Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court denying Mother's petitions to terminate the parental rights of Father to the parties' two children, holding that the trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support the denial of the termination petitions.Mother filed petitions to terminate Father's parental rights in the children, alleging that Father had willfully failed to pay for the support of the children and had abandoned and neglected the children. The trial court denied the petitions to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's orders, holding that the trial court's findings of fact did not permit meaningful appellate review and were thus insufficient to support the trial court's denial of the termination petitions. View "In re B.F.N." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Father's parental rights to his two children pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(a)(3), holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.On appeal, Father argued that a finding of unfitness was at odds with the evidence presented and that the Department of Children, Youth and Families did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) legally competent evidence existed to support the trial justice's findings as to parental unfitness; (2) the trial justice's conclusion on the issue of reasonable efforts to reunify was not clearly erroneous; and (3) there was no error either in the permanency hearing, as conducted by the trial justice, or in the subsequent decision. View "In re Jae'La G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights for failure to comply with a court-ordered family service plan and knowingly engaging in criminal conduct resulting in his inability to support his child for at least two years, holding that the evidence was not sufficient to support termination.The trial court terminated Father's parental rights under Tex. Fam. Code 161.001(b)(1)(O) and (Q). The court of appeals affirmed the subsection (O) finding without reaching the question of whether evidence supported termination under subsection (Q). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals, holding that the order at issue did not support termination under subsection (O). View "In re A.L.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court in the underlying partition action, holding that Subchapter C of Chapter 9 of the Family Code supplements, rather than supplants, the remedial options available to former spouses who wish to divide property that went undivided in divorce.In 1987, the legislature enacted Subchapter C, which created a new option - besides partitions - for former spouses to divide property that escaped division in divorce. Subchapter C set forth a "just and right" standard for a judge to divide community property post-divorce. At issue was whether Subchapter C made that new remedy the exclusive remedy and vested exclusive jurisdiction over that remedy in the original divorce court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding (1) if either former spouse prefers the "just and right" standard, Subchapter C supplies it; and (2) the statutory text does not impose any jurisdictional restrictions. View "S.C. v. M.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals summarily dismissing Appellant's appeal from the order of the district court that dismissed her amended complaint for grandparent visitation, holding that the court of appeals erred when it dismissed the appeal rather than reversing the district court's dismissal and remanding the cause with directions.The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint with prejudice after it determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the minor child's father had not been given notice of the proceedings. The court of appeals summarily dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-323 required the district court order that the father, as an indispensable party, be brought into the action before it dismissed the action for lack of an indispensable party; and (2) the court of appeals erred by endorsing this dismissal. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bruce Querbach sought to overturn a final order of the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) which determined that reports to DHS that petitioner had abused two children were “founded.” The circuit court, reviewing the order as an order in other than a contested case, assumed that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard in that rule was a “probable cause” standard. After holding a trial to develop the record for review, as required by Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 996 P2d 958 (2000), the circuit court concluded that only two of DHS’s four “founded” determinations could be sustained under that standard. On petitioner’s appeal and DHS’s cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the circuit court’s application of a “probable cause” standard and, instead employing the “reasonable suspicion” standard that it had used in an earlier, similar case, concluded that not just two, but three of DHS’s “founded” determinations had to be sustained. Appealing to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that “probable cause” was the correct standard for determining that a report of abuse is founded and that none of DHS’s “founded” determinations hold up when the record on review was considered under that standard. Petitioner also argued that, given that the circuit court found that the DHS investigation and analysis into the reported abuse was incomplete and flawed in various respects, the “founded” determinations had to be set aside. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that three of the four “founded” dispositions were supported by substantial evidence. View "Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Mother's appeal from two juvenile court permanency and review orders and from the juvenile court's decision denying her motion to close the case for want of jurisdiction, holding that none of the juvenile court orders from which Mother appealed were appealable orders.The State filed a neglect petition alleging that Mother neglected her child. As the case progressed, the juvenile court held review and permanency hearings, in connection with which it issued orders. Mother appealed two of those orders and the denial of her motion to close the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the orders appealed from did not affect Mother's substantial rights and were not appealable. View "JW v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Diana Myers's Wyo. R. Crim. P. 60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from the parties' martial settlement agreement and divorce decree, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.In 2019, Diana and Griffin Myers divorced. In 2021, Diana filed her motion seeking relief from the settlement agreement and divorce decree on the grounds that an asset divided pursuant to the divorce was worth significantly more than Diana believed during mediation. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Diana had no right to discovery on her Rule 60(b) motion; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Diana's motion asserted improper grounds, was untimely, and failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances. View "Myers v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the written dispositional orders entered by the circuit court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two children, holding that the dispositional orders failed to include findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support the termination of parental rights.The Department of Health and Human Resources filed a motion alleging that the termination of Mother's parental rights was required by W. Va. Code 49-4-605(a)(1) because the children had been in foster care for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The Supreme Court vacated the orders below and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court (1) erroneously entered written dispositional orders that contained none of the findings required by W. Va. Code 49-4-604(c)(6) for termination of parental rights; and (2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

Ohio’s Necessaries Statute permits creditors to collect certain debts from one spouse incurred by the other.. Seeking to recover outstanding legal defense bills owed by Snyder’s husband, who had been convicted of embezzlement, Finley filed a debt-collection lawsuit against Finley and her husband, asserting joint liability. Snyder contends that the lawsuit was “objectively baseless” and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e.The Sixth Circuit reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Finley. The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly held that the Necessaries Statute does not impose joint liability on a married person for the debts of a spouse. A creditor must first seek satisfaction of its claim from the assets of the spouse who incurred the debt and must show that the debtor-spouse is “unable to pay” for a non-debtor spouse to be liable under the Necessaries Statute. Finley’s claims against the husband remain pending in the Ohio state trial court. View "Snyder v. Finley & Co., L.P.A." on Justia Law