Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Abby G. Poitier, now known as Abby G. Cullins, filed a complaint in the district court for Douglas County to modify a previously entered paternity decree, seeking increased parenting time with her child, S.B. On the day of the trial, she sought to voluntarily dismiss her complaint. The trial court granted the dismissal without conditions and proceeded to trial on the counterclaim filed by Brian P. Beatty, which included a request for attorney fees. Although Brian was not successful on his counterclaim, the district court awarded him a portion of his attorney fees, finding Abby's complaint to be frivolous and interposed solely for delay or harassment.The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order. The appellate court reasoned that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-603, the district court retained jurisdiction to consider Brian's counterclaim for attorney fees even after Abby dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the district court's award of attorney fees, noting that Abby had not made efforts to have a relationship with S.B. since 2019 and had dismissed her complaint on the day of trial without notice.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court agreed that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Brian's counterclaim for attorney fees and that the award of $1,500 in attorney fees was reasonable. The court found that Abby's actions were frivolous and interposed for delay or harassment, supporting the lower courts' decisions. View "Beatty v. Poitier" on Justia Law

Zachary Oxley and Tiffani Davis are the natural parents of MC1, born in June 2011. They were never married and had a brief relationship. After their separation, Davis had another child, MC2, with an unknown father and later married Patrick Davis. In 2016, during their divorce proceedings, Larry Lumpkins intervened, seeking custody of MC1 and MC2, claiming in loco parentis status. The court granted Lumpkins temporary custody, and Oxley later intervened to establish paternity of MC1, which was confirmed through DNA testing.The Lonoke County Circuit Court awarded custody of MC1 and MC2 to Lumpkins in 2018, granting Oxley visitation rights. Oxley did not appeal this initial custody order. In 2020, Oxley filed a petition to modify custody, alleging Lumpkins failed to comply with the visitation schedule and neglected MC1’s hygiene and care. The circuit court held a hearing in 2021, where Oxley presented evidence of Lumpkins’s neglect and obstruction of visitation. Despite expressing concerns, the court denied Oxley’s petition, citing the ad litem’s recommendation to keep MC1 and MC2 together and reinstated visitation for Oxley.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred by not applying the presumption in favor of Oxley as MC1’s fit, natural parent. The court held that a fit, natural parent is entitled to custody unless proven unfit, which was not established in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision, remanded with instructions to award Oxley sole primary custody of MC1, and vacated the court of appeals opinion. The mandate was issued immediately to facilitate MC1’s transition to Oxley’s custody. View "OXLEY v. LUMPKINS" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce between Clayton LeGault, Jr. (Husband) and Lisa LeGault (Wife). The key issue is the division of marital assets, specifically the treatment of Husband's defined benefit pension plan, which he had been contributing to for six years before the marriage. The parties separated in May 2022, and both filed for divorce. Wife proposed a division of assets that included her receiving 100% of her 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan, as well as 50% of the marital portion of Husband's pension. She also sought an offset of other assets to account for the premarital portion of Husband's pension.The Circuit Court (Manchester) divided Wife's 401(k) and Husband's deferred compensation plan equally and applied the Hodgins formula to divide Husband's pension. The court acknowledged Wife's argument that RSA 458:16-a, I, which includes all property acquired prior to the marriage as subject to distribution, might conflict with the Hodgins formula. However, the court felt bound by precedent and did not separate the premarital portion of the pension for division or offset by other marital assets. The court's final decree awarded Wife a significant portion of the marital estate, including half of the marital portion of Husband's pension.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court clarified that RSA 458:16-a, I, includes all property, including premarital portions of pensions, as subject to equitable distribution. The court held that Hodgins provides a default rule for pensions earned entirely during the marriage but does not address pensions with premarital portions. The court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure the premarital portion of Husband's pension is considered in the equitable distribution of assets. View "In the Matter of LeGault & LeGault" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parents, Bharathan Jeevanandam and Vanikala Bharathan, regarding child support payments. The parents divorced in 2012, and the father was ordered to pay child support to the mother, who had primary physical custody of their child. In 2021, the father filed a complaint for modification, seeking to terminate his child support obligation because the child was enrolled in a full-time residential program paid for by the municipalities. The Probate and Family Court terminated the father's child support obligation retroactively to January 1, 2022.The father then sought reimbursement from the mother for the child support payments made after the retroactive termination date. The Probate and Family Court ordered the mother to repay the father at a rate of $80 per week through the Department of Revenue Child Support Enforcement Division. The department, however, contended that it lacked the authority to enforce the reimbursement order because it was not an order for child support. The judge denied the department's motion for reconsideration, leading to the department's appeal.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and determined that the Department of Revenue does not have the authority to enforce a judgment requiring one parent to reimburse the other for overpayment of child support when the reimbursement does not go to support the child. The court held that the department's enforcement authority is confined to judgments, decrees, and orders that are "for the support and maintenance of a child" as defined by G. L. c. 119A, § 1A. Since the reimbursement in this case did not go to support or maintain the child, the court vacated the portion of the second amended judgment that required the department to enforce the reimbursement obligation through wage assignment. View "Jeevanandam v. Bharathan" on Justia Law

