Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights as to her three children, holding that any violation of the children's alleged constitutional right on the part to conflict-free counsel was harmless error.The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights due to her failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that Mother could assume a responsible role in the children's lives within a reasonable time. On appeal, Mother argued (1) her children had a procedural due process right to conflict-free counsel under the state and federal constitutions, and (2) the trial court violated this right by failing to inquire into whether the attorney appointed to represent them had a conflict of interest due to the children's conflicting goals concerning reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even if the children had a constitutional right to conflict-free counsel, any violation of such a right was harmless error. View "In re Amias I." on Justia Law

Now four-year-old M.G. is fed through a G-tube due to his diagnoses of esophageal reflux, generalized intestinal dysmotility, and laryngomalacia. He is also eligible for Regional Center Services due to a developmental disability. Both parents are Regional Center consumers due to their developmental disabilities and are former foster children. During a medical appointment, the parents did not know M.G.’s feeding schedule and told the treating physician they were aggressive and hit each other. M.G. was temporarily placed in a medical foster home. DCFS filed a petition. The court found that the parents have violent altercations and mental and emotional problems and developmental delays rendering them incapable of caring for M.G., ordered M.G. removed from the custody of his parents, and ordered reunification services and monitored visitation for both parents. Ultimately, the court terminated their parental rights.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship analysis as set out by the California Supreme Court in “Caden C.” (2021) and instead considered factors Caden C. deems improper. Substantial evidence does not support the finding of “no bond.” The focus is not on whether M.G.’s parents can assume their parental roles but on whether M.G. will be harmed by the termination of the relationship. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

In this case concerning the scope of the litigation privilege, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the protection afforded by the litigation privilege applies even where the statements in question are fraudulent misrepresentations and that the litigation privilege extends to actions taken during the course of litigation.Plaintiffs were creditors of William von Thaden, who was married to Kimberly von Thaden until their divorce. Defendant represented Kimberly in the divorce proceedings. Before they filed the instant complaint against William and Kimberly Plaintiffs had asserted several claims against William related to contract disputes. William subsequently declared bankruptcy. Plaintiffs then commenced this action against Defendant, seeking to hold him liable for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations he made to the court during the divorce trial. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of this complaint, holding that the litigation privilege applied under the circumstances of this case. View "Bassichis v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that when a district court seeks to determine if the movant has demonstrated a prima facie case for modification of child custody under Rooney v. Rooney, 853 P.2d 123 (Nev. 1993), the court must generally consider only the properly-alleged facts in the movant's verified pleadings, declarations, or affidavits and may not consider alleged facts or offers of proof provided by the nonmoving party.Despite announcing the above general rule, the Supreme Court also announced an exception that a district court may look to the nonmovant's evidentiary support when it "conclusively establishes" the falsity of the movant's allegations. The Court's opinion further reiterated that a movant must first show the district court with specific, properly-alleged facts that his or her motion to modify child custody is potentially meritorious on its face before courts will decide a case fully upon its merits. The Court then held that because the movant's declarations in this case established a prima facie case for modification, the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "Myers v. Haskins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Respondent was conclusively presumed to be the child's legal father based on positive DNA test results and that his status as such gave him rights incident to a parent-child relationship, holding that there was no error.After determining that Respondent was the biological father of the child at issue the court entered a child custody decision awarding Respondent joint physical custody with the child's mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted and applied the Nevada Parentage Act (NPA), Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 126, in concluding that Respondent was conclusively presumed to be the child's legal father based on the DNA test results; and (2) the district court's order establishing joint physical custody comported and the evidence and the preferences set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 125C. View "Martinez v. Avila, Jr." on Justia Law

G.V. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights as to his newborn daughter (E.V.) and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. He argued the court and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to adequately inquire into the child’s Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 SSA conceded there were two errors with respect to duties under ICWA, but they were harmless. Alternatively, SSA moved the Court of Appeal to receive additional new evidence (that was not previously presented to the juvenile court) that allegedly rendered the appeal moot, or at least demonstrated any inquiry errors as to ICWA had to be deemed harmless. The Court denied the motion, and found that under In re A.R., 77 Cal.App.5th 197 (2022), all cases where the ICWA inquiry rules were not followed mandated reversal. Judgment was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for compliance with ICWA. View "In re E.V." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage) related to all three of her children. After hearing the evidence of Defendant's untreated mental health issues and her abuse of her oldest daughter, C.S., the court immediately terminated dependency jurisdiction over C.S. The court entered a juvenile custody order granting sole physical and legal custody of C.S. to the child's father with monitored visitation for Defendant in a therapeutic setting when C.S.'s therapist thought that she was ready. Defendant appealed.On appeal, Defendant claimed that the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction after it granted sole physical and legal custody to C.S.'s father without first providing services that attempted to repair the relationship between Defendant and C.S. and that the court's order impermissibly delegated the authority to C.S.'s therapist.The Second Appellate District affirmed. At the point when the juvenile court determined that Defendant posed a risk to C.S. and the court's decision to allow monitored visits resolved that issue. Thus, there was no reason for the court to retain jurisdiction over the case. Because C.S. remained with her father, Defendant did not have a right to reunification services. Regarding Defendant's impermissible-delegation claim, the court held that it was one of two viable options, the other being to deny visitation altogether. Here, C.S.'s therapist does not have any discretion about whether visits would be allowed, only when they should commence. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a stepfather’s petition for custody and support of a child filed three years after the stepfather and mother divorced. The stepfather based his petition on the underlying divorce and the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611 (1989). The magistrate court ultimately dismissed the stepfather’s petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the stepfather, who never adopted the child, had brought a common law custody claim under Stockwell, which was specifically prohibited in Doe v. Doe, 395 P.3d 1287 (2017). The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the magistrate court’s decision and affirmed the judgment of dismissal. View "Glatte v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Appellant the mother of six-year-old M.B., appealed the August 31, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and the notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe failed to include the birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great-grandfather as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) and related California law.   The Department argued that Appellant’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and that any omission of required information from the ICWA-030 notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe was harmless because its post-appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the May 13, 2021 order denying Appellant’s section 388 petition. However, the court conditionally affirmed the August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. The court explained that rather than attempt to moot Appellant’s appeal by belatedly conducting the investigation required by section 224.2, the Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a conditional reversal with directions for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law.   Further, the court wrote for its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, far more is required than passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its statutory obligations. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Delaware and against the City of Seaford in the State's action seeking injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of the City's ordinance entitled "Ordinance Relative to Abortion" and a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid, holding that the ordinance was preempted by Delaware law.In 2021, the City enacted the ordinance, which mandates that all fetal remains resulting from an abortion or miscarriage be cremated or interred. In its lawsuit, the State argued that the ordinance conflicted with state law, making it invalid under the doctrine of preemption. The Court of Chancery granted relief, holding that the ordinance conflicted with Delaware's statutory scheme requiring an official record of death before human remains can be cremated or interred. View "State v. City of Seaford" on Justia Law