Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding David Cook custody of the two minor children he shared with Charmaine Parker, holding that the district court did not err.When Cook and Parker divorced, Parker received custody of the parties' two children. The children were later taken into protective custody and then placed with Cook when Parker was accused of assaulting the children's older half-sibling. Cook filed a civil case asking the district court to modify the original custody order to award him custody of the children. The district court entered judgment in favor of Cook. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Cook's motion to strike five of Parker's expert witnesses and denied Parker's request to present surrebuttal testimony. View "Parker v. Cook" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Father's petition seeking the return of seven-year-old Child from Massachusetts to Brazil, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Father filed his petition pursuant to The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, alleging that Mother removed Child from Brazil to Massachusetts without his authorization. The district court granted Father's petition and ordered that Child be returned to Brazil. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in finding that returning Child to Brazil would not expose Child to a grave risk of harm; and (2) did not err in declining to consider Child's views. View "Vieira v. De Souza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court placing physical custody of B.C. with Mother, from whom B.C. had initially been taken, holding that there was no error.B.C. was removed from Mother's home pending adjudication in proceedings following a petition alleging child endangerment. The juvenile court later granted the Department of Health and Human Services' motion for a placement change and ordered that the physical custody of B.C. be placed with Mother upon her completion of certain conditions. The juvenile court also considered and overruled Father's motion for legal custody and placement of B.C. Father appealed, arguing that the order exceeded the juvenile court's authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court's order placing B.C. with Mother pursuant to the terms of a transition plan were consistent with this Court's opinion and mandate. View "In re Interest of A.A." on Justia Law

Donna Wald petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of supervision directing the district court to vacate an order denying her demand for a change of judge and to grant the demand. Donna and Gerard Wald divorced in 2019. The Honorable Daniel Narum was the presiding judge in the divorce action. Donna was awarded hay bales and other assets in the property distribution. After entry of the divorce judgment, Donna moved for contempt or in the alternative for redistribution of property, claiming she was unable to retrieve the hay bales awarded to her, and Gerard refused to turn the bales over. The district court denied her motion. Donna appealed, and the property distribution and denial of the post-judgment motion were affirmed on appeal. In 2021, Donna sued Gerard for unjust enrichment and tortious conversion, alleging the hay bales awarded to her in the divorce judgment were worth $242,216; she had not received any of the hay bales; Gerard kept the bales for his own use or sold them for his own gain; and she was deprived of the value, use, and benefit of the bales. She requested the district court to award her $242,000 in damages. Judge Narum was assigned to the case, and Donna filed a demand for a change of judge. Donna argued she complied with the statutory requirements for a change of judge and the court erred by denying her request. The North Dakota Supreme Court denied Donna's petition, concluding the district court did not err when it denied the demand for a change of judge. View "Wald v. Hovey, et al." on Justia Law

Shane Lance Yates and Amy Jo Yates (“Petitioners”) appealed district court orders denying their petitions for name changes and requests for reconsideration. They argued the district court erred in concluding their current names and the names requested were the same names. Petitioners sought to change their respective names from “SHANE LANCE YATES” (in all uppercase letters) to “Shane Lance Yates” and “AMY JO YATES” (in all uppercase letters) to “Amy Jo Yates.” They requested the changes to “terminate the guardian-ward relationship, and to distinguish from all other aliases, correct any mistakes, errors or identity confusion that exists in relation to the ALL CAPS STATE CREATED NAME.” The district court denied the petitions under res judicata because the Petitioners had previously filed identical name change petitions, which had been denied by the court, and they did not seek to change from one name to another and the requested change would not affect any action or legal proceeding or other right, title, or interest, as was the stated purpose. The Petitioners argue the district court erred in concluding their current names and the names requested were the same names. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Petitioners offered no authority or reasoned argument that there was any legal significance to the capitalization of their names. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitions. View "Matter of Shane Lance Yates" on Justia Law

