Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A minor in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) was brought to a hospital for mental health treatment. A hospital social worker then petitioned the superior court to have the minor involuntarily hospitalized at a psychiatric facility for a mental health evaluation. The court held a brief ex parte telephonic inquiry at which it took the social worker’s sworn testimony. The court concluded that the minor was a danger to herself and granted the petition. Under the statute governing involuntary commitments, the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing within 72 hours if the psychiatric facility intended to continue providing treatment beyond that time. Before any hearing, however, OCS informed the court that it consented to the minor’s 30-day commitment for treatment; it contended that its consent made the 30-day commitment “voluntary” and, under the statute governing parental admissions, no hearing was required. The court eventually held an evidentiary hearing nearly 30 days after the minor’s initial hospitalization for evaluation. The court decided that the standards for a 30-day commitment were met because there was clear and convincing evidence that the minor had a mental illness, that she posed a risk of harm to herself, and that there were no less restrictive means of treatment available. The court also concluded that OCS had the statutory authority to admit a child in its care under the parental admissions statute. The first 30 days of the minor’s commitment were therefore considered voluntary, and her continued hospitalization would be considered under the involuntary commitment framework only after those 30 days expired. The court further determined that, because the 30-day limit under the parental admission statute was separate from the 30-day limit before a jury trial was required under the involuntary commitment statute, the minor could be held for an additional 30 days — 60 days total — before there was any need for a trial. The minor appealed, arguing the superior court violated her due process rights by not allowing her to be heard at the initial inquiry, when the petitioner testified under oath, and by treating her initial 30-day commitment as voluntary. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the minor’s hospitalization for evaluation complied with due process; a hearing was not required at the ex parte review stage, and a judge’s decision to hold a brief inquiry with the petitioner did not give the respondent a right to be heard. But the Supreme Court further concluded that it was error to treat the initial 30-day commitment as voluntary, because OCS was not a parent or guardian statutorily authorized to use the voluntary parental admission framework. Because the 30-day commitment should have been considered involuntary, any further hospitalization could not be ordered absent a full hearing or jury trial. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court order characterizing the first 30-day commitment as voluntary and authorizing an additional 30 days of commitment. View "In the Matter of the Hospitalization of April S." on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her daughter after a termination trial. The mother appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that on the facts of this case, the mother preserved her evidentiary appeal point. The Court rejected the Office of Children’s Services’s (OCS) assertion that the mother waived her evidentiary objection by not repeatedly raising it to every question asked during the relevant testimony. The Court also concluded that, because the superior court did not explain its evidentiary ruling at any point during the relevant testimony or in its termination decision, it could not determine: (1) whether the court allowed some or all of the hearsay testimony for limited purposes; (2) how the court used the hearsay evidence to reach its findings; or (3) whether the court erred or abused its discretion by allowing and relying on the hearsay testimony. The case was therefore remanded to the superior court for a full explanation of its evidentiary ruling, how the ruling related to the hearsay testimony, and how the hearsay testimony related to the trial court’s findings. View "M.B. (Mother) v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

Ilka Porter and Lina Louise Porter, through her mother and next friend, Ilka Porter, appealed a probate court order that concluded Sean Porter was married to Alexis Campbell Porter at the time of his death, and appointing Alexis Campbell Porter as administratrix of his estate. The question presented by these appeals was one of first impression in Alabama: Whether the death of a party to a marriage, after a marriage document is executed but before the marriage document is recorded, invalidates the marriage for failure to comply with the registration requirements of section 22-9A-17, Ala. Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that it did not, affirming the probate court's order. View "Porter v. Estate of Porter" on Justia Law

Scott and Tal were married for 17 years and had three children together. They divorced in 2014. In the stipulated dissolution judgment, Scott's gross annual income was listed as $196,440. He was ordered to pay $4,326 per month in spousal support and $3,674 per month in child support. In 2017, Scott sought to modify child and spousal support. The court found his yearly gross income had declined to $185,664 and the parties’ oldest child had aged out of child support, which constituted a change in circumstances. The court reduced spousal support to $3,800 per month.Two years later, Scott filed another request to modify spousal support. The court found that his income had not decreased, that Tal had “made efforts” to become self-sufficient, and that in addition to threatening to file several requests to modify support, Scott had unsuccessfully filed a motion for sanctions “rehashing the issues in 2017” and ordered him to pay Tal’s attorney fees ($5,000) incurred in opposing the latest request. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the request, rejecting arguments that the trial court failed to consider required criteria under Family Code section 4320, erroneously excluded live testimony at the motion hearing, and abused its discretion in issuing attorney fee sanctions. View "Marriage of Kahan & Diamond" on Justia Law

