Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

ason Canerdy appealed a district court order denying his motion for contempt and his motion to modify primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. Jason and Samantha Canerdy were divorced in June 2020. The parties had two minor children. The judgment awarded Samantha primary residential responsibility and Jason reasonable parenting time. In April 2021, Jason filed a motion to modify the judgment to be awarded primary residential responsibility of the minor children, or in the alternative, be awarded equal residential responsibility. Jason also filed a motion for contempt for Samantha's interference with his parenting time. The district court denied Jason's motion for contempt and his motion to modify the judgment for primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. The court found that there was no evidence that Samantha disobeyed the judgment, and that she had not committed contempt of court. Further, the court found no persistent and willful denial of parenting time, no evidence that the children were in any danger, and no evidence that primary residential responsibility changed. The court stated that Jason did not take responsibility for his own inaction in regard to not spending as much time with his minor children because he did not regularly attend or participate in their dance activities. The court noted that Jason would seek to make up his parenting time when the dance activities occur on his scheduled weekend. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Jason established a prima facie case for modification and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Canerdy v. Canerdy, et al." on Justia Law

Thomas Kaspari appealed an amended judgment awarding spousal support to Jean Kaspari entered after the first appeal in this case. The district court ordered Thomas to pay $7,000 per month in spousal support to Jean until he turned 65 years old. Thomas argued the district court erred in the amount of spousal support it awarded, claiming: (1) the court failed to properly consider the distribution of the parties’ assets and debts; (2) the evidence did not support a finding of a need for support; and (3) the court improperly attempted to equalize the parties’ incomes. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that although the district court made findings about the Ruff-Fischer factors and considered Jean's need for spousal support and Thomas' ability to pay, the court failed to adequately explain its reason for awarding spousal support of $7,000 per month when Jean did not show a need for that amount. "The court was not required to provide a detailed calculation of Jean Kaspari’s need for spousal support, but it was required to make sufficient findings to provide a discernible basis for its decision. Without further explanation from the district court, the amount appears to be arbitrary or an attempt to equalize the parties’ incomes." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s spousal support decision and remanded for that court to make further findings explaining its decision or to reconsider the amount of support. View "Kaspari v. Kaspari" on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights to four-year-old Antonio R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, contending that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), required the Department to inquire of the maternal extended family members, and the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply despite the Department's insufficient inquiry. The court also concluded that the information in the hands of the extended family members was likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child. In this case, the error was prejudicial because the court did not know what information the maternal relatives would have provided had the Department or court inquired. Accordingly, the court conditionally affirmed and remanded for the juvenile court and the Department to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and California law. View "In re Antonio R." on Justia Law

Kristine and Jeffrey McInerney were married in 2003, and had two minor children. Kristine, who resided in Indiana with the two children, filed a complaint for divorce on May 1, 2020, in Bryan County, Georgia. At the time of the filing, the marital residence was in Bryan County, and Kristine believed Jeffrey resided there. However, Jeffrey moved to Chatham County shortly before Kristine filed for divorce. On July 2, 2020, Jeffrey sold the marital residence in Bryan County, and the sale proceeds were placed in a trust account as agreed to by the parties. In his answer and counterclaim, Jeffrey consented to venue and jurisdiction, and admitted he was a Georgia resident who resided in Bryan County within six months of the filing of the complaint for divorce. Approximately two months after she initiated the divorce action in Georgia, Kristine initiated a child custody action in Indiana. The parties agreed that Indiana had exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody action and all child custody and visitation issues. The parties later participated in mediation in Georgia in an attempt to resolve all issues relating to their divorce and the custody of their children, but were unable to come to an agreement. Jeffrey then filed a motion to dismiss the divorce case in Bryan County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1 (a). This appeal presented the question of whether a superior court could transfer or dismiss a divorce case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) without offending Article VI, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court held that with respect to the question of transfer of venue, OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) was consistent with the authority vested in the General Assembly by the Georgia Constitution to enact statutes that direct the superior courts on how to exercise their power to change venue. As to the question of dismissal, OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) was an exercise of the General Assembly’s plenary legislative power, not a matter of venue subject to the constitutional venue provisions. "The venue provisions do not limit the General Assembly’s authority to provide for the dismissal of a divorce case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens." However, because the trial court incorrectly analyzed some of the factors set forth in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a), the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "McInerney v. McInerney" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting respondent's request to move their daughter, H.P., from California to Illinois. The court concluded that the Family Code permitted counsel to determine what was in H.P.'s best interest and make that position known to the trial court; any reliance on hearsay did not prejudice petitioner; and substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that circumstances had changed so significantly that granting the move-away request was in H.P.'s best interest. View "Ramsden v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the nonprecedential opinion of the court of appeals instructing the district court to consider whether Rebecca Bender presented newly discovered evidence warranting relief from a child support order, holding that the district court should have determined whether Bender's proffered evidence warranted relief.Years after marriage dissolution and child support proceedings between Bender and Peter Bernhard, Bender filed a motion to modify the child support termination order based on "newly discovered evidence" under Minn. Stat. 518.145, subd. 2(2) and Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as may be just, a district court has discretion under section 518.145 to consider newly discovered evidence that arises after the court's underlying decision; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in finding that Bender's newly discovered evidence was not "new." View "Bender v. Bernhard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by answering that Texas law does not authorize certain state officials to directly or indirectly enforce the state's new abortion restriction requirements.Plaintiffs, who provided and funded abortions and support for women who obtain them in Texas, requested a declaration that Senate Bill 8, the "Texas Heartbeat Act," Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.201-.212, unconstitutionally restricted their rights and injunction prohibiting Defendants, state agency executives, from enforcing the Act's requirements. After a remand, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered answered that Texas law does not grant the state agency executives named as defendants any authority to enforce the Act's requirements, either directly or indirectly. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights with respect to two Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1903(4), and Iowa Code chapter 232B (Iowa ICWA), holding that the juvenile court erred in considering the best interests of the children on the narrow question of transfer to the tribal court.In 2018, the State commenced child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings involving the older child, and in 2019, the Sate commenced CINA proceedings against the younger child. The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska & Iowa (Tribe) was granted intervention and subsequently filed a motion to transfer the case to tribal court. The juvenile court denied the motion to transfer on the ground that it would not be in the best interests of the children. The court then terminated the parental rights of both parents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying the Tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction. View "In re T.F." on Justia Law

K.P. (mother) and D.P. (father) appealed juvenile court orders denying mother’s petitions to change the court’s order terminating her reunification services and thereafter terminating both of their parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. The petition for termination involved the parents' five children, and recounted the parents’ past abuse of the minors, the parents’ history of drug abuse, three of the children having been born with drugs in their system, the parents’ history with the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency), and the parents’ criminal history. A 2020 disposition report recommended the parents be bypassed for services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(13), due to the physical abuse of the minors and the parents’ extensive drug abuse. Later that year, father and mother filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court’s order denying them reunification services. The court summarily denied the parents’ section 388 petitions by written orders, finding for each: “[T]he request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstance” and “the proposed change of order . . . does not promote the best interest of the child.” After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petitions, but reversed its orders terminating parents’ parental rights. The Appellate Court found some evidentiary support for each element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, therefore the juvenile court's ruling there was inadequate evidence to support the exception was an abuse of discretion under the controlling caselaw. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to weigh the evidence presented under the applicable standard and, in its discretion, consider additional evidence. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law