Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Marie Yammine, as former wife and primary beneficiary of a two million dollar life insurance policy issued by Respondent ReliaStar Life Insurance Company to her former husband, Dr. Jean Bernard, appealed a declaratory judgment finding the contingent beneficiary, Appellee Roland Ghoussoub, was entitled to the policy's death benefit. Dr. Bernard died after the trial court granted the parties' divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues. The trial court declared Yammine and Bernard were divorced and that 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) operated to revoke her beneficiary designation to the death benefits. Whether Oklahoma's revocation-upon-divorce statute, 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A), applied when one party dies after the granting of the divorce but prior to final judgment on all issues, was a matter of first impression for the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Court concluded Section 178(A) required a final judgment on all issues, and that the trial court erred by interpreting 15 O.S.2011 § 178(A) to revoke Yammine's beneficiary designation in Bernard's life insurance policy based on an order granting divorce when the final judgment on all issues remained pending at husband's death. The trial court's declaratory judgment was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghoussoub v. Yammine" on Justia Law

Patricia and Thomas married in 1989 and had twins in 1996. A judgment dissolving their marriage was entered in 2002. Thomas began representing himself. In 2005, the court deemed Thomas a vexatious litigant and issued an order prohibiting him from filing new motions or litigation when representing himself without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge (Code Civil Procedure 391.7). In 2018, the trial court reaffirmed its vexatious litigant finding and again imposed a prefiling order. Representing himself, Thomas appealed. His briefs contained “menacing” and “odious” language making “implicit threats" against members of the judiciary and attorneys. Thomas challenged those orders and rulings made years earlier.In 2020, the court of appeal declined to consider Thomas’s challenges to the long-final orders and warned Thomas that further “use of the appellate process to threaten” would “result in an order of sanctions.” The court upheld the 2018 vexatious litigant and prefiling orders. In 2021, Thomas filed seven requests to file new litigation, along with numerous other documents. The court determined the requests to file lacked merit and had “no basis or legitimate purpose.” The court of appeal denied a writ petition and notified Thomas it was considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, giving him the opportunity to address possible sanctions. The court subsequently dismissed the appeal as “objectively and subjectively frivolous.” View "Marriage of Deal" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether a district court erred in dismissing a a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities (“APR”) filed by Steven Cook (“Stepfather”) for lack of standing. The Court reaffirmed that neither exclusive physical care nor parental consent was required for a nonparent to establish standing to petition for an APR under section 14-10-123(1)(c), C.R.S. (2021), of Colorado’s Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (“UDMA”). Thus, the Court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Stepfather’s APR petition and its award of attorney fees against Stepfather pursuant to section 13-17-102, C.R.S. (2021), and remanded for further proceedings. View "Parental Responsibilities of: E.K." on Justia Law

Father appealed a sanctions order imposed by the family division enjoining him from submitting filings in this case unless the filing was signed by a licensed attorney or he first obtained permission from the court. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court acted within its discretion in sanctioning father given his pattern of filing numerous motions that lacked factual or legal support, failing to adhere to procedural rules, and acting without good faith. The Court concluded, however, that the court’s order was overly broad in scope because it applied to all of father’s submissions to the court in this matter and did not clearly provide father with instructions on how to comply. Therefore, the case was remanded for the trial court to amend its sanctions decision accordingly. View "Fox v. Fox" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court applying the endangerment standard of the child-custody modification statute, Minn. Stat. 518.18(d)(iv), to a noncustodial parent's motion for joint legal custody of the parties' child based on their prior stipulation to apply the statutory best-interests standard set forth in Minn. Stat. 518.18(d)(i), holding that the district court erred.The noncustodial parent's modification motion in this case was expressly predicated on section 518.18(d)(i), which provides that the statutory best-interests standard set forth at Minn. Stat. 518.17 applies if the parties previously agreed in a court-approved writing to the application of that standard. The district court denied the motion for custody modification without holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by requiring the noncustodial parent to establish a prima facie case for a change in custody based on the statutory endangerment standard in section 518.18(d)(iv). View "Woolsey v. Woolsey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her minor child, holding that the termination order was properly entered pursuant to Rules 52 and 53 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.The trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights in her child based on an adjudication of grounds under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(6) and (9) and a determination that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the order was supported by the presumption of regularity, which Mother failed to rebut, as well as an unchallenged finding of fact. View "In re E.D.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to three of her minor children, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights.The Department of Social Services moved to terminate Mother's parental rights to the three juveniles on the grounds of neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, willful failure to pay for the cost of care for the juveniles, and abandonment. The trial court concluded that grounds existed for termination pursuant to each of the grounds alleged and that it was in the juveniles' best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's amended termination order was entered without jurisdiction, but the findings of fact in the trial court's original order supported the adjudication on the ground of neglect; and (2) Mother failed to show prejudice from any alleged error by her trial counsel. View "In re B.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child, holding that the trial court erred in adjudicating the existence of grounds to support a termination of Father's parental rights.At the conclusion of a termination hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to support the termination of Father's parental rights and that it was in the child's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in adjudicating the existence of grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) or (7) because the termination of parental rights motion failed to provide sufficient notice to Father that his parental rights were potentially subject to termination under those grounds. View "In re D.R.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to the juvenile who was the focus of this matter, holding that Stepmother had standing to initiate the termination action and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights.Stepmother filed a private petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to her minor child, alleging as grounds for termination willful abandonment of the child within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7). After a trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Stepmother satisfied the relevant statutory requirements to file a private petition for termination of parental rights; (2) clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of abandonment existed for the termination of Mother's parental rights; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re A.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her minor child, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights.After a hearing, the trial court for that the grounds for termination alleged in the termination petition filed by the Department of Social Services existed and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's properly supported findings demonstrated that Mother's parental rights in the child were subject to termination on the basis of neglect. View "In re M.K." on Justia Law