifically provide, as required by the Marriage Act, “that the non-modifiability applies to amount, duration, or both.” He asserted that a change in circumstances necessitated the modification.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate and the circuit court in holding that section 502(f) allows parties to make maintenance entirely nonmodifiable or to select a single aspect of the obligation, amount, or duration, to make nonmodifiable and that the settlement agreement showed the parties intended to make the maintenance obligation nonmodifiable in both amount and duration. Stephen cannot now avoid that obligation based on changed circumstances. View "In re Marriage of Dynako" on Justia Law

Sandra and Mark were married in 1992. In 2014, Sandra filed for divorce. The couple had five children; three were then minors. While the divorce was pending, Mark’s mother died; he inherited approximately $615,000. The inheritance included checking accounts and investment accounts, the majority being held in two individual retirement accounts (IRAs).In the divorce judgment, the circuit court excluded Mark’s inheritance in calculating his child support and maintenance obligations under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/504, 505. The circuit court subsequently certified a question for interlocutory review: “Whether inherited mandatory retirement distributions are income for purposes of child support and maintenance calculations.” The appellate court reframed the question and held that mandatory distributions or withdrawals taken from an inherited IRA containing money that has never been imputed against the recipient for the purposes of maintenance and child support calculations constitute “income.” The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Classifying the distributions and withdrawals as income does not constitute impermissible double counting because the inherited IRAs had not been previously imputed to Mark as income for support purposes. Mark’s nonmarital mandatory distributions and withdrawals received and reinvested in his own retirement accounts are not excluded from the statutory definition of “income.” View "In re Marriage of Dahm-Schell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a writ of prohibition preventing the order of a court of common pleas judge restoring Appellant's firearms rights from being effective, holding that a writ of prohibition was warranted.Appellant was convicted of a crime in Ohio that prohibited him, under federal law, to possess a firearm unless Appellant had his civil rights restored under Ohio law, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Appellant filed an application for relief from his federal firearms disability, and Judge Peeler, a Warren County Court of Common Pleas Judge, granted the application. Appellee, Appellant's ex-wife, sought a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent Judge Peeler's order from being effective. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellee established the necessary elements for a writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Suwalksi v. Peeler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioners, three boys, prohibiting the circuit court from extending the improvement period of Respondent, their mother, holding that Petitioners showed that they were entitled to the writ.Specifically, Petitioners requested a writ that either directed the circuit court to set their case for a dispositional hearing or that commanded the circuit court to terminate Respondent's parental rights. The Supreme Court granted the writ and remanded this case to the circuit court, holding that Respondent's improvement period was improper from the beginning and that the circuit court committed clear error in extending her improvement period. View "State ex rel. P.G.-1 v. Honorable Wilson" on Justia Law

L.D., father of A.D., appeals a juvenile court order granting a guardianship for A.D. The father argued the court erred by finding A.D. to be a deprived child and failing to address the best interest factors and make an exceptional circumstances finding. A.D.’s aunt and uncle petitioned the juvenile court for a guardianship under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.1, alleging A.D. was a deprived child. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father had not provided care for or had any contact with A.D. since 2007 or 2008, and did not make any significant attempts to locate A.D. or have A.D. placed in his care. The court found that although the mother testified she attempted to hide A.D. from the father due to “what the father did to her [the mother],” the father has been aware of A.D.’s whereabouts since at least late 2019. In 2019, the father attempted to speak with A.D. on the telephone, but A.D. refused. The court found the father made no further attempt to contact A.D. The court found the father had abandoned A.D. The father claimed the juvenile court did not address the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court was "able to discern how the court’s findings apply to the statutory best interest factors. The court was not required to specifically identify and discuss each best interest factor. The court made sufficient findings to conclude that the guardianship was in the best interest of A.D." Further, the Court found an exceptional circumstances finding was required when both a parent and non-parent are suitable candidates. When the child was deprived by the parents, no finding of exceptional circumstances was required to be made by the court to grant a guardianship. The finding of deprivation eliminates the need for a finding of exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, because A.D. was a deprived child, the juvenile court was not required to make a finding of exceptional circumstances in order to grant the guardianship. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the juvenile court's order. View "Interest of A.D." on Justia Law

Petitioner appeals a circuit court order denying her petition for guardianship of her great-nephew, a minor child, pursuant to RSA chapter 463 (2018 & Supp. 2020). On appeal, petitioner challenged the circuit court’s determination that she could not obtain guardianship because the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) already had legal custody of the child as a result of ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that an award of legal custody pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C did not preclude the appointment of a guardian pursuant to RSA chapter 463. Accordingly, judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of B.C." on Justia Law