Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

After wife filed a petition for dissolution of her 39-year marriage to husband, the parties stipulated to the appointment of the Honorable Melinda Johnson as temporary judge. Judge Johnson subsequently entered a "non-CLETS" domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against wife.The Court of Appeal concluded that Judge Johnson did not exceed the scope of her appointment when she heard and decided husband's request for a DVRO, but did err as a matter of law when she specified that the restraining order was a "non-CLETS" order. The court remanded the matter to permit Judge Johnson to enter an order in compliance with Family Code section 6380. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Marriage of Reichental" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyson on plaintiff's interference claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court concluded that Tyson's request for recertification was reasonable as a matter of law under 29 U.S.C. 2613(e) and did not interfere with defendant's FMLA rights. The court explained that it was reasonable as a matter of law to require recertification based on a significant change in the circumstances of plaintiff's absences. View "Whittington v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part two district court orders in this divorce case - a custody order and a visitation order, holding that the district court abused its discretion in requiring Father to submit to regular alcohol testing during the transition period to joint custody.On appeal, Father argued that the district court erred in awarding primary custody to Mother during the transition period, in implementing a fifteen-month transition plan, and requiring him to submit to regular alcohol testing during the transition. The Supreme Court reversed the alcohol testing requirement and otherwise affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody to Mother; (2) abused its discretion in requiring Father to film himself taking a home breath test at least once a week and undergo random tests for nearly one year; and (3) did not commit reversible error when it delayed seven months after the final hearing before entering its custody and visitation orders. View "Mecartney v. Mecartney" on Justia Law

M.A. (mother) and A.O. (father) appealed the termination of their parental rights to their three children. In January 2019, Children and Family Services (Agency) received a report that the home was filthy. It received a separate report that the maternal grandparents hit the children and the parents were methamphetamine addicts. Both parents had prior arrests for possession of a controlled substance. The parents and grandparents actively avoided detention warrants executed to the home. In June 2019, a police officer on an unrelated call found the family at the home and detained the children. The next month, two children were placed in foster care; the parents had a third child, L.A.-O (L) in May 2020, whom the the Agency detained and filed a dependency petition. In July 2020, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing as to L., the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction based on failure to protect, failure to support, and abuse of a sibling, and formally removed L. from the parents’ custody and ordered reunification services. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that the children were adoptable and that there was no applicable exception to termination of parental rights. It therefore terminated parental rights. The Court of Appeal addressed two novel issues raised by the parents' appeal: (1) the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Caden C., 11 Cal.5th 614 (2021) overruled lower appellate court decisions holding that a parent asserting the parental-benefit exception must show that he or she occupied a “parental role;” and (2) the juvenile court erred by “ignor[ing]” evidence in social worker’s reports filed in connection with earlier hearings and that these reports established that the parental-benefit exception applied. The trial court found that the parental-benefit exception did not apply partly because the parents “ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time” and partly because the prospective adoptive parents “ha[d] been acting in a parental role.” Because the trial court used this terminology, the Court of Appeal could not tell whether its ruling conformed with Caden C. Hence, judgment was remanded for reconsideration of the parental-benefit exception. With regard to the second issue, the appellate court disagreed: the reports were not introduced into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing; hence, neither the Court of Appeal nor the juvenile court could consider them. "The parents will be free to introduce them on remand." View "In re L.A.-O." on Justia Law

Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

This matter arose from four Child in Need of Aid (CINA) cases. In each, the superior court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child through the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA), and in each case Brenda Finley, working under contract with OPA, appeared as the GAL. Pursuant to CINA Rule 11(e), Finley disclosed to the parties that she was a foster parent in another CINA case. She stated that she did not believe that her role as a foster parent “will affect her ability to be [impartial] in this specific case, or in other cases.” A parent in each case moved for an evidentiary hearing “regarding whether Ms. Finley should be disqualified as a guardian ad litem.” Arguing that Finley’s role as a foster parent might create a conflict of interest due to her relationship with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) as both a foster parent and a GAL, the parents sought additional details to determine whether a conflict existed, suggesting a hearing would allow them to elicit information regarding Finley’s past, present, and possible future tenure as a foster parent, the status of the cases in which she served as a foster parent, her financial arrangements with OCS, and her relationship with OCS workers. Both OCS and OPA filed qualified oppositions to the parents’ request for a hearing, arguing: that categorical disqualification of foster parents from serving as GALs was overbroad; the court should provide clarity on what framework should govern the potential conflict; and that a low bar for disqualification would fail to recognize “the difficulty of keeping positions in child welfare staffed by qualified individuals, ideally with ties to the community . . . .” The Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct applied to determine whether the GAL has a disqualifying conflict of interest and that the superior court must permit limited discovery to ascertain the underlying facts for determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists. View "C.L. v. Office of Public Advocacy" on Justia Law

In this divorce case, the Supreme Court primarily affirmed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court holding Ronald Rosser in contempt for deliberately deceiving Holly Rosser, holding that the district court's contempt order did not include sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to hold Ronald in contempt.In reversing, the court of appeals held (1) Ronald's deceptive conduct did not amount to statutory contempt as a matter of law because it was directed at Holly, rather than at the court; and (2) under Utah Code 78B-6-301(4), deceitful conduct during litigation does not rise to the level of contempt unless it is directed at the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' vacatur of most of the district court's contempt order, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly reached the interpretation and application of the contempt statute in this case; but (2) erred in reading subsection (4) of the statute to reach only deceit directed at the court because the statute includes deceit in respect to a court's proceedings. View "Rosser v. Rosser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court that denied Christina C.'s application to modify child custody of her daughter, Daphnie F., holding that the district court's order did not follow the framework set forth in State on behalf of Tina K. v. Adam B., 948 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 2020).Pursuant to a Colorado custody order, Daphnie was placed in the permanent custody of her paternal grandparents. Christina filed a motion to modify, arguing that she was a fit biological parent who had a right to custody of her child that was superior to that of the child's grandparents standing in loco parentis. The district court denied Christina's motion for new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's findings and reasoning were not sufficient under the correct standard set forth in State on behalf of Tina K. View "State ex rel. Daphnie F. v. Christina C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the child custody modification order entered by the district court awarding Father primary physical custody of the parties' two children, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.When the parties divorced, a stipulated divorce decree awarded them joint legal, physical, and residential custody of their two minor children. The court later granted Mother's motion to modify, concluding that it was in the children's best interests for Mother to have primary residential custody. Father subsequently filed the custody modification issue at issue, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the children's best interests that he be awarded primary residential custody. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the children's best interests to award primary physical custody to Father. View "Gutierrez v. Bradley" on Justia Law

DCFS alleged, and the juvenile court found true, three allegations that mother had physically abused, failed to protect, and medically neglected her daughter, Emily L., within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). While this appeal was pending, Emily turned 18 and is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.The Court of Appeal concluded that, although the appeal is moot as to Emily, the court will exercise its discretion to address the merits. In this case, substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding of the juvenile court. Given the lack of substantial evidence of any risk of future harm to Emily at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the court concluded that the juvenile court erred in assuming jurisdiction over this action. The court reversed the juvenile court's order asserting jurisdiction, vacated the juvenile court's factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. View "In re Emily L." on Justia Law