Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Golan, a U.S. citizen, married Saada, an Italian citizen, in Italy, where, in 2016, they had a son, B. In 2018, Golan flew to the United States and moved into a domestic violence shelter with B. Saada sought an order returning B. to Italy under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which requires that a child be returned to the child’s country of habitual residence upon a finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained unless the authority finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” The district court concluded that B. would face a grave risk of harm if returned to Italy, given evidence that Saada had abused Golan but ordered B. returned to Italy, applying Second Circuit precedent obligating it to “examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child” and concluding that ameliorative measures could reduce the risk to B. Following a remand, the Second Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated. A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for the return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. The Second Circuit’s rule, imposing an atextual, categorical requirement that courts consider all possible ameliorative measures in exercising discretion under the Convention, improperly elevated return above the Convention’s other objectives. A court reasonably may decline to consider ameliorative measures that have not been raised by the parties, are unworkable, draw the court into determinations properly resolved in custodial proceedings, or risk overly prolonging return proceedings. View "Golan v. Saada" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decrees of the family court denying the Department of Children, Youth, and Families' (DCYF) petition to terminate the parental rights of Parents to their child, holding that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence of parental unfitness in this case.On remand, after finding the facts by clear and convincing evidence, the trial justice concluded that DCYF had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with their child. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) the record demonstrated that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with their child, and the trial justice was clearly wrong to conclude otherwise; and (2) contrary to the trial justice's conclusion, DCYF proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory requirements supporting the termination of Parents' parental rights to their child. View "In re Nolan V-S" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.After a trial, the trial justice concluded that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit to parent her son and that it was in the child's best interest that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) in finding that the child had been placed with the Department of Children, Youth, and Families for at least twelve months and that there was not a substantial probability that the child could return to Mother’s care within a reasonable period of time; and (2) in finding that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re Donnell R-H" on Justia Law

Parents of the two children at issue in a juvenile dependency case repeatedly denied having any American Indian heritage. The social services agency spoke with several of the parents’ relatives but never asked those relatives whether the children had any American Indian heritage. Nearly 30 months into the proceedings and on appeal from the termination of her parental rights, the biological mother objected that the agency did not discharge its statutory duty to inquire whether her children might be “Indian children” within the meaning of the state’s broader version of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court explained that there is no dispute that the agency did not properly discharge its statutory duty. However, the critical inquiry is whether the error was harmless and how harmlessness is to be assessed. The court offered a fourth rule: An agency’s failure to discharge its statutory duty of initial inquiry is harmless unless the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that the children at issue may be “Indian child[ren],” in which case further inquiry may lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile court.   Here, the court held that the error was harmless, because the record contains the parents’ repeated denials of American Indian heritage, because the parents were raised by their biological relatives, and because there is nothing else in the record to suggest any reason to believe that the parents’ knowledge of their heritage is incorrect. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

Santa Cruz County Human Services Department filed a juvenile dependency petition, Welfare & Institutions Code section 361(c), concerning an 11-year-old girl, then residing with her father. The whereabouts of her mother were unknown. It was alleged that father had physically abused the minor. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, found the allegations of the petition true, and adjudged the minor a dependent of the court. Father received family reunification services for 17 months. The court found legal guardianship with the minor’s maternal grandparents to be the appropriate permanent plan, found that visitation of the minor by father would be detrimental, and ordered that father have no contact with the minor.After a contested six-month post-permanency review hearing in which the court heard testimony, it reaffirmed the detriment finding and denied visitation. Father renewed his request for visitation at the 12-month post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court denied father’s request for a contested hearing, reaffirmed the detriment order, and denied his request for visitation. The court of appeal affirmed. Father, as the parent of a child where the permanent plan is legal guardianship, did not have an unqualified statutory right nor an unfettered due process right to a contested post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court did not err in requiring him to make an offer of proof in support of his request for a hearing. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Husband filed a petition seeking appointment as guardian over his wife. The parties' daughter, Christy Hladik, objected and sought to have herself appointed. In July 2020, the trial court entered the Court's First Amended Plan for Care and Treatment of Ward and Management of Property of the Ward. A month later, the trial court appointed daughter as guardian over the person and property of Wife. Husband appealed, and on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's own motion, the matter was retained. After reviewing the record and briefs, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings. View "Walterscheidt v. Hladik" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion to intervene in the underlying child abuse and neglect proceedings and reunifying the child with Mother, holding that there was no error.Petitioners, the foster parents of the two children in this case, moved to intervene in the underlying proceedings, but the circuit court denied intervention. The court then ordered that the child be reunified with Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court properly denied Petitioners' motion to intervene in the underlying child abuse and neglect proceedings. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order entered by the district court dismissing Grandmother's petition for grandparent visitation for lack of standing, holding that there was no error.Grandmother petitioned against Mother and Father for visitation rights with the three children at issue in this case under the Grandparents and Great-grandparents Visitation Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 1801-1806. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, concluding that Grandmother did not prove that she had a sufficient existing relationship with the children. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court applied the correct standard of proof and that the record did not compel the court to make factual findings in Grandmother's favor. View "Fiske v. Fiske" on Justia Law

Respondents B.A. and J.W., adopted S.A., a minor, and his two younger siblings. In 2020, S.A. had homicidal and suicidal ideations and allegedly acted out against his siblings. S.A. was eventually placed in foster care at the request of B.A., J.W., and A.W. (collectively, “Parents”). After initially opening a voluntary case, the Park County Department of Human Services (“Department”) filed a petition in dependency or neglect as to S.A. The district court, sitting as a juvenile court, adjudicated S.A. dependent or neglected on September 16, 2021. The juvenile court, after conducting a series of hearings, reviewing the proposed treatment plans, and considering the parties’ position statements, ordered therapeutic sibling visits between S.A. and his two younger siblings “[p]ursuant to [section] 19-7-204,” C.R.S. (2021). The court entered this order over Parents’ strenuous objection. Parents then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court. The Court found that neither the Foster Youth Siblings Bill of Rights, nor the dependency or neglect provisions of the Colorado Children’s Code, granted the juvenile court personal jurisdiction over the siblings. Additionally, the court’s personal jurisdiction over the parents and its subject matter jurisdiction over the case did not grant the court authority over the non-dependent siblings. Accordingly, the Court vacated the juvenile court order, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado in the int. of S.A., a Child" on Justia Law

John Moss was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III) after he pleaded no contest to the charge. The charge stemmed from allegations made by defendant’s adoptive sister. In exchange for his plea, the trial court dismissed the other charges that had been brought against defendant, including another count of CSC-III, and a fourth-offense habitual-offender enhancement. Defendant and the complainant did not have a birth parent in common, but they were both adopted by the same woman. After sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing for the first time that he was not related to the complainant by either blood or affinity. The trial court denied the motion, determining that, although the adoptive siblings were not related by blood, they were related by affinity. Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals; the Court denied the application in an unpublished order. Defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address whether a family relation that arises from a legal adoption was either effectively a blood relation, or a relation by affinity, as those terms were used in MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520e. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, reasoning that defendant and the complainant were effectively related by blood. With that finding, the appeals court considered it unnecessary to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by affinity, but it did so anyway because of the remand order and concluded that they were not related by affinity. Defendant again sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant and the complainant, were adoptive siblings, and were not related by blood for purposes of the statute. "[T]he Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise." Because the order directing oral argument on the application only asked the parties to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by blood, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that defendant and the complainant were not related by affinity was left undisturbed. Because an adequate factual basis for defendant’s plea did not exist in light of the Courts’ legal rulings, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Moss" on Justia Law