Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a spouse seeking pendente lite alimony, attorney’s fees, and expert fees during the pendency of a dissolution action must demonstrate that a postnuptial agreement that purportedly precludes such payments is invalid or otherwise unenforceable before the trial court may properly order the other spouse to make such payments. After their marriage, Plaintiff and Defendant executed a postnuptial agreement setting forth terms for the distribution of property and determining support awards in the event their marriage dissolved. Plaintiff later brought this action seeking dissolution of the marriage and temporary and permanent alimony. The trial court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff temporary alimony, current attorney's fees and a retainer for legal counsel, and a contribution toward specified future expert fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that it need not determine the enforceability of the parties' postnuptial agreement before awarding Plaintiff alimony and litigation expenses. View "O.A. v. J.A." on Justia Law

Aaron Taylor appealed the district court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Third Amended Judgment modifying his parenting time, limiting his decisionmaking authority, and finding him in contempt. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in denying Taylor’s motion to modify or in granting Leah Taylor’s countermotion. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Taylor v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Mary Orwig appealed a district court order finding her in contempt and imposing remedial sanctions. She challenged whether the parties’ divorce judgment was an order from which non-compliance could result in a finding of contempt, the evidence supporting a finding of contempt, and the sanction as an improper punitive sanction. Steven Orwig cross-appealed the court’s Order Following Remand awarding Mary her attorney’s fees in the divorce. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Orwig v. Orwig" on Justia Law

Viviana Lovett appealed an order denying her motion to modify primary residential responsibility for the children she had with Antonio Lovett. Viviana argued the district court erred by finding she failed to establish a prima facie case for modification because the divorce judgment stated the parties would revisit the parenting plan if either parent intends to move and Antonio moved to relocate the children. The North Dakota Supreme Court did not reach the merits of Viviana's argument because it concluded the issue on appeal was now moot. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. View "Lovett v. Lovett, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved three appeals after two limited remands by the North Dakota Supreme Court for additional proceedings at the district court. Kevin Johnson appealed several district court orders, a second amended judgment, and a third amended judgment. All proceedings arose from Johnson's divorce from Julie Lessard. The Supreme Court concluded Johnson’s issue, contending the district court had granted a divorce only to Lessard and thereby exceeded its authority, was frivolous and awarded Lessard $750 in attorney’s fees under N.D.R.App.P. 38. The Court further concluded the district court did not err in holding Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case requiring an evidentiary hearing to modify residential responsibility, the court did not err in granting Lessard’s motions for a protective order and for sanctions, and its decision allowing Lessard to relocate out of state with the minor children was not clearly erroneous. View "Lessard v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the juvenile court erred when it terminated Father's parental rights because the child was not adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA).The juvenile court ultimately concluded that it could terminate Father's parental rights because the child was previously adjudicated CINA in a previous CINA proceeding that resulted in a guardianship. The court then terminated Father's rights under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(f) and (g). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that a prior CINA adjudication in a closed case cannot be utilized to meet the statutory requirements of 232.116(1)(f) and (g) for a second CINA proceeding. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Katherine was in dependency court for five years while her parents struggled with significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the juvenile court terminated services and the parental rights of both parents rejecting her father’s claim of a “beneficial parental relationship” (Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)). While recognizing that he had maintained regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, while his ongoing instability had caused additional instability and trauma.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that the father had previously concealed a crash caused by driving under the influence and then refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a series of abrupt changes in Katherine’s placement. He physically assaulted his mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he concealed and downplayed. Katherine had confided at times she feared her father and did not want to speak to him. The negative impact of the father’s unresolved issues on Katherine was antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 366.26. View "In re Katherine J." on Justia Law

K.W. was removed from his long-term placement with his relative, “Grandma B.,” after she took a one-day trip and did not notify the social worker of the trip. The consequence of this removal resulted in tremendous upheaval in K.W.’s life and violated the requirements of RCW 13.34.130. Though K.W. was legally free, the placement preferences set out in the statute still applied, and the court erred in failing to apply them and failing to place K.W. with relatives. View "In re Dependency of K.W." on Justia Law

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the divorce judgment entered by the district court in which the court adopted a referee's determination of the parties' child's primary residence and awarded Kristina Toland marital fees, holding that there was no error.The referee determined that Toland be awarded primary residence of the parties' minor child even if Toland relocates from Maine to Ohio and that Toland be awarded attorney fees. The district court adopted the referee's findings and recommendations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the referee's findings were not clearly erroneous, nor was the determination based on these findings that the child's best interest would be served by living in Toland in Ohio while maintaining contact with Helge Reimann; and (2) the attorney-fee waiver provision in the parties' premarital agreement was unenforceable as applied to their litigation of parental rights. View "Riemann v. Toland" on Justia Law