S.J.H. appealed a district court order granting the State’s motion for sanctions against him for failure to obey a court order for genetic testing and from a default judgment ordering him to pay child support. The North Dakota Child Support Division (“State”) commenced a civil action against S.J.H. to establish paternity for a minor child. S.J.H. retained counsel. In S.J.H.’s answer and counterclaim, he included a request for genetic testing to be conducted. At a hearing nearly four months later, he withdrew his request for testing. The district court then entered an order requiring S.J.H. to submit to genetic testing. After two months went by with no testing having been conducted, the district court requested a status update from the parties. S.J.H.’s counsel responded that S.J.H. had not been tested, and counsel moved to withdraw, stating that his attorney-client relationship with S.J.H. had “deteriorated to a degree that further representation is not possible” after their discussions about the proceedings “resulted in an impasse.” The State subsequently scheduled an appointment for genetic testing for March 25, 2021, in S.J.H.’s state of residence. On March 10, the State sent a letter to S.J.H.’s counsel with the information regarding the upcoming appointment. This letter was sent to counsel only and not directly to S.J.H. On March 31, the court granted S.J.H.’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. On April 30, the district court again asked the State and S.J.H. for a status update. Because S.J.H. failed to attend his March 25 appointment, the State requested sanctions against him, including striking his answer and rendering default judgment against him. S.J.H. stated he was unaware of the March 25 appointment, and learned of such appointment only upon being served the State’s motion for default judgment two months later. Nevertheless, the court granted the State's motion for sanctions. S.J.H. argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in granting sanctions against him because his former attorney failed to notify him of the scheduled genetic testing appointment, thus he did not disobey the court order to submit to genetic testing. Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sanctions order. View "North Dakota v. S.J.H., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court terminating the parental rights of Father, holding that any error committed by the circuit court did not prejudice Father.After a hearing, the circuit court issued a decision terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their three children. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) erred when it prematurely signed the State's proposed findings, but Father failed to establish prejudice caused by the error; (2) did not err when it determined that the Department of Social Services made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family; (3) did not clearly err in finding that Father's continued custody of the children would result in serious physical or emotional harm; and (4) did not err when it found that termination of Father's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative commensurate with the best interests of the children. View "In re A.A." on Justia Law

Scarlett was born in Honduras in 2013. Her family moved to the United States in 2015. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services received a referral claiming that her father, Franklin, had attacked her mother, Karen. The Department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code 300(a), (b)(1) petition. The court found true the allegations that, because of multiple instances of domestic violence, and because Franklin had hit Scarlett with a belt, Franklin placed Scarlett at risk of serious physical harm and Karen failed to protect her.Scarlett subsequently filed a request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings under Code of Civil Procedure 155.1. A child is eligible for SIJ status if: the child is a dependent of a juvenile court, in the custody of a state agency by court order, or in the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the court; the child cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis; and it is not in the child’s best interest to return to his or her home country or the home country of her parents. The juvenile court denied the request, ruling the findings were “discretionary.” The court of appeal reversed. The lower court was required to consider the evidence submitted and Scarlett submitted unimpeached and uncontradicted evidence that required the court to enter an order with the findings Scarlett requested under section 155. View "In re Scarlett V." on Justia Law

Mandy and Dan Valentine divorced in 2015. In 2017, Mandy petitioned the magistrate court for an order modifying the child custody and support provisions of the divorce decree. The magistrate court did not modify the custody provisions in the decree but concluded that substantial and material changes in circumstances existed to justify modifying the child support order. Mandy appealed several aspects of this ruling to the district court. The district court, sitting in an appellate capacity, affirmed in part and reversed in part the magistrate court’s order. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Mandy challenged the district court’s conclusion that her student loans and several other sources of income could be combined to calculate her income under the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. Dan cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s conclusion that the magistrate court abused its discretion in calculating his pro rata share of childcare expenses. The Supreme Court determined that while the district court correctly interpreted the Idaho Child Support Guidelines to require the inclusion of gross and, if applicable, potential income in the calculation of Guidelines Income, it erred in concluding that the magistrate court’s failure to make a finding that Mandy was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed before imputing potential income to her was harmless. Second, the district court erred in determining that the magistrate court abused its discretion in ordering Dan to pay his pro rata share of childcare expenses after subtracting the amount of Idaho Child Care Program benefits Mandy received from the total costs. View "Valentine v. Valentine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights to their older child and the order finding that Mother's younger child was in jeopardy in her care, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.On appeal, Mother argued that the district court erred in concluding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.S. 1901-1963, did not apply to either child, and Father challenged the termination of his parental rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in concluding that the ICWA did not apply to either of Mother's two children; and (2) the court did not err or abuse its discretion by finding at least one ground of parental unfitness and in determining that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the older child. View "In re Children of Michelle C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the juvenile court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights.The juvenile court concluded that the State proved the grounds for termination and terminated Father's parental rights. Father's counsel filed a motion for belated appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court then affirmed, holding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the bases for termination under both Iowa Code 232.116(1)(3) and 232.116(1)(h) were satisfied and that no exceptions in Iowa Code 232.116(3) applied to preclude the termination. View "In re W.T." on Justia Law