A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2019 and have one son together. Plaintiff moved out of the marital home in January 2023 and initiated divorce proceedings in March 2023. In April 2023, defendant was arrested and charged with weapon offenses after threatening a process server with a handgun. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in July 2023 under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on allegations of stalking and harassment. The court issued a TRO prohibiting defendant from contacting plaintiff, granting her temporary custody of their son, and denying defendant parenting and visitation time.During the final restraining order (FRO) hearing, plaintiff called defendant as a witness. Defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but the trial court ordered him to testify. Defendant refused to answer questions beyond stating his name, invoking the Fifth Amendment. The trial court ruled that defendant could not invoke the privilege and that an adverse inference could be drawn from his refusal to testify. Defendant appealed the decision.The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. While defendant's motion for leave to appeal was pending, the Appellate Division published T.B. v. I.W., addressing a similar issue. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted defendant leave to appeal.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that while the Fifth Amendment does not provide blanket immunity in PDVA FRO hearings, a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to specific questions that pose reasonable risks of self-incrimination. The court ruled that no adverse inference may be drawn from the exercise of this right. The PDVA immunity provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) is not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and does not adequately protect a defendant's rights. The trial court's ruling was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "M.A. v. J.H.M." on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of a two-year-old child named Layla, has a history of alcohol and illegal drug abuse. Both respondent and Layla tested positive for methamphetamine and THC at Layla's birth. Respondent admitted to using marijuana and unprescribed Valium on the same day she gave birth to her twin children. Layla lived with respondent and respondent's girlfriend, in a home that respondent claimed was infested with rats. A social worker from Swain County Department of Social Services (DSS) observed respondent behaving erratically and under the influence of drugs. Despite signing a safety plan that prohibited unsupervised contact with Layla, respondent violated the plan within days.The District Court of Swain County adjudicated Layla as a neglected juvenile based on respondent's continued drug abuse, erratic behavior, and failure to follow the safety plan. The court's findings included respondent's drug use, the unsafe living conditions, and the violation of the safety plan. Respondent appealed the adjudication order to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial court's order, stating that the trial court's findings lacked specific factual details about how respondent's actions impaired or risked impairing Layla's welfare. The appellate court required additional findings to support the conclusion of neglect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the conclusion of neglect. The court emphasized that while specific written findings of a substantial risk of impairment are not required, the trial court's findings must logically support the conclusion of neglect. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings, including respondent's drug abuse and unsafe living conditions, adequately supported the adjudication of Layla as a neglected juvenile. View "In re L.C" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce action between Tami Van Beek and Darrell Van Beek, who married in June 2007 and have three children. During the trial, both parties provided testimony and exhibits, and the court also received testimony from their children, school administrators, and Darrell's parents. The district court divided the marital estate, awarding Tami farmland and an equity payment of $700,000, while Darrell received crops, land rent, and vehicles. Tami was granted primary residential responsibility and child support based on Darrell's income of $48,000 per year. Tami was also awarded attorney’s fees.The district court's decisions were challenged by Darrell on several grounds, including the valuation and distribution of the marital estate, the exclusion of his insurance agent's testimony, the award of primary residential responsibility to Tami, the calculation of his child support obligation, and the award of attorney’s fees. The district court's distribution of marital property was reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the court's findings were generally upheld, except for the inclusion of potential income of $198,823 in the marital estate, which was reversed and remanded for reconsideration.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case. The court held that the district court erred in including the potential income of $198,823 in the marital estate and remanded for reconsideration of the allocation of the existing marital estate. The court also remanded for consideration of whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs with respect to the appeal would result in financial hardship to Darrell and, if appropriate, the amount of any award. The court affirmed the district court's decisions regarding the distribution of marital property, the exclusion of the insurance agent's testimony, the award of primary residential responsibility, and the calculation of child support. View "Van Beek v. Van Beek" on Justia Law

Heidi Holm and Joshua Holm were married in June 2021, and Heidi filed for divorce in April 2023. The couple has no children. During the divorce proceedings, Heidi filed two motions to compel discovery. The first motion was denied, and Joshua's request for attorney's fees was also denied. The second motion was granted, and Joshua was ordered to pay Heidi's attorney's fees due to his incomplete and untimely responses to discovery requests. The district court held a two-day trial, divided the marital assets and debts, and set a valuation date for the assets.The District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, initially scheduled the trial for November 13, 2023, but it was continued. The court set a valuation date of January 1, 2024, which was incorrect as per N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1), which requires the valuation date to be sixty days before the initially scheduled trial date. Despite this error, the court's use of the agreed-to valuations by the parties rendered the error harmless.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment and orders. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Joshua's request for attorney's fees, as his answer brief was untimely and his discovery responses were evasive. The court also upheld the district court's valuation of the marital assets, including the contents of Joshua's safe, the real property owned by Holm Empire Holdings, and the 2004 Chevy 2500 pickup truck. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court's valuation of X Marks the Spot Investments was within the range of evidence presented and that the division of marital property and debts was equitable. The court emphasized the district court's findings regarding Joshua's lack of credibility and attempts to hide assets. View "Holm v. Holm" on Justia Law

Sokunthim Nou appeals from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court in which the court allocated property between her and Rotanak Huot and awarded shared parental rights and responsibilities and shared residency of their children. Sokunthim challenges the court’s property determinations on multiple grounds, but does not contest the custody determination. The court found that all the parties’ assets were marital because they were acquired during the marriage and through significant effort by both parties. The court allocated just over half of the net value of the parties’ properties to Sokunthim and the remainder to Rotanak. The court also found Sokunthim’s income to be $435,598, based largely on Rotanak’s testimony about Punky’s LLC’s daily sales.The District Court held a trial with both parties represented by counsel and interpreters present. The court heard testimony from the parties, a real estate broker, Sokunthim’s accountant, and her father. The court entered a comprehensive divorce judgment, determining that all the parties’ assets were marital and allocating them accordingly. The court’s judgment awarded Panyah LLC to Rotanak and implicitly awarded Punky’s LLC to Sokunthim. Sokunthim filed motions for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law and for a new trial, which the court denied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court’s determination of Sokunthim’s income was unsupported by the evidence. The court’s finding as to her income may have influenced other financial aspects of the judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the division of property and child support award and remanded for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Nou v. Huot" on Justia Law