Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The superior court determined that the marital estate should be divided 60/40 in the husband’s favor because of his lower earning potential. But the court then considered the husband’s sale of the marital home: remodeling expenses and financial dealings were inadequately explained, and contributed to a loss of marital equity. The court offset that loss by dividing the wife’s retirement savings plan 70/30 in her favor. And because the retirement savings plan was the most significant marital asset, this allocation resulted in a property division that highly favored the wife. The husband appealed the property division, and also in the trial court's calculation of child support order. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the property division failed to follow the proper procedure for addressing the post-separation dissipation of marital assets: first valuing the dissipated asset at the time of separation and then crediting that amount to the responsible spouse in the property division. The Supreme Court also concluded that a figure for the amount of lost marital equity used in the property division was clearly erroneous. The Court therefore vacated the property division and remanded for further consideration. In all other respects the superior court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Rohde v. Rohde" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of guardianship by the district court granting guardianship of Mother's son to his maternal grandparents, holding that the district court did not err in finding that continued efforts to reunify Mother and child would likely be unproductive.After a hearing, the district court granted the Department of Public Health and Human Services' petition for guardianship of six-year-old S.S. On appeal, Mother argued that the district court erred in finding that continued efforts to reunify Mother and S.S. would likely be unproductive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that additional reunification efforts would not be productive. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, Lucas D, holding that the trial justice did not err in deciding that Mother's parental rights should be terminated.After a trial, the trial justice issued a decision finding Mother to be unfit and determining that her parental rights should be terminated. Mother appealed, arguing that the Department of Children, Youth and Families failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed or allowed to be committed cruel and abusive conduct toward Lucas while in her care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was competent evidence to support the trial justice's finding that Mother was an unfit parent; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination was in the best interests of the child. View "In re Lucas D." on Justia Law

When members of the Public Employees’ Retirement Association (“PERA”) apply for retirement, they can choose between three options for benefit distribution. Generally, a retiree’s option choice is final. Pursuant to section 24-51-802(3.8), C.R.S. (2021), if a retiree chose either option 2 or 3 at retirement and the retiree’s then-spouse was named cobeneficiary, “the court shall have the jurisdiction to order or allow [the] retiree . . . to remove the spouse that was named cobeneficiary . . . in which case an option 1 benefit shall become payable.” In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether section 24-51-802(3.8) empowered a divorcing retiree to unilaterally remove a former spouse as named cobeneficiary and convert to option 1 retirement benefits. Assuming without deciding that this issue was adequately preserved for appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Instead, applying the statute’s plain language, the Court held that section 24-51-802(3.8) vested the trial court, not the retiree, with the authority to remove the former spouse as cobeneficiary and facilitate a conversion to option 1. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on different grounds. View "In re Marriage of Mack" on Justia Law

In 2017, Joanne Slaieh filed a divorce action against her husband, Nabeel Slaieh. A few years later, while the action was still pending, Nabeel was arrested on allegations of stalking and making criminal threats against Joanne, resulting in the opening of a criminal case against him. When Nabeel subsequently sought to depose Joanne in the divorce action, Joanne objected, citing a victim’s right under California's Marsy’s Law to refuse being interviewed or deposed by the defendant. Nabeel responded by filing a motion to compel her deposition, arguing Marsy’s Law applied to criminal proceedings only. After a hearing on the issue, the trial judge agreed with Joanne and denied Nabeel’s motion to compel. Nabeel filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the trial judge’s order and conclude the right to refuse a deposition contained in article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(5) of the California Constitution did not apply to a civil action like a marriage dissolution proceeding. He argued the text of Marsy’s Law made clear its protections applied in criminal proceedings only. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore granted the petition. View "Slaieh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In dividing the divorcing parties’ assets, a Massachusetts court ordered a special master to sell the Vermont property. After the sale, plaintiff filed an action in a Vermont superior court to rescind the sale and quiet title to the property. Applying the doctrine of comity, the civil division dismissed his action, deferring to the ongoing proceeding in Massachusetts. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Vermont court should not have dismissed his suit on comity grounds because the Massachusetts court lacked jurisdiction to order the special master to sell the property. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the Vermont court acted within its discretion and affirmed. View "Nijensohn v. Ring" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the juvenile court that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to the termination of parental rights proceedings below, holding that the juvenile court did not err in determining that Z.K. was not an "Indian child" under ICWA.After holding a hearing on the applicability of ICWA the juvenile court concluded that ICWA remained inapplicable to Z.K. Turning to the merits, the juvenile court found that the State's reasonable efforts to avoid the out-of-home placement had been unsuccessful and proceeded to terminate the parents' parental rights to Z.K. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court properly determined that Z.K. did not meet the definition of "Indian child" under the applicable ICWA statutes. View "In re Z.K." on Justia Law

M.G. (Mother) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her 11-year-old daughter, A.R., and her 10-year-old son, C.R., and placing them in a permanent plan of adoption by their paternal grandparents. M.G. did not challenge the merits of the order; instead, she argued it had to be reversed because the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to conduct an inquiry into whether the children had Native American ancestry, as required by the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal found an ICWA inquiry should be conducted in every case. "The tribes have a compelling, legally protected interest in the inquiry itself. It is only by ensuring that the issue of Native American ancestry is addressed in every case that we can ensure the collective interests of the Native American tribes will be protected. Thus, the failure to conduct the inquiry in each case constitutes a miscarriage of justice." In the interest of limiting any further delay, the Court conditionally reversed and remanded the case with instructions that SSA conduct the inquiry immediately, and that the trial court likewise resolve the issue as soon as possible. If the initial inquiry revealed no Native American heritage, then the judgment would be reinstated forthwith. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders pertaining to her children, citing the court’s findings that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. 1901) did not apply to the dependency proceedings. She argued that evidence of her children’s Native American ancestry triggered the duty under state law (Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2(e)) to further investigate whether her children come within the federal Act.The court of appeal vacated and remanded. The Department of Family and Children’s Services failed to comply with the statutory duty to further investigate whether the children are Indian children; the juvenile court’s negative ICWA findings were based on insufficient evidence. The social worker’s initial inquiry established a reason to believe the children are Indian children; both the mother and the maternal grandfather stated that “a maternal great grandfather may have Native American ancestry in Minnesota.” The court rejected an argument that further inquiry would be futile, and specifically that contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the State Department of Social Services would be an idle act. View "In re I.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying Mother's motion for relocation with the minor child of the parties, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The parties in this case were never married and together have a child. Pursuant to a court order, the parties were granted joint custody and Mother was granted physical placement of the child. The next year, Mother filed a motion to relocate with the child to the state of Florida. The trial justice denied the motion to relocate, concluding that relocation was not in the best interests of the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in denying the motion to relocate. View "Leon v. Krikorian" on Justia Law