Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Parents' parental rights in their twin sons, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.After a hearing, the trial court entered an order concluding that grounds existed to terminate Parents' parental rights on the grounds set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3), (6), and that it was in the children's best interests for Parents' parental rights to be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that Parents' parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(3) and that the termination of Parents' parental rights would be in the children's best interests. View "In re J.C.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her three children and an order terminating Father's parental rights to one of those children, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion.After a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the existence of grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights to her children pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3) and (6) and the existence of grounds to terminate Father's parental rights to his child pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (6), and (7). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting an inquiry into Mother's competency; (2) the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law supported its adjudication of grounds to terminate Father's parental rights for willful abandonment; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was in the child's best interests to terminate both parents' parental rights. View "In re J.A.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights in his three children, holding that the findings supported the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate Father's parental rights.Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order determining that three grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights for neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and failure to pay for a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juveniles. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3). The trial court further concluded that it was in the children's best interests that Father's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that grounds existed pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(3) to terminate Father's parental rights. View "In re M.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights, holding that a substitute judge may not make new factual findings or conclusions of law under Rule 52 and Rule 63 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.After the district court terminated Father's parental rights to his child the Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the case for additional findings of fact. On remand, the matter was assigned to a substitute judge, who issued a new order finding that the child was neglected and terminating Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter for a new hearing, holding that the substitute judge lacked authority to make new, dispositive findings of fact under Rule 52. View "In re K.N." on Justia Law

Mother D.S. (“Mother”) appealed the order terminating her parental rights to daughter, M.M., arguing the adoption assessment prepared by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“Department)” was inadequate, the court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a bonding study, and the Department conducted an inadequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Mother argued the Department’s adoption assessment was inadequate and failed to sufficiently include a review of the nature and frequency of the contact between Mother and M.M. The court held that Mother’s claim fails on its merits. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to termination of parental rights if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Here, the court found that Mother did not satisfy the first prong of the exception because her visitation had been inconsistent.   Further, the court found that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Mother’s belated request for a bonding study and continuance, on the day of the section 366.26 hearing that had been pending for several months. Mother had not maintained regular visitation, so the parental-benefit exception was inapplicable.   Finally, there is nothing in the record indicating Mother and Father might have been unaware of having Indian ancestry. The court, therefore, rejected Mother’s “unvarnished contention that additional interviews of [relatives] would have meaningfully elucidated the children’s Indian ancestry.” View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court confirming a foreign custody order, holding that the language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 125A.465 is plain and unambiguous and that the challenges to the registration of the foreign custody order were untimely.At issue was the proper interpretation of the portion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act that precludes a party from challenging the registration of foreign child custody orders under section 125A.465 if the party fails to do so within twenty days of receiving notice of the request to register. Appellant, the father to the two minor children whose custody was at issue, filed a challenge to Respondent's attempt to register. The district court gave full faith and credit to the order and registered it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under section 125A.465's plain and unambiguous language this Court must apply the statute's twenty-day deadline to preclude untimely challenges to the registration of a foreign custody order. View "Blount v. Blount" on Justia Law

LuAnn Erickson appealed a district court order granting her motion to vacate its previous order recognizing a tribal court restraining order under N.D.R.Ct. 7.2, but concluding that the tribal court restraining order was entitled to full faith and credit under 18 U.S.C. § 2265. Erickson argued that the court erred in granting full faith and credit to the tribal court order, because the tribal court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court failed to provide her reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. Specifically she averred she was not properly served with the tribal court proceedings. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court record did not reflect Erickson was properly served with the tribal court proceedings under the Tribal Code. “Without proper service on Erickson, a hearing should not have been held, and a permanent protection order should not have issued.” Further, because the record demonstrated that Erickson was notified of the protection order proceedings after a permanent protection order was already entered, it follows that she was not afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b)(2). “Although Erickson responded to Baker’s attorney’s email attaching exhibits, this email was sent to Erickson the day before the hearing. Further, the email did not contain any information that would have informed Erickson a hearing would be conducted the following day. We conclude this is insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.” Therefore, the district court erred in according full faith and credit to the tribal court restraining order. The district court order granting Erickson’s motion to vacate its previous order recognizing a tribal court restraining order was affirmed; however, insofar as the order granted full faith and credit to the tribal court restraining order, judgment was reversed. View "Baker v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Cody Berdahl appealed a divorce judgment entered following a bench trial in his divorce action against Joleen Berdahl. He argued the district court erred in distributing the marital property, in ordering him to pay spousal support to Joleen, and in awarding Joleen credit for attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court’s inclusion of property acquired after the parties’ separation was induced by an erroneous view of the law. Therefore, the court’s distribution of marital property was reversed and this issue remanded with instructions to assign value only to property that existed at the time of separation and to equitably distribute the property after taking into consideration the correct value of the marital estate. Further, because the district court’s order was “internally inconsistent” with regard to the award of attorneys’ fees, the Court remanded that issue for further consideration. The Court found no reversible error as to the award of spousal support, and affirmed as to that issue. View "Berdahl v. Berdahl" on Justia Law

Ariza Barreras, T.B., and F.B. (“the children”) were siblings. In May 2017, the children were transferred to the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department's (“CYFD”) custody. At the time, Barreras was four months old, T.B. was two years old, and F.B. was one year old. CYFD employees Michelle Hill and Lora Valdez placed the children with foster parents Vanessa Dominguez and Justin Romero without evaluating whether Barreras and T.B., who were exposed to drugs in utero, “should have been treated and cared for as ‘special needs’ children and placed with foster parents who had received . . . additional training.” Dominguez and Romero had no experience as full-time foster parents for multiple children under the age of three with special needs. Hill and Valdez allegedly made this full-time placement even though Dominguez and Romero were licensed only as respite care providers. This case arose from allegations of abuse of T.B. and F.B., and the death of Ariza. The specific issue was whether the "special relationship" doctrine exposed five CYFD employees from liability when they all asserted qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the children’s representatives’ allegations stated a plausible claim that two of the CYFD employees—Leah Montano and Gwendolyn Griffin—violated the children’s substantive due process rights. However, the district court erred by concluding that the other three employees—Kim Chavez-Buie, Michelle Hill, and Lora Valdez—committed a constitutional violation. The district court also erred by finding that the clearly established prong of qualified immunity had been waived for purposes of this motion. The Court therefore reversed as to Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez on the constitutional violation prong of qualified immunity because the complaint failed to allege liability under the special relationship doctrine. Chavez-Buie, Hill, and Valdez were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The Court reversed as to Montano and Griffin on the clearly established prong of qualified immunity because, even though it agreed with the district court that the allegations state a claim under the special relationship doctrine, the Court found the district court incorrectly deemed the clearly established prong waived. The case was remanded for a determination whether Montano and Griffin violated clearly established law. View "Hunt, et al. v. Montano, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Philip Borelli (Husband) appealed a circuit court order that found he owed respondent Catherine Borelli (Wife) a child support arrearage, which the court ruled that it lacked authority to modify retroactively. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Borelli" on Justia Law