Dean Gerving appealed a second amended judgment modifying his child support obligation. Gerving argued the district court erred in calculating his net income and erred by denying his request for a downward deviation in his child support obligation based on his payment of the child’s private school tuition. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Gerving’s request for a downward deviation, but concluded the court erred in calculating Gerving’s net income. Therefore, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to properly calculate Gerving’s net income and child support obligation. View "Gerving v. Gerving, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the probate court denying Mother's petition to modify or terminate an order of the superior court that transferred custody and guardianship of her child to the child's paternal grandmother and step-grandfather (together, Grandparents), holding that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.A Connecticut superior court granted the motion filed by the Connecticut Department of Children and Families to transfer custody and guardianship of the child to Grandparents, who lived in New Hampshire. After Mother, the child, and Grandparents had all moved to Maine, Mother filed a petition in the Hancock County Probate Court seeking to register and modify or terminate the Connecticut order. The probate court denied Mother's petition. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding that the probate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider or adjudicate Mother's petition to modify a guardianship established in Connecticut's equivalent of a child protection matter. View "In re Guardianship by Stacey M." on Justia Law

Petitioner Reginald Swain (Grandfather) appealed the denial of a request to terminate a father's parental rights ("TPR") and to adopt the child. The family court determined Grandfather proved a statutory ground for TPR, but concluded TPR and adoption would not be in the child's best interests because the child was already in a stable custody situation with her grandparents, Father had seemingly reformed his ways while in prison, and the child might benefit in the future from having a relationship with him. The court of appeals affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari. Grandfather contended the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's decision to deny TPR and adoption. Specifically, Grandfather contended both courts ignored the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, conflated the status of custody of a child with the permanency of TPR and adoption, and erroneously focused on the appearance of the new birth certificate, ignoring Mother's consent to the adoption. Conversely, Father argued both courts correctly found Grandfather failed to meet his burden of demonstrating TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. Exercising its de novo review, the South Carolina believed TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. "Because the focus is on the child's best interests rather than the parents' interest when determining whether TPR and adoption is appropriate," the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted the adoption. View "Swain v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Britton appealed two circuit court orders denying his request to terminate alimony, and granting the requests of respondent Patricia Britton for contempt for nonpayment of alimony and renewal of alimony. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found: (1) an obligation to pay alimony under the applicable statute automatically expired after three years unless renewed, modified, or extended; (2) a stipulation providing for a term of alimony beyond the three-year limit does not override the statutory expiration of the alimony obligation; (3) the original alimony award was first entered in 1985, and petitioner’s alimony obligations expired in 1988; (4) a court order approving a 2016 stipulation did not serve to renew or extend the 1985 alimony award. Therefore the trial court erred in finding petitioner in contempt of the 2016 stipulation and order. Petitioner did not have an obligation to pay alimony after the alimony award expired in 1988; as a result, the amounts petitioner paid in error based on the mistaken belief that the 1985 alimony order remained in effect were not required and were, therefore, voluntary. Absent fraud, “money voluntarily paid under a mistake of law cannot be recovered.” Accordingly, the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in declining to order reimbursement or credit of sums paid between 1988 and 2018. View "In the Matter of Britton" on Justia Law

In 2017 Brubaker sought dissolution of her marriage to Strum and requested a domestic violence restraining order, alleging Strum threatened to kill her and stalked her. The two entered into a stipulated temporary protective order. Brubaker alleged Strum violated the stipulated order multiple times. In 2018, the family law court issued a two-year domestic violence restraining order and subsequently found Strum had violated that order. In awarding Brubaker sole custody of their children, the court stated that Strum had not rebutted the presumption that an award of sole or joint custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child, noting Strum’s inability to control his explosive temper and aggressive behavior.In 2019 Brubaker unsuccessfully sought to renew the two-year domestic violence restraining order. The court of appeal reversed the denial. The trial court erroneously considered only whether Strum committed acts of domestic violence during a narrow window of time when the original restraining order was in effect, and not whether Brubaker had a reasonable fear of future abuse, given all relevant facts and circumstances. A court should renew a domestic violence restraining order when the court finds the probability of future abuse is sufficient that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have a “reasonable apprehension” that abuse will occur absent a protective order. View "Marriage of Brubaker and Strum" on Justia Law