Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Stephen Salmon (Husband) and Melissa Salmon (Wife) filed competing requests for domestic violence restraining orders against each other pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). At the conclusion of the hearing on both petitions, the trial court issued an order granting Wife’s petition and denying Husband’s. Husband appealed. He did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings or to support the issuance of a DVPA restraining order in favor of Wife. Instead, he challenged only the trial court’s denial of his petition, arguing: (1) the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion to the extent it believed Family Code section 6305 constrained its authority to simultaneously grant both requests for protective orders in this case; (2) even if section 6305 applied, the trial court abused its discretion by choosing between two identified aggressors in order to grant relief to only one of them; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant Husband’s request for custody of the parties’ children. The Court of Appeal concluded section 6305 indeed governed the parties' competing requests for competing protective orders; the statute expressly permitted the trial court to weigh the acts of the parties to determine if one should be considered the dominant aggressor before issuing a mutual restraining order; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband's custody request. View "Salmon v. Salmon" on Justia Law

Defendant violated her joint custody agreement with Petitioner by traveling from Switzerland to the United States with their then-12- year-old daughter, M.D., in July 2020. Petitioner filed a petition seeking M.D.’s return to Switzerland, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague Convention). After an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the district court denied the petition based on the mature child defense, finding that M.D. was of sufficient age and maturity such that the court should take account of her views and that she objected to returning to Switzerland. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for the return of M.D. under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that M.D. is an “innocent party” in this acrimonious dispute. But because M.D. did not express a particularized objection to returning to Switzerland, instead describing a preference—for a variety of understandable reasons—to remain in the United States, the district court’s finding that M.D.’s statements constituted an objection within the meaning of the mature child defense was clearly erroneous. View "Vladyslav Dubikovskyy v. Elena Goun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the petition filed by the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) to terminate Father's parental rights, holding that Father was not entitled to relief on his claims of error on appeal.On appeal, Father argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the termination proceedings and that the district court erred in denying his motion to set aside the entry of default. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) because Wyo. Stat. 14-2-318(a) does not create a mandatory right to counsel, it does not create a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights cases; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motions to set aside the entry of default. View "Roberts v. State, Dep't of Family Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint seeking dissolution of her marriage to Defendant, holding that the district court erred by dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.In his motion to dismiss, Defendant asserted that the parties were legally divorced in Venezuela, and therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dissolution action under Rule 12(b)(1) and lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant under Rule 12(b)(2). The district court sustained the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dissolution action because the complaint's allegations sufficiently established the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the marital relationship; and (2) the district court erred to the extent it relied on its equitable estoppel findings to support dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Bleich v. Bleich" on Justia Law

In this divorce and custody case, the chancellor excluded the testimony of the parties’ minor children per se, without first interviewing the children and determining their competency and best interests. The chancellor then interviewed the children in chambers, but did not make a record of the interviews. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s decision on all issues, including child custody. On certiorari review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the chancery court erred in the procedures used and findings made attendant to the issue of the children’s testimony. It therefore reversed the chancellor’s judgment regarding child custody, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Denham v. Denham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice Grandmother's complaints for determination of de facto parentage concerning her two minor grandchildren, holding that the best interests determinations required in guardianship actions and in actions for de facto parentage are distinct determinations.The district court determined that issue preclusion completely barred Grandmother's claims for de facto parentage because the issue of the child's best interests was already decided in a prior consolidated proceeding on competing guardianship petitions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the matter for the court to consider Grandmother's standing with respect to her complaints for de facto parentage, holding that issue preclusion did not prevent the court from considering Grandmother's complaints for de facto parentage because the best interests determinations required in a guardianship proceeding are not identical to those in a proceeding for de facto parentage. View "Gardner v. Greenlaw" on Justia Law

In this opinion considering whether an indemnification provision in a property settlement incident to a divorce decree was enforceable where the divorcing veteran agreed to reimburse his or her spouse if the veteran elected to receive military disability pay rather than retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the spouse's motion to enforce the reimbursement provision of the divorce decree, holding that there was no error.After noting that federal law precludes state courts from dividing disability pay as community property in allocating each party's separate pay, the Supreme Court held (1) even if the parties agreed on a reimbursement provision that the state court would lack authority to otherwise mandate, state courts do not improperly divide disability pay when they enforce the terms of a negotiated property settlement as res judicata; and (2) a court does not abuse its discretion by awarding pendente lite attorney fees under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.040 without analyzing the factors set forth in Burnzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969). View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order as to her minor child, G.Z. First, Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that her minor son’s subdural hematomas were the result of her neglectful acts. Second, Mother argues her due process rights were violated when the juvenile court relied on Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1’s rebuttable presumption in finding neglect by Mother when it “never notified its intent to do so until all parties had argued and submitted the case.”   The Second Appellate District vacated the court’s factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. The court reversed the juvenile court’s order given the lack of substantial evidence. The court explained that here, as set forth in the preceding section, Mother presented evidence that G.Z.’s subdural hematomas were not the result of abuse or negligence by her, rebutting the presumption of section 355.1, subdivision (a). Mother’s family members who were interviewed all told the CSW they have no concerns of neglect or physical abuse by Mother. Because Mother provided rebuttal evidence, the burden shifted back to DCFS to prove the petition’s allegations. Here, substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. View "In re G.Z." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the juvenile court's determination that Mother had neglected A.B. and award of custody to Aunt and Uncle, holding that Aunt and Uncle were not entitled to relief on any of their allegations of error.Mother left A.B., her daughter, for nearly one year in the care of Aunt and Uncle. When Mother came to take A.B. back, Aunt and Uncle filed for custody, alleging that Mother had abused and neglected A.B. The juvenile court determined that A.B. had been neglected by Mother and awarded custody to Uncle and Aunt. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the juvenile court had erred in its neglect determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) applied the appropriate standard of review; (2) did not err in reversing the neglect determination; and (3) did not err in declining to affirm on the alternative ground of abuse. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court allowing Wife trial counsel to withdraw from representation several weeks prior to a divorce bench trial, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted counsel's motion to withdraw without conditioning the withdrawal upon the substitution of other counsel by written appearance.On appeal, Wife argued that the district court abused its discretion under the circumstances because no "extraordinary circumstances" were cited, as required under Rule 102(c) of the Wyoming Uniform Rules for District Courts to allow her trial counsel to withdraw without first obtaining substitute counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the district court could reasonably conclude extraordinary circumstances existed to allow Wife's counsel to withdraw without requiring substitution of counsel. View "McGill v. McGill" on Justia Law