Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

X.K. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former husband, M.C., under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). She alleged a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by M.C., including incidents where he slapped her, pulled her away from a car, and forced her to have sex. She also claimed M.C. engaged in coercive control, such as restricting her movements and financial resources. X.K. requested sole custody of their daughter, J.K.C., and no visitation for M.C.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, stating the events described were not recent and did not provide sufficient reason to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. The court focused on the custody and visitation disputes between the parents and denied the DVRO request, reasoning that these issues did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of the definition of "abuse" under the DVPA and improperly denied the DVRO because the allegations occurred in the context of a custody dispute. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credited, could constitute physical and sexual abuse and conduct disturbing her peace. The court emphasized that the trial court should have considered the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing whether M.C.'s conduct in California constituted abuse.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed two Indian children from their home after finding their parents intoxicated and unable to care for them. The superior court adjudicated the children as being in need of aid, and the children’s tribe intervened. The children’s father moved to another state and, after initially failing to engage with OCS, eventually completed all case plan requirements. OCS then sought to place the children with their father through the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC), but the other state denied approval. Despite this, OCS sought permission from the superior court to release custody to the father while he was temporarily in Alaska.The superior court found that the ICPC was inapplicable to a release of custody to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p) and granted OCS’s request, dismissing the case. OCS released custody to the father before he left Alaska. The Native Village of Saint Michael appealed, arguing that the ICPC should apply and that the superior court failed to make adequate best interest findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that when OCS properly releases custody of a child to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p), the requirements of the ICPC do not apply, even if the parent plans to subsequently transport the child to another state. The court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the ICPC was inapplicable under the circumstances and that the other state’s approval was not required for placement with the father. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Native Village of Saint Michael v. State" on Justia Law

A mother and father had their parental rights terminated in two consolidated child in need of aid (CINA) cases. They appealed the termination, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for further proceedings. While the appeal was pending, the children's foster parents petitioned to adopt them, and the superior court granted the adoption petitions. On remand, the superior court did not require the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to make further efforts to reunify the family and instead reevaluated the same information, terminating the parental rights again. The parents appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order a second time.The parents then sought to vacate the adoption and reopen the CINA case. The adoptive parents opposed, arguing that the parents' attempt to vacate the adoption was barred by the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree. The superior court agreed with the adoptive parents, concluding that the parents' failure to appeal the adoption decree itself within one year barred their challenge. The court also concluded that the motion to reopen the CINA case was moot because the adoption remained valid, and the children were no longer in need of aid.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's judgment. The court held that the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree under AS 25.23.140(b) applies strictly to appeals of the adoption decree itself, not to appeals of related termination orders in CINA cases. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality and stability for adopted children, noting that allowing collateral attacks on adoption decrees beyond the one-year period would unreasonably disrupt the upbringing of adopted children. Consequently, the adoption remained valid, and the CINA case was moot. View "In re Adoption of C.R. and E.R. v. State" on Justia Law

Julie and Gerald Ross (Grandparents) filed a petition in district court to adopt their grandchildren, R.K. and J.K., and to terminate the parental rights of the children's biological parents, Steven and Denielle Kracht (Parents). The district court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding that they had abandoned and neglected their children, that the father had abused the children, and that both parents were unfit. The adoption petition by the Grandparents was still pending.Parents appealed the termination order to the Utah Court of Appeals before the adoption action concluded. The Court of Appeals certified the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for original appellate review. The central issue was whether the termination order issued by the district court was immediately appealable before the adoption action concluded.The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code subsection 78B-6-112(3) creates a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, allowing termination orders issued by district courts to be immediately appealable. The court concluded that the statutory language of subsection 78B-6-112(3) indicates that a district court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of adoption is entered, thus making such termination orders appealable upon entry. This decision overruled the Court of Appeals' previous decision in In re Adoption of K.R.S., which had held that no exception to the final judgment rule allowed parties to appeal a district-court-issued termination order before it was final. The Utah Supreme Court retained the case for further argument on the merits of the Parents' challenges to the termination order. View "Ross v. Kracht" on Justia Law

A.K. (Mother) is the mother of four minor children, B.C., K.J.C., D.W.C., and B.C. In 2013, while living in Alaska, the children’s biological father, C.C. (Father), was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor and subsequently incarcerated. That same year, Mother and the children moved to Utah. In 2015, Father was convicted, and in 2016, Mother divorced Father and married L.K. (Stepfather), who then began living with and raising the children alongside Mother.In 2020, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition in district court for Stepfather to adopt the children, which included a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father intervened and opposed the termination and adoption. After an evidentiary hearing, the Second District Court in Weber County terminated Father’s parental rights.Father immediately appealed the termination order. While his appeal was pending, the Utah Court of Appeals decided In re Adoption of K.R.S., holding that a termination order issued by a district court is not immediately appealable when an underlying adoption petition remains unresolved, as it does not constitute a final judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and, for reasons articulated in Ross v. Kracht, 2025 UT 22, retained jurisdiction to hear further arguments on Father’s challenges to the termination order. The court issued an order requesting the parties to brief the merits of Father’s challenges to the termination order. View "In re Adoption of B.C." on Justia Law

