Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

C.M., mother of four minors (mother), appealed juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. Her sole contention on appeal was that the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services and juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the ICWA. View "In re M.E." on Justia Law

C.O. (mother) appealed a court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter Z.O. The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for mother without providing grounds or explanation in the record, as it was required to do. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother that this error deprived her not only of the ability to participate at critical stages in the proceedings, but also the ability to effectively appeal and challenge the juvenile court’s reasoning for the appointment of the GAL (i.e., that mother lacked competence to understand the nature or consequences of the proceedings and to assist counsel regarding the underlying litigation). The Court concluded the trial court record did not give it "sufficient confidence" that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And as a result, the Court reverse the termination and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Z.O." on Justia Law

In 2019 a woman sued her former husband’s medical provider, alleging that from 2003 to 2010 the provider negligently prescribed the husband opioid medications, leading to his addiction, damage to the couple’s business and marital estate, the couple’s divorce in 2011, and ultimately the husband's death in 2017. The superior court ruled the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and rejected the woman’s argument that the provider should have been estopped from relying on a limitations defense. Because the undisputed evidence shows that by 2010 the woman had knowledge of her alleged injuries, the provider’s alleged role in causing those injuries, and the provider’s alleged negligence, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the claims accrued at that time and were no longer timely when filed in 2019. And because the record did not show that the woman’s failure to timely file her claims stemmed from reasonable reliance on fraudulent conduct by the provider, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable estoppel did not apply. View "Park v. Spayd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the court of appeals in this dissolution of marriage proceeding, holding that, contrary to the judgment of the lower court, Husband's concealment of a certain pension was intrinsic fraud.Throughout negotiation within the proceedings below, Husband failed to disclose his GE retirement pension. After Wife discovered the omission five years later she brought this action seeking to modify the dissolution decree by awarding her part of the pension, alleging extrinsic fraud. In response, Husband argued that the alleged fraud was intrinsic and that reasonable diligence on Wife's part would have led to the discovery of his pension within one year after entry of the order. The district court entered judgment for Wife. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the district court properly found the fraud was extrinsic but erred in determining that Wife would not have found the pension with reasonable diligence. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) Husband's concealment of the GE pension was intrinsic fraud; and (2) Wife would have discovered the pension within one year with reasonable diligence. View "In re Marriage of Hutchinson" on Justia Law

After declaring them dependents of the court, a California juvenile court removed M.V. and I.V. (together, Children) from the physical custody of their parents, J.V. (Father) and M.Z. (Mother), and placed them with a relative caregiver pending reunification efforts. Father, Mother, and the Children appealed those dispositional orders, arguing substantial evidence did not support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was substantial danger to the Children if they were returned home and that there were no reasonable means to protect them without removing them from their parents’ custody. After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the dispositional orders as to both Father and Mother. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

Appellant Raymond Dapo filed suit against his adoptive mother for sexual abuse that allegedly occurred 13 years earlier. He then agreed to release the adoptive mother from liability in exchange for her filing a third-party equitable apportionment claim against the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) and assigning the claim to him. OCS challenged the validity of this assignment. The superior court agreed with OCS that the assignment of the adoptive mother’s apportionment claim was void; it invalidated the assignment, dismissed the claim with prejudice, and awarded OCS attorney’s fees. Dapo appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court found that because a defendant prosecuting a third-party equitable apportionment claim possessed nothing in the claim itself that could be assigned, such claims are not assignable, and the Court affirmed the superior court’s invalidation of the assignment in this case. But the Supreme Court also concluded that it was error to dismiss the apportionment claim with prejudice; the Court thus vacated the order of dismissal and remanded for the court to provide the adoptive mother a reasonable time to decide whether to pursue the claim herself. View "Dapo v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

Mother appealed a family division order modifying legal parental rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact as to son. The court first issued a parental rights and responsibilities order in 2015, based on the parties’ agreement. In October 2017 father filed emergency motions to modify legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact, alleging that mother was suicidal and unable to care for son. On the same day, the court granted a temporary modification solely on the basis of father’s filings, awarding sole legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities to father pending a hearing to determine whether a longer-term modification would be appropriate. Following a hearing in January 2018, the court ordered the parties to return to the terms of the original 2015 parentage order, pending a final determination on the motions to modify. At the conclusion of merits hearings held in March 2020 and 2021, the family division issued its order dividing legal responsibility for son between the parties, awarding father responsibility for educational matters and mother responsibility for all other matters. Physical parental rights and responsibilities remained shared, but the court modified the parent-child contact schedule so that the parties alternated weeks on Fridays instead of Thursdays and mother would only care for son after school every other week. On appeal, mother argued this order should have been reversed because the court: (1) abused its discretion by dividing legal rights and responsibilities between the parties; (2) impermissibly relied on DCF history; (3) erred in allowing son’s attorney to participate at the merits hearing; and (4) did not make sufficient findings relative to son’s best interests. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vance v. Locke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court adjudicating Xandria P. as a juvenile under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), holding that there was no merit to the appeal.The court's order of adjudication found that Xandria was a juvenile under section 43-247(3)(a) who was abandoned by her parent, lacked proper parental care, or whose parent neglected or refused to provide proper or necessary care. The court found that the home environment created by Xandria's parents was injurious to her health, safety, morals, and well-being. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State sustained the adjudication petition by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the petition. View "In re Interest of Xandria P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting Mother's request for primary physical custody of the parties' daughter, V.F., and denying Father's request fo primary physical custody, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.Under a parenting order entered as part of their Arizona divorce the parties shared physical custody of V.F. Father later moved to South Dakota, registered the Arizona divorce and child custody order, and moved to modify the original shared parenting arrangement. Mother, who lived in California, opposed the motion and sought primary physical custody of V.F. The circuit court granted primary physical custody of the child to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court's decision to grant primary physical custody of V.F. to Mother was not an abuse of discretion. View "Flint v. Flint" on Justia Law

Bryon Updike appealed a divorce judgment, arguing the district court erred when it calculated child support and when it distributed the parties’ assets and debts. April Updike cross appealed, arguing the court erred when it failed to include a commencement date for the child support obligation. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court did not err when it imputed income to Bryon for purposes of child support, and the court’s property and debt distribution was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to include a child support commencement date that the parties agreed to on appeal, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Updike v. Updike, et al." on Justia Law