Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Timothy W. and Julie W. were in the midst of a dissolution of their marriage. The underlying dispute here relates to Julie’s disclosure of certain facts about Timothy’s past (the sensitive information) that Julie revealed to her codefendant and private investigator, Ronnie Echavarria, Sr. (Echavarria), in connection with the dissolution case. Echavarria revealed the sensitive information to at least one other person, which resulted in several other individuals learning the information. Timothy filed a civil case against Julie and Echavarria (defendants), alleging 12 separate causes of action, many of which were duplicative or not properly pleaded as separate claims. Defendants moved pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to dismiss. The trial court granted the motions as to 10 of the 12 causes of action, all based in tort, and denied the motion as to two contract-based claims. Timothy appealed, arguing the court erred by granting the motion. Julie cross-appealed, arguing the remaining two causes of action should also have been dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that Timothy’s claims directly arose from the dissolution case, and that all of the claims were barred by the litigation privilege. His contract claims were barred on several additional grounds. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court properly granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the tort claims and incorrectly denied it as to the two breach of contract claims. View "Timothy W. v. Julie W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's order changing the permanency plan for Mother and her two youngest children from family reunification to adoption, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.On appeal, Mother argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that the Department of Family Services (DFS) made reasonable but ultimately unsuccessful efforts at reunification and that the permanency plan for the children should be changed to adoption. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the record adequately supported the court's determination that DFS met its burden to prove its efforts at reunifying Mother with her two children were reasonable but unsuccessful. View "NP v. State" on Justia Law

In this abuse and neglect matter, the Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus compelling the circuit court to reunify Daughter with Parents and to remove Kinship Parents' party status in the underlying action, holding that Daughter and Parents had a clear legal right to reunification, and the circuit court had a clear legal duty to order that reunification.Upon filing the underlying petition, the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) removed Daughter from Father's home and placed her with Kinship Parents. After Parents successfully completed post-adjudicatory improvement periods all parties recommended reunification of the family. The circuit court concluded that the DHHR was required to move for termination of Parents' parental rights under W. Va. Code 49-4-605(a)(1) because Daughter had been in "foster care" for more than fifteen months. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that there was a clear legal right to reunification and a clear legal duty to order that reunification and that there was no other adequate remedy available. View "State ex rel. L.D. v. Honorable Cohee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the dispositional order of the circuit court terminating Father's parental rights to his minor children under W. Va. Code 49-4-604(c)(6) due to aggravated circumstances, holding that the dispositional order was insufficient to permit a meaningful review of the proceedings below.The circuit court conducted an adjudicatory hearing and found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abused the two children. The circuit court terminated Petitioner's parental rights at the conclusion of the hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's dispositional order and remanded the case with directions, holding that the order did not contain the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with W. Va. Code 49-4-604 and Rule 36(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. View "In re E.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources and others (collectively, DHHR) to prohibit the Honorable Louis Bloom, Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawah County, from enforcing mandamus orders he issued against DHHR, holding that DHHR was entitled to a writ of prohibition.The circuit court established the underlying mandamus proceeding initiated by two Kanawha County Guardians ad Litem (the GALs) to compel the DHHR to address and remedy issues of employee staffing and training in the Kanawha County Child Protective Services Division Office. The circuit court subsequently granted the GALs' request to expand the scope of the initial writ of mandamus and added issues concerning statewide staff and child housing over the DHHR's objections. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the circuit court exceeded the scope of its agreed-upon order by impermissibly expanding the scope of the mandamus proceeding. View "State ex rel., W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources v. Honorable Bloom" on Justia Law

