Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parties are married and have three sons born between 2005 and 2013. After the parties separated, M.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO, Fam. Code 6200) against A.S. for herself and her sons, alleging that A.S. enlisted her friends and mother to talk her into reconciling with A.S., that he threatened to kill M.S.’s male friend and followed him to his home, and that he engaged their children to spy on her.The court granted the DVRO specifying M.S. and her children as protected parties after hearing evidence of A.S. stalking and harassing M.S. and that A.S. often slapped the children “upside the head,” pushed them down, and choked them “in the name of playing,” screamed at the children, called them derogatory names, and encouraged them to engage in physical violence with each other for entertainment, in addition to the “spying.” The court also granted M.S. temporary physical and legal custody of the children with supervised visitation for A.S. The court of appeal affirmed the three-year DVRO. There was sufficient evidence of good cause for including the children in the DVRO. View "M.S. v. A.S." on Justia Law

Tescari and Salame, Venezuelan citizens, have two minor children. Tescari removed the children from their home in Venezuela and brought them with her to the U.S. Salame filed a petition seeking their return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Abduction. Tescari and the children were granted asylum in the U.S.The parties stipulated that Salame had a prima facie of wrongful removal and retention. Tescari claimed an affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention, 22 U.S.C. 9003(e)(2). The court concluded Tescari failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her affirmative defense that returning the children to Venezuela would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the alleged abuse was relatively minor, the court had no discretion to refuse the petition nor to consider potential future harm. The determination that Salame could provide the children with shelter, food, and medication in Venezuela is not clearly erroneous. Despite Venezuela’s political schisms and civil unrest, Tescari failed to introduce sufficient evidence that it is a zone of war, famine, or disease. Any defects in the Venezuelan court system fall short of "an intolerable situation." While the factors that go into a grant of asylum may be relevant to Hague Convention determinations, the district court has a separate and exclusive responsibility to assess the applicability of an Article 13(b) affirmative defense. View "Ajami v. Solano" on Justia Law

David and Sara share joint legal custody of their five-year-old child. Initially, the child spent nearly 80 percent of his time with Sara. In 2017, David’s monthly income was $15,000; he paid $1,525 in monthly child support. Sara also received a $5,000 monthly gift from her father, which later increased to $7,500. In 2020, David moved to modify the child support order. His time with the child had increased to 42 percent; his monthly income had risen to $17,500. He also sought a seek-work order. Sara had not worked since 2013, The court reduced monthly child support to $891, retroactive to February 2020. In imposing a seek-work order, the court explained, “the policy of the State of California is that both parents should work and provide support for their minor child,” and that the order was in the “best interest of the child.”The court of appeal affirmed. Under Family Code section 4053, the trial court has the discretion to impose a seek-work order in an appropriate circumstance. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that such an order was in the “best interest of the child” and the order is consistent with various principles in section 4053. View "Haley v. Antunovich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dejaun Kendrick, individually and on behalf of her minor son, sued the estate of the deceased, Anthony Michael Barre, seeking filiation and child support. The estate filed exceptions of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action. The trial court granted the exceptions, but the court of appeal reversed. Finding an initial child support claim cannot be brought after the father’s death, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s ruling granting the exception of no cause of action. View "Kendrick v. Estate of Michael Barre, et al." on Justia Law

John Morris appealed the division of marital property in his divorce from Andrea Morris. He argued the superior court erred by: (1) crediting the opposing expert’s valuation of certain marital property; (2) refusing to credit him for post-separation mortgage and utility payments; (3) treating a particular marital debt improperly; (4) finding that a gift of marital property became his ex-wife’s separate property; and (5) declining to offset the property awarded to his ex-wife with money she received from their child’s insurance benefit. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order except for its treatment of the marital debt and its conclusion that the man’s gift of marital property was not returned to the marital estate by his ex-wife. View "Morris v. Morris" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court awarding retroactive child support in a paternity action initiated after the child reached the age of majority, holding that the three-year statute of limitations to bring a paternity action after the child reaches the age of majority applies to a parent's request for retroactive child support.Mother and Father had one child together. More than one year after the child turned eighteen, Mother filed a paternity action against Father in order to seek back child support. Mother asked the district court to recognize the parties' previous agreement for $400 per month under Nev. Rev. Stat. 126.900(1) and alternatively argued that, even absent an agreement, she was entitled to retroactive child support. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Mother's request for retroactive child support was timely; (2) because Mother was permitted to seek retroactive child support the district court abused its discretion by concluding that it did not have the authority to grant relief; and (3) because Father did not make a promise in writing to make monthly support payments, the district court correctly denied Mother's section 126.900(1) claim. View "Hargrove v. Ward" on Justia Law

Daniel Watanabe and Solveig (Watanabe) Pedersen divorced in 2016. During the marriage, Pedersen inherited a large sum of money and land after her mother passed away. At their dissolution trial, the court held that various real properties were Pedersen’s separate property, despite the fact that both Watanabe’s and Pedersen’s names were on the title for the properties. Watanabe appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to apply the joint title gift presumption since the property was acquired in both of their names during marriage. Watanabe also argued the trial court erred by allowing extrinsic evidence of Pedersen’s intent when she quitclaimed her separate property to the community. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the gift presumption did not apply, regardless of whether the property was acquired before or during marriage. The Court of Appeals also held that extrinsic evidence was appropriately admitted to determine whether Pedersen intended to transmute separate property, not to dispute the quitclaim deed itself. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the joint title gift presumption did not apply regardless of whether the property was acquired before or during marriage. In addition, the Supreme Court held that extrinsic evidence could be admitted to explain the intent of the parties when signing a quitclaim deed to determine whether a party intended to convert separate property into community property. View "In re Marriage of Watanabe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming a family court order of contempt, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the order sought to punish future contempt rather than present contempt.The family court ultimately held Appellant in contempt, found him to be $126,691 in arrears on his child support (including interest), and reduced his monthly payment. The court of appeals affirmed the order of contempt. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the family court's factual findings were not erroneous; but (2) because the family court sought to coercively punish Appellant's future conduct, the order was an abuse of discretion. View "Crandell v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Services ex rel. Dilke" on Justia Law

Procedurally, after an initial determination of child support and custody, Appellee Kirsten Friend (Mother) sought to modify the child support order and applied to find Appellant Brian Friend (Father) in contempt, claiming he had not paid child support for several months. The district court granted Mother's motions. The trial court found Father in indirect contempt and increased the child support payment. Mother asked for attorney fees and costs, dividing the request into fees incurred for the request to modify child support and fees incurred for the contempt request. Father objected but conceded the only issue was whether Mother was legally entitled to the fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, where a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees below, they are also entitled to appellate attorney fees; where an award of attorney fees is within the trial court's discretion, a prevailing party may be granted appellate attorney fees. View "Friend v. Friend" on Justia Law