Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court changing the permanency plan for Mother and her three children from family reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption, holding that the juvenile court abused its discretion.On appeal, Mother argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that the Wyoming Department of Family Services had made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with her children. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the record demonstrated that the Department failed in its burden to show that it provided Mother appropriate services or genuine help to achieve reunification with her children. View "In re MA" on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the provisions of a district court order that found Mark Becher in contempt for failure to pay various expenses following his divorce from Sonia Becher, holding that the court's order is modified slightly but that Mark's remaining assignments of error were without merit.On appeal, Mark argued that the district court erred in (1) finding him in contempt for failure to pay for a portion of the children's 2016 medical expenses, real estate taxes, and a wilderness therapy program and requiring Mark to pay for his share of those expenses as part of a purge plan; (2) requiring him to pay for his share of the children's future medical expenses as part of the purge plan; (3) assessing interest; and (4) ordering him to pay Sonia's attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the portion of the order regarding contempt findings and purge provisions related to the children's 2016 medical expenses and future medical expenses must be deleted; and (2) there was no merit to Mark's remaining assignments of error. View "Becher v. Becher" on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued that the Department of Children and Family Services and the court failed to comply with Code section 224.2 by inquiring whether her child is or might be an Indian child within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother had “denied Native American ancestry for the family.”The court of appeal affirmed, finding any error harmless. The maternal grandmother is the only person Mother identified as a person who should have been asked about Indian ancestry; she had expressed her desire to adopt the child and to have the child placed with her. Under ICWA, when an Indian child is the subject of foster care or adoptive placement proceedings, “preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with .. a member of the Indian child’s extended family,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Maternal grandmother, Mother’s counsel, and the child.’s counsel, each of whom requested placement with the maternal grandmother, would have had a strong incentive to bring to the court’s attention any facts that suggest that she is an Indian child. Their failure to do so implies that the maternal grandmother is unaware of such facts. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Maria appealed the termination of her parental rights over her three children, who all have the same father, arguing that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to interview her extended family members about their Indian ancestry. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1901, gives Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation; where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 lists requirements to effectuate the Act’s policies. The court of appeal affirmed. The record does not support Maria’s argument that readily obtainable information would have shed meaningful light on whether the children are Indian children. There was a prior juvenile court finding that two of Maria’s children are not Indian children, the juvenile court asked Maria, the father, and paternal aunt about Indian ancestry, both parents eschewed Indian ancestry, and Maria was living with extended family members whom she could have asked about potential Indian ancestry. It was unlikely that any further inquiry of family members would have yielded information about Indian ancestry. View "In re Darian R." on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and vacated in part the juvenile court's order terminating the parental right of Parents, holding that the juvenile court's opinion was too affected by legal error to merit deference on appeal.After a hearing on the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The court found that both parents were unfit and had neglected the children and that termination was strictly necessary in the best interest of the children. After the adoptive placement with the uncle failed, the parents filed motions for post-judgment relief. The juvenile court denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated in part, holding that remand was required for a new best interest determination under the law as clarified in this opinion. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Mother's motion to relocate the parties' minor child, M.M., to Virginia, holding that the district court followed the correct procedures.Mother moved to relocate with M.M. to Virginia Beach, Virginia because her husband was required to relocate for work there and Father would not consent to the relocation. The district court granted Mother's motion. At issue on appeal was the correct interpretation of the best interests provision of Nevada's child relocation statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.007(1)(b), including the application of the custody best interests factors as well as the applicable burden of proof necessary to satisfy section 125C.007(1). The Supreme Court held (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.007(1)(b) requires the district court to make specific findings that relocation would be in the best interests of the child, which should include the custody best interest factors, and tie those findings to its conclusion; and (2) the applicable burden of proof for the threshold test is preponderance of the evidence. View "Monahan v. Hogan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing pending abuse and neglect proceedings after Child was returned to the care of Mother in South Carolina, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing the proceedings and placing Child with the non-offending parent.The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division removed Child from Father's care after he was arrested and incarcerated for assaulting his girlfriend. Mother requested that the district court dismiss the abuse and neglect proceedings or, in the alternative, place Child with her and confer with the South Carolina family court under the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The district court granted custody to Mother and ordered that the matter be dismissed upon confirmation of Child's return to South Carolina. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing the abuse and neglect proceedings after Child was returned to Mother's care in South Carolina. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition that alleged the mother (S.V.) had brandished a knife and pushed a female companion in the now-three-year-old child’s presence.A social worker inquired of S.V. about the child’s Indian ancestry; she did not give the social worker any reason to believe the child was or might be an Indian child. In preparing the detention report, a social worker interviewed the child’s maternal great-grandmother and maternal great-grandfather. It is not clear whether the social worker asked any relatives about the child’s Indian ancestry. S.V. filed a form stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry as far as she knew. If that changed, S.V. was to inform the court and the social worker. The juvenile court then inquired whether S.V. knew if alleged the father had Indian ancestry. She indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry. The court found it had no reason to know that the alleged father had Indian ancestry; his whereabouts were unknown.The court of appeal remanded. The first-step inquiry duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1903(2), requires the Department to interview, among others, extended family members and others who had an interest in the child. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law