Rhone served in the military 1950-1953 and 1959-1988. In 1986, Rhone and JoAnne, divorced; the Florida Divorce Decree stated that JoAnne would receive 40% of Rhone’s military retirement benefits. In 1988, Rhone left military service due to disability. To receive disability compensation, Rhone waived part of his military retirement pay (38 U.S.C. 5305). The state court denied Rhone’s motion to modify the Divorce Decree, stating that the payment of retirement benefits constituted alimony, not a property division. The state court issued a Continuing Writ of Garnishment directing the VA to withhold that payment from Rhone’s retirement pay. The VA determined that the order obliged the VA to make payments from Rhone’s disability compensation. After Rhone attempted to avoid garnishment by renouncing benefits, in 2002 the VA determined that Rhone's compensation benefits were not subject to garnishment and had been erroneously withheld. Rhone was reimbursed for $27,664. In 2005, the VA determined that it must comply with the alimony award and resumed garnishing Rhone’s disability compensation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals issued a 2020 decision, finding the 1991 order “valid on its face” and providing for “permanent periodic alimony” so that the VA legally garnished Rhone’s disability compensation under 42 U.S.C. 659(a); (h)(1)(A)(ii)(V). The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. The statutes authorize the VA to withhold a portion of a veteran’s VA disability payment for alimony or child support pursuant to legal process when a veteran has waived a portion of military retirement pay to receive VA benefits. The VA lacks jurisdiction to decide questions associated with a state garnishment order. View "Rhone v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the circuit court's dispositional order terminating Petitioner's parental rights to his child, holding that the termination of Petitioner's parental rights was erroneously based upon a condition of abuse and neglect upon which Petitioner was never adjudicated.The Department of Health and Human Resources filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging medical neglect, educational neglect, and substance abuse. Petitioner stipulated to medical and educational neglect, and the circuit court adjudicated Petitioner neglectful on that sole basis. The circuit court then terminated Petitioner's parental rights. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) Petitioner's termination improperly presumed a substance abuse disorder that was never proven and therefore not the subject of Petitioner's adjudication; and (2) the circuit court erred in terminating Petitioner's parental rights based upon failure to comply with an improvement period that was not properly implemented in accordance with statutory requirements. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the County of Los Angeles and other county defendants (the County) for removing her son, J.G., from her care. The County demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It found the County was immune from suit and Plaintiff failed to allege a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome immunity. Plaintiff appealed and alleged a mandatory duty and, in the alternative, the court should have allowed her to amend her complaint. The court later denied Plaintiff’s motion to tax expert witness fees.   In a consolidated appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff had the burden to establish a reasonable possibility she could amend the complaint to state a claim. She says the determination of whether the collateral contacts provision created a mandatory duty is a factual issue and she “can likely identify more” collateral contacts. However, the court explained that the collateral contacts provision gives social workers discretion to determine which contacts are necessary. As a matter of law, it does not create a mandatory duty. View "Thompson v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Foster Parents' motion to intervene in an abuse of neglect proceeding, holding that abandonment must be alleged before a foster parent is allowed to intervene pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-422(9)(b).The Department of Public Health and Human Services removed two Indian children for physical neglect and placed them with Foster Parents for three years. The Department later submitted an Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children for the younger child to be placed with her grandmother in Virginia. Foster Parents opposed the placement and filed a motion to intervene. The district court denied intervention, concluding that Foster Parents as a matter of law did not have a right to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because section 41-3-422(9)(b) precludes intervention in cases where the Department has not alleged abandonment, the district court did not err in denying Foster Parents' motion to intervene; and (2) Foster Parents were statutorily precluded from asserting a nonparent interest in the parent-child relationship while the proceedings remained pending. View "In re U.A.C." on Justia Law

Raisa Pinto ("Mother") and Sailesh Arulkumar ("Father") were married in 2015. Both parents were trained physicians who attended medical school in India. In the summer of 2017, the couple moved to Oklahoma to allow Mother to attend a three-year Hematology and Oncology fellowship at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center ("OUHSC"). In July 2017, shortly after beginning her fellowship, Mother gave birth to the couple's only child. At the time, Father was working in Tulsa, commuting from the couple's home in Oklahoma City. He later took a job in Oklahoma City to reduce his commute time. In April 2018, Mother filed for divorce in Oklahoma County. The trial court granted the couple's divorce on the grounds of incompatibility. In its order, the trial court designated Mother as the custodial parent, but ordered equal visitation time. The couple has adhered to the custody plan and split time with their child equally since the divorce. While completing the final year of her fellowship, Mother began her search for employment. During her job search, Mother applied to 120 positions and underwent thirty interviews. Of those interviews, Mother received seven job offers for positions located in California, New York, and Pennsylvania. Mother did not receive any job offers in Oklahoma. Prior to accepting an out of state job offer, Mother contacted Father to inquire if he knew of any job openings in Oklahoma. The next day Mother accepted an offer from a hospital in New York. Later that month, Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate to which Father timely objected. Although finding Mother's request was made in good faith, the trial court denied the relocation request finding Father met his burden showing relocation was not in the child's best interest. Mother appealed the trial court's ruling. After its review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's proposed relocation. View "Arulkumar v. Arulkumar" on Justia Law