Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In two separate cases, an Alaska superior court decided that it could not terminate parental rights to children with alleged Indian heritage without cultural expert testimony, and that the cultural expert testimony presented was too vague and generalized to be helpful. Although it was error to construe the Alaska Supreme Court precedent to require cultural expert testimony in every ICWA case, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to require expert testimony based on its explanation that it could not competently weigh the evidence of harm in these cases without cultural context. And because the cultural expert testimony presented did not provide a meaningful assessment of tribal social and cultural standards and was not grounded in the facts of these particular cases, the Supreme Court held the court did not clearly err by giving the testimony no weight. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision to deny termination of parental rights in each case. View "Alaska Dept. Health & Soc. Serv. v. C.A., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner-mother J.J. petitioned for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, seeking review of an order denying family reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued the juvenile court improperly bypassed reunification services, and that real party in interest the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to comply with the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. The Agency disputed both contentions. Because the order denying reunification services was not supported by sufficient evidence, the Court of Appeal granted the petition as to mother’s first contention. Because the ICWA issue was premature, the Court rejected mother’s second contention. View "J.J. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of procedendo to compel Franklin County Probate Court Judge Jeffrey Mackey to lift a stay in a probate case and proceed with Relators' adoption petition, holding that the court abused its discretion by allowing the adoption proceeding to languish in this case.In July 2019, Relators filed a petition to adopt Z.W.D., identifying K.T. as the minor child's biological mother. After the Supreme Court held in 2020 that indigent parents have a constitutional right to counsel in adoption proceedings in probate court K.T. asked the probate court magistrate to appoint counsel to represent her because she was indigent. The probate court stayed the matter and then, in October 2021, determined that K.T. was indigent. In April 2022, Relators filed this complaint alleging that the probate court's stay to allow K.T. to apply for indigent representation was unreasonable and unconscionable. The Supreme Court granted a writ and ordered the probate court to appoint counsel for K.T. within thirty days of this decision, holding that the probate court should take all reasonable steps to identify potential counsel. View "State ex rel. T.B. v. Mackey" on Justia Law

The Washington Supreme Court exercised discretionary interlocutory review in this case primarily to decide whether the Washington Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA) required the State to take active efforts to prevent the breakup of J.M.W.’s family before taking him into emergency foster care. Consistent with the plain text and purpose of WICWA, the Supreme Court concluded that it did. The Court also concluded the trial court was required to make a finding on the record at the interim shelter care hearing that J.M.W.’s out of home placement was necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or harm. The matter was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Dependency of J.M.W." on Justia Law

Alonna Knorr, formerly known as Alonna Knorr Norberg, appealed a money judgment entered in favor of Jon Norberg for Knorr’s share of unpaid expenses assigned to her under the divorce judgment. Knorr argued the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss or vacate the order granting Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment because the parties had a global settlement agreement that resolved the issues in this case. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not adequately explain its decision. The matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Norberg v. Norberg, et al." on Justia Law

Braden Allery appealed an order denying his motion for relief from a default judgment modifying primary residential responsibility for the two children he had with Regan Whitebull. In 2019, the district court entered a judgment awarding Allery and Whitebull equal residential responsibility of the children. In March of 2021, Whitebull moved to amend the judgment, asserting a material change in circumstances had occurred because the parties no longer lived in the same area and the children were then both school-aged. Her motion papers were personally served on Allery. The sheriff’s return of service showed he was served in Parshall. Allery did not respond to the motion. The district court entered an order finding Whitebull established a prima facie case justifying modification of primary residential responsibility and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The court served the order and notice of hearing on Allery at a Bismarck address. Allery did not appear at the evidentiary hearing, and Whitebull moved for entry of default judgment. On the day of the hearing, after it had concluded, Allery learned through social media the hearing had been held. Allery sent a letter to the district court the same day, stating that he never received notice of the hearing. He requested the court reschedule the evidentiary hearing and send notice to his current Parshall address. The court granted Whitebull’s motion for default judgment and awarded her primary residential responsibility of the children. Allery moved for relief from the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) requesting the district court vacate the order due to excusable neglect or based on the strong public policy of adjudicating matters on the merits. The North Dakota Supreme Court was not persuaded the district court erred in denying Allery's motion, and affirmed judgment. View "Allery v. Whitebull" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a claim on behalf of thousands of West Virginia’s foster children challenging the State’s administration of child welfare services. Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district court abstained from hearing the case in deference to parallel state-court proceedings. Plaintiffs alleged that a federal class action is the most—if not the only—effective way to achieve the kind of systemic relief they seek.The Fourth Circuit reversed holding that principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Plaintiffs bring federal claims, and federal courts “are obliged to decide” them in all but “exceptional” circumstances. The court explained that Younger’s narrow scope safeguards Plaintiffs’ rights, bestowed on them by Congress in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, to present their claims to a federal tribunal. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. The court further wrote For years, West 4 Virginia’s response to any foster-care orders entered as part of the individual state hearings seems to have been to shuffle its money and staff around until the orders run out, entrenching rather than excising structural failures. Thus, forcing Plaintiffs to once more litigate their claims piecemeal would get federalism exactly backward. View "Jonathan R. v. Jim Justice" on Justia Law

Respondent-Mother appealed circuit court orders entered during abuse and neglect proceedings regarding N.T. initiated by petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), under RSA chapter 169-C (2014 & Supp. 2021). Mother argued the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss the abuse and neglect petitions, claiming that, because the court failed to issue adjudicatory findings within sixty days of the filing of the petitions as required by RSA 169-C:15, III(d) (2014), the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. She also argued the court erred when it found that she had physically abused and neglected N.T. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held RSA chapter 169-C had multiple purposes that were advanced by the time limit in RSA 169-C:15, III(d): to protect the life, health, and welfare of the child, and to protect the rights of all parties involved in the abuse and neglect proceeding. "Because construing the time limit as jurisdictional would undermine all of these important objectives, we conclude that the legislature did not intend that the court be divested of jurisdiction as a consequence of its non-compliance with the deadline." In its review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court was satisfied the trial court did not err in finding Mother abused N.T. Accordingly, the circuit court orders were affirmed. View "In re N.T." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter. She did not challenge the basis of the termination of her rights. Her sole contention is that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b).1 Specifically, Appellant acknowledged she denied Indian heritage, but she contends DCFS failed to ask maternal extended family members whether J.W. is an “Indian child” within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The court found the juvenile court erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without evidence that DCFS questioned extended family members despite having contact with those same family members. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because the daughter was placed for adoption with her maternal grandmother. As a second ground, the court found no prejudice because there was nothing in the record to suggest that the daughter had Indian heritage or that the mother’s denial of Indian heritage was uninformed or incorrect. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

S.A. (mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and ordering G.A. (minor) be placed for adoption. Mother contended the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because the Agency did not contact extended family members to inquire about the ICWA and the juvenile court made no findings regarding agency compliance in that regard. Mother added that no express ICWA findings were made by the juvenile court during the course of the proceedings, compounding the error, and asked the Court of Appeal to remand the case for ICWA compliance. The Court of Appeal determined that while the juvenile court failed to make an ICWA finding, the error was harmless because the Agency satisfied its duty of inquiry, and there was no reason to believe the minor was an Indian child: "the parents consistently stated they had no reason to believe they had Native American ancestry and did not object to the Agency’s reports that consistently concluded they did not. No further duty to inquire was triggered in this case, as the court and Agency had no reason to believe that an Indian child was involved." From this the Court found no prejudice flowing from the Agency's failure to interview extended family members. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to formally enter its ICWA finding on the record. View "In re G.A." on Justia Law