Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this marital dissolution proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding child support and failing to award retroactive child support, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The district court awarded Wife permanent child support of $1,800 per month from Husband and declined Wife's request for retroactive child support. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err or abuse its discretion in categorizing Husband's income from his father as "gift income," resulting in the exclusion of that income from the court's child support calculation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to award Wife retroactive child support. View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

In the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the issue presented for review centered on a district court's setting aside the adjudication and termination orders entered against A.P.’s parents, S.S. and D.P. under C.R.C.P.60(b)(5). Because the Parents failed to show that former Judge Natalie Chase was actually biased in their case, and because Rule60(b)(5) was reserved only for extraordinary circumstances not present here, the district court abused its discretion by misconstruing the law concerning impropriety and bias in this case, and misapplied Rule 60(b)(5) in granting the Parents' relief. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado in the Interest of A.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court declining to remove the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) as the guardian of certain children, holding that DHS acted unreasonably in failing to send relative notices as to the removal of the children and in failing to serve the children's best interests.The children at issue lived in their stepgrandmother's care for approximately eighteen months after they were adjudicated as children in need of assistance. The parental rights of the children's parents was subsequently terminated by the juvenile court. Later, acting as the children's guardian, DHS entered the children's home on the pretext of a visit and abruptly removed the children from their stepgrandmother's care to place them in foster care with strangers. The children's guardian ad litem filed motions for the immediate return of the children to their step grandmother, for a hearing on modification of placement, and to remove DHS as guardian. The juvenile court declined to remove DHS as the guardian. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DHS acted unreasonably by making the sudden change to the children's placement. View "In re K.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal court against his ex-wife, two state judges, and several others under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court sua sponte dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, pointing to related state court proceedings pending on appeal.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing his suit under Rooker-Feldman because the relevant state-court cases were pending on appeal when he filed this lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court’s judgment finding. The court explained that in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the district court relied on Hale and the court’s unpublished Houston decision.” The court concluded that Hale is no longer good law after Exxon Mobil and hold that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is pending when the federal suit is filed. The court further reasoned that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow” jurisdictional bar. It applies only to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. View "Miller v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law

N.G., the subject of this dependency proceeding, was born to mother M.S., in 2011. N.G.’s father had no meaningful relationship with N.G. M.S. met J.R., permissive intervenor in this case, in 2014. M.S. and J.R. had a child, N.G.’s half-brother, and married in 2015 but divorced in 2016. The children remained with M.S. and had regular visits with J.R. In August 2020, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (the Department) received a report that M.S. was neglecting the children by locking them in their bedrooms for long periods of time, exposing them to drug paraphernalia, and failing to properly feed them. In October, a juvenile court entered an agreed shelter care order that placed N.G. and his half-sibling with J.R. M.S. agreed to this placement in the dependency order. In the same month, J.R. moved for the juvenile court to grant concurrent jurisdiction over both children in family court so J.R. could modify his son’s parenting plan and petition for nonparental custody of N.G. The juvenile court granted the motion as to J.R.’s son but denied concurrent jurisdiction for N.G. “at this time.” Despite concurrent jurisdiction over N.G. being denied, J.R. petitioned for de facto parentage in family court in December. J.R. then filed a motion to intervene in the dependency. The juvenile court granted J.R.’s motion to intervene under CR 24(b) without explaining its reasoning. M.S. filed a motion for discretionary review with the Court of Appeals, which was ultimately denied. The Washington Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly denied the mother’s motion for discretionary review. "Although the trial court committed probable error when it failed to articulate why it allowed permissive intervention under CR 24(b)(2), the intervention of the dependent child’s former stepfather did not have an immediate effect outside the courtroom. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not commit probable error in denying discretionary review." View "In re Dependency of N.G." on Justia Law

Erin McAlister appealed trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to Georgia's equitable caregiver statute. McAlister contended the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver. McAlister also contended the trial court erred in denying her counterclaim for breach of a settlement agreement that the parties signed when they separated. Because Catherine turned 18 years old prior to the docketing of this appeal, McAlister's challenge to the award of visitation rights was moot. Those portions of the trial court's orders addressing the constitutionality of the equitable caregiver statute and the award of visitation, were vacated, and the trial court directed to dismiss Clifton's claim for visitation. However, because the record supported the trial court’s finding that McAlister failed to carry her burden of proving any damages from Clifton’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the court did not err in denying McAlister’s counterclaim. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the court’s judgment. View "McAlister v. Clifton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a probate court’s order denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 850 and sustaining objections thereto by Defendant; denying Plaintiff’s Petition for Letters of Administration; and granting Defendant’s Petition for Probate of Will.   At issue is whether a mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Defendant and his now-deceased wife entered into after separation and in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145, which operates as a statutory waiver of certain of Defendant’s rights as a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141, including the right to inherit from his deceased wife and to be appointed as the personal representative of her estate.   The Second Appellate reversed the probate court’s order and held that the MSA did effect a waiver of Defendant’s rights of a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141. The court reasoned that based on its independent review of the MSA and the undisputed record evidence, the written MSA signed by Defendant and his wife, each with the advice of counsel, constituted a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145. Further, the MSA is an enforceable waiver of his rights as a surviving spouse, as Defendant failed to point to any evidence he was not provided with “[a] fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of his wife prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the Estate of her ex-husband and against his widow individually and as administratrix of the Estate, claiming that her ex-husband misrepresented the value of his real estate investments during divorce proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground that the discovery rule did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the claims as time-barred; the district court did not consider whether Plaintiff’s claims should be tolled.   On appeal, Plaintiff invoked the discovery rule and equitable estoppel to argue that this suit, initiated more than thirteen years later, is nevertheless timely. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court further remanded for consideration the doctrine of equitable estoppel as to one of the contested investments.   The court reasoned that the discovery rule is not a tool to aid speculation or to validate a hunch. As Plaintiff has not shown that she had any “knowledge of facts” supporting the fraud within two years prior to initiating suit, she cannot invoke the discovery rule to save her claims. Further, Plaintiff failed to investigate her ex-husband’s assurances that his real estate investments were worth nothing, notwithstanding warning signs and ample opportunity to do so during the divorce proceedings. View "Koral v. Alsou Saunders, Est. of Gregg Saunders" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed after a court terminated her parental rights pertaining to three of her five children. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") failed to comply with its duty under California law to inquire whether the children are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act.DCFA filed a motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal, claiming post-appeal evidence mooted Defendant's appeal.The Second Appellate District granted DCFS's motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal. The court found that although DCFS was not timely in interviewing Defendant's children's relatives, DCFS eventually did so, making any prior failure harmless. The court also held that DCFS is not required to interview a child's great-grandparents because they are not considered "Extended family members under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1903(2). View "In re Allison B." on Justia Law