X.K., a Chinese emigrant, and M.C., a U.S. citizen, married and had a child in California. After moving to China in 2018, M.C. returned to California in January 2022, and X.K. followed with their child in December 2022. They lived with M.C.'s parents until August 2023, when X.K. left for a domestic violence shelter. She filed for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against M.C., alleging a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, citing the lack of recent events and insufficient reasons to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. X.K. testified about M.C.'s abusive behavior, including physical assaults, sexual coercion, and emotional and financial control. M.C. did not testify but his counsel argued against the DVRO and sought increased visitation rights. The trial court denied the DVRO, stating that the issues were primarily about custody and visitation, which did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of "abuse" under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) and improperly denied the DVRO based on the context of custody and visitation disputes. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credible, could constitute abuse under the DVPA, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing abuse.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law

In this case, the husband filed for an absolute divorce, and the wife counterclaimed. The parties attempted mediation but did not reach a settlement. The wife’s counsel later sent a settlement package to the husband’s counsel, which included a Voluntary Separation and Property Settlement Agreement, a promissory note, and a guaranty. The cover letter specified that the husband needed to sign the agreement and note by the end of the day on September 25, 2020. The husband signed the documents on September 28, 2020, and filed an amended complaint for divorce based on mutual consent, incorporating the agreement.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that the husband had timely accepted the wife’s offer and that a binding settlement agreement was formed. The court granted the husband’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and entered a judgment for absolute divorce based on mutual consent, incorporating but not merging the agreement into the judgment. The wife appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s judgment, finding that the husband had not timely accepted the wife’s offer and that no contract was formed.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The court held that the wife’s offer was conditioned on the husband signing the agreement and note by September 25, 2020, and that the husband’s failure to meet this deadline meant that no contract was formed. The court also found no evidence that the wife had waived the deadline. The court concluded that the husband’s signing of the documents on September 28, 2020, constituted a counteroffer, which the wife was not obligated to accept. View "Pattison v. Pattison" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that A.K., a three-year-old child, was in need of care. Both parents entered no contest statements, and the court found A.K. to be a child in need of care. The father later died, leaving the mother as the sole subject of the termination proceedings. The State filed a motion to terminate the mother's parental rights, and during a pretrial conference, the mother did not appear, but her attorney did. The court set a date for a "proffer trial" under K.S.A. 38-2248(f). At the proffer trial, the mother was absent, and her attorney objected to proceeding by proffer, leading the court to set a full trial date. The mother did not appear at the trial, and her substitute counsel did not object to proceeding by proffer. The court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence.The Johnson District Court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence. The mother appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to proceed by proffer because she had instructed her counsel to object. She also argued that K.S.A. 38-2248(f) violated procedural due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the mother's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court misapplied K.S.A. 38-2248(f) by terminating the mother's parental rights based on a proffer alone. The court clarified that while K.S.A. 38-2248(f) permits a proffer against an absent party who has not instructed their counsel to object, it does not allow the district court to make a finding of unfitness or terminate parental rights based solely on the proffer. The court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re A.K. " on Justia Law

Stacy L. Jones and Joshua Colgrove were in a relationship and had a child, B.C. After their separation, Stacy moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, with B.C. and her other children. Joshua, who was diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome, did not initially seek custody. Stacy was later convicted of felony child abuse and placed on probation, leading to juvenile court proceedings where B.C. was placed in foster care. Joshua's request for B.C.'s placement with him was denied due to his non-compliance with DHHS requests. The juvenile court eventually found Stacy rehabilitated and awarded her custody of B.C., issuing a bridge order transferring jurisdiction to the district court.The district court entered a custody decree consistent with the juvenile court's order. Joshua filed a petition for modification, and the State filed a complaint to establish child and medical support. The district court overruled Joshua's motion to dismiss the State's complaint and required him to pay child support. The court also issued an amended custody decree after the juvenile court corrected minor errors in its bridge order. Joshua's motions to reconsider and strike the amended orders were denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court's findings, including Stacy's compliance with rehabilitative measures and her ability to protect B.C., were supported by evidence. The court also held that the State's intervention to establish child support was permissible under the relevant statutes. The court determined that the issue of the amended orders was moot and did not warrant further review. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to Stacy, requiring Joshua to handle transportation for parenting time, and not awarding Joshua the child tax credit. View "Jones v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law