Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A.C. (Mother) is the mother of E.C., now three years old. In 2020, E.C. was taken into protective custody after Mother’s domestic violence-related arrest, and, in 2021, she was made a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).1 Mother timely appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under section 366.26.2 E.C.’s alleged father, Ed. C., is not a party to the appeal. Mother’s sole claim on appeal is that Kern County Department of Human Services (the Department) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978(ICWA) and related California law with respect to its duty of “further inquiry,” which was triggered by information that maternal great-grandmother and two maternal great-uncles were enrolled members of the Apache tribe   The Fifth Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2, subdivisions (b) and (e), and rule 5.481(a)(5). The court further explained that if, after determining that an adequate inquiry was made consistent, the juvenile court finds that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the court’s orders terminating Mother’s parental rights are affirmed. View "In re E.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint seeking an order prohibiting the general division judge from exercising further authority over some of the claims in the underlying case, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint.Appellant brought an action against the estate of his ex-wife in the general division of the court of common pleas seeking to recover funds to which Appellant claimed he was entitled under the former spouses' separation agreement. The state filed a counterclaim against Appellant. The trial court ruled (1) Appellant was entitled to $15,353, but there were genuine issues that precluded summary judgment on his remaining claims; and (2) the estate was entitled to partial summary judgment on its counterclaims. Appellant then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the judge from taking further action on the estate's counterclaim. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the general division did not patently or unambiguously lack subject-matter jurisdiction, and Appellant had an adequate legal remedy by way of direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Gray v. Kimbler" on Justia Law

E.W. (the Child) was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Both parents were referred to services to treat substance abuse and were put on a family services plan. Both struggled to engage with their treatment plans. Father requested the Department of Human Services explore a kin-like placement in Montana where he was originally from and where he had family and friends who might be willing to care for the Child. The trial court approved the placement, and ordered that the Department retain custody of E.W. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on the interaction among three different but related statutory schemes. Specifically, the Court considered what should happen when: (1) a Colorado court obtains initial jurisdiction over a child under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”); (2) that court adjudicates the child neglected or dependent pursuant to the Colorado Children’s Code; (3) the child is then placed in an out-of-state placement through the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”); (4) the parents subsequently move out of state; and (5) no other state court has asserted jurisdiction over the child. Does the Colorado court lose jurisdiction simply because the child and the parents have separately left Colorado? Reading these statutory provisions together, the Supreme Court concluded that it does not. Instead, in the circumstances presented here, the Colorado court retains jurisdiction over the child. View "R.W. & H.W. v. People in interest of E.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part and vacating in part the trial court's adjudication of abuse, neglect, and dependency and eliminating reunification efforts with Mother.The trial court adjudicated the child an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile and, finding that reunification with Mother would be unsuccessful, ordered that reunification efforts with Mother cease. Mother's visitation rights with the child were terminated. The court of appeals vacated the disposition and permanency planning order, holding that the trial court denied Mother a fair hearing and erred in adjudicating the child an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in adjudicating the child abused, neglected, and dependent; (2) the trial court did not err in eliminating reunification efforts with Mother; and (3) Mother's counsel provided effective assistance. View "In re L.N.H." on Justia Law

Mother Diana LaFlam appealed the denial of her motion to modify physical and legal rights and responsibilities. She argued that her relocation to Florida following a divorce from father Jody LaFlam was an unanticipated circumstance requiring modification of the physical rights and responsibilities of their two children, and that father’s neglect of the children’s health warranted a modification of legal rights and responsibilities. Father cross-appealed the portion of the order finding that his neglect of the children’s health constituted changed circumstances under 15 V.S.A. § 668(a). The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the family division that mother’s relocation was not a change in circumstances as to physical rights and responsibilities, and that father’s conduct was a change in circumstances with respect to legal rights and responsibilities. The Court reversed and remanded as to the trial court's best-interests analysis. View "LaFlam v. LaFlam" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott Traudt appealed a family division order granting defendant Victoria Traudt’s motion to enforce a provision in the parties’ 2010 divorce order that required plaintiff to refinance the mortgage on the marital home and pay defendant $25,000. Plaintiff argued that defendant was barred from enforcing the judgment by the eight-year statute of limitations for actions on judgments set forth in 12 V.S.A. § 506. The family division found that the statute of limitations did not apply because plaintiff had acknowledged the debt within the limitations period. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division. View "Traudt v. Traudt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court granting a change of placement for Jordon B., holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.The juvenile court granted temporary custody of Jordon to Foster Parents based on concerns that Mother and Father were not able to care for him. After the court adjudicated Jordon to be a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) the court approved a case plan with a primary permanency plan of reunification. Mother subsequently filed a motion for change of placement. Foster Parents filed a motion to intervene, as did Stepbrother, the adult stepbrother to Jordon. The court determined that Foster Parents and Stepbrother lacked standing to intervene. The court subsequently granted Mother's motion for a change of placement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Foster Parents did not have standing to appeal the placement order or the right to intervene as parties; and (2) because Stepbrother was not a "sibling" to Jordon, his request to intervene was properly denied. View "In re Jordon B." on Justia Law

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment granting a petition to terminate her parental rights to her two minor children, Jane Doe I and John Doe I (the children). The magistrate court determined that Mother had neglected the children as defined in Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), and that termination was in the best interests of the children. On appeal, Mother argued the definition of “neglect” provided in section 16-2002(3)(b) violated the Idaho and the United States Constitutions, and she argues that the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. After its review of the magistrate court record, the Idaho Supreme Court found the magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. That decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. It was therefore affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgments of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of three children to the Butler County Department of Job and Family Services - Children Services Division (the agency), holding that the current challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata.The dispositional hearing granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case occurred more than ninety days after the filing of complaints for temporary custody. The juvenile court then granted permanent custody to the agency. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to the agency because the temporary-custody judgment was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if no motion to dismiss has been filed, under the plain language of former Ohio Rev. Code 2151.35(B)(1), the juvenile court is required to dismiss the complaint after ninety days; (2) a juvenile court's failure to dismiss the complaint is an error in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, not one that deprives the court of jurisdiction; and (3) the judgments granting temporary custody of the children to the agency were valid, and the parents' challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata. View "In re K.K." on Justia Law

Tuwanda Williams and John Williams, Jr., filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Fault Grounds and Consent to Divorce on Grounds of Irreconcilable Differences” and submitted for review a judgment of divorce based on irreconcilable differences and a divorce agreement. Shortly thereafter, Tuwanda changed her mind. She withdrew her consent to the divorce agreement and also withdrew her consent to the divorce based on irreconcilable differences. John moved to enforce the divorce agreement. The chancellor found that Tuwanda timely withdrew her consent to the irreconcilable-differences divorce but that the divorce agreement was an enforceable contract binding on both Tuwanda and John. The chancellor granted John’s motion to enforce the divorce agreement and entered what he called a “final judgment” incorporating the agreement. Tuwanda appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that because the order entitled “final judgment” was not a final, appealable judgment, it lacked jurisdiction to review. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law