Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiff in this divorce action, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and Defendant filed a counterclaim for divorce. As to attorneys' fees, the trial justice found that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the parties' postnuptial agreement's fee-shifting provision, as well as R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-16. Defendant appealed, challenging the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice had both a statutory and contractual basis to award Plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs and did not abuse his discretion in making the award. View "McCollum v. McCollum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Father's petition to modify a child custody order granting Mother primary custody of the parties' daughter (Child), holding that there was no abuse of discretion during the proceedings below.The original child custody order granted Mother primary custody of Child. Father later petitioned the court to modify the order, claiming that the original order had proved unworkable due to ambiguity in its terms. After a trial, the district court concluded that a material change of circumstances had occurred since the original order and that it was in Child's best interests for the parties to have shared custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that there had been a material change of circumstances affecting Child's welfare since the original custody and visitation order and that Child's best interests would be served by granting the parties shared custody. View "Gardels v. Bowling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the judgment and decree of divorce entered by the circuit court in this case, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining Daniel Parker's military "monthly pay base" to be $1,500.94.Daniel filed for divorce from Camille Parker, citing irreconcilable differences. In dispute during the underlying proceedings was the correct amount of Daniel's "monthly basic pay" for the purpose of determining the equitable division of his retirement benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the court's decree dividing Daniel's military retirement but otherwise affirmed, holding that the record revealed a legal error in the application of federal law to determine Daniel's monthly pay base. View "Parker v. Parker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a superior court erred in it affirmed a Court of Common Please Criminal Division's decision overturning a Montgomery County District Attorney (DA) decision. The DA had disapproved the private criminal complaint of Luay Ajaj (Father) against Saja Ibrahim Abdulkareem Al Rabeeah (Mother) for violations of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2904(a) (interference with custody of children), and 18 Pa. C.S. § 2909(a) (concealment of whereabouts of a child). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the proper standard of review courts should apply when reviewing a disapproval decision under Rule of Criminal Procedure 506(B)(2) was: if the private complainant demonstrated that the disapproval decision amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional. Applying that standard of review here, the Court concluded Father failed to demonstrate that the DA’s decision to disapprove the Complaint amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional, and, consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order. View "In Re: Private Comp. Filed by L. Ajaj" on Justia Law

After D.H. (Mother) and B.G. (Father) divorced, Father was obligated to pay $10,000 per month in child support for the parties’ youngest child, A.G., subject to California Family Code section 3901. Father filed requests for orders (RFOs) seeking: (1) a judicial determination that his child support obligation had terminated; and (2) a refund of overpaid support—both on the basis that A.G. had turned 18 and was no longer enrolled as a full-time high school student after June 2020. Father also sought sanctions against Mother pursuant to Family Code section 271. The trial court declined to impose sanctions, but granted Father’s other requests, finding that A.G. was no longer a full-time high school student as of July 1, 2020, and ordering Mother to refund overpaid amounts of child support. On appeal, Mother argued that the court erred by: (1) misinterpreting the meaning of “full-time” in section 3901; (2) finding that A.G. was not a “full-time” high school student; (3) terminating child support retroactively; (4) implicitly finding a material change of circumstance to justify modifying child support; (5) relying on unadmitted evidence; and (6) improperly shifting the burden of proof to Mother on Father’s RFOs. The Court of Appeal found that “full-time” in Family Code section 3901 generally had the same meaning as set forth in Education Code section 48200 regarding compulsory education for minor children: “the length of the schoolday [designated] by the governing board of the school district in which the residency of either the parent or legal guardian is located.” Because the trial court did not apply this definition, the court's order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings, and additional discovery, if necessary, so that the court could make appropriate findings. Mother’s remaining arguments were rejected. View "Marriage of D.H. and B.G" on Justia Law

The Sonoma County Human Services Department filed a petition on behalf of then-11-month-old A.G., alleging that A.G.’s alleged father, F.G., recently been released from prison, violently attacked her Mother twice in the baby’s presence. The Department recommended that A.G. and her 14-year-old half-sister be declared dependents and remain in Mother’s custody with Mother to receive family maintenance services. Mother and F.G. had a history of domestic violence. Mother’s extensive child welfare history began in 2015, with allegations of general neglect, physical abuse, and emotional abuse inflicted by Mother on her older daughters. Mother had a history of substance abuse. The court declared A.G. a dependent and ordered family maintenance services. About 18 months later, a neighbor found Mother unconscious and unresponsive outside her apartment at around midnight, with A.G. crying and strapped in her stroller. Paramedics arrived; when Mother was finally roused, she became combative and displayed indicators of intoxication. She admitted taking two “bars” of Xanax.The court terminated reunification services and found that returning A.G. to Mother's care would “create a substantial risk of detriment” to A.G.’s “safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” The court of appeal upheld the order, rejecting Mother's argument that the court improperly compared A.G.’s current foster home to Mother’s home and “evaluated [A.G.’s] best interest, instead of evaluating detriment of return.” There was substantial evidence that Mother’s history of drug use and relapse posed a risk of detriment to A.G. View "Sarah K. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated a portion of the divorce judgment entered by the district court in this case and otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court failed to make the specific finding required by statute establishing why it was equitable and just to allocate a tax exemption to the parent without primary residency.The amended divorce judgment at issue granted Husband contact with the parties' two children three weekends per month, ordered Husband to pay child support, and allocated one child dependency tax exemption to Husband. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment below, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in its allocation of overnight child contact; (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to make the award of child support retroactive; and (3) erred in its allocation of the child dependency exemptions. View "Proctor v. Childs" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal is whether section 5241 precludes the obligee from seeking a determination of arrearages allegedly owed by the obligor, where the obligor’s employer is subject to a valid earnings assignment order. The family court ruled section 5241 precludes such a request, but reached that conclusion by answering a different question: whether section 5241 precludes an obligee from seeking to enforce arrearages against an obligor whose employer is subject to an earnings assignment order. The court concluded section 5241 precludes such a request. As a result, the family court denied a request by Plainitff for an order to determine child and spousal support arrearages against her former husband, Defendant. The court also granted Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorney.   The Second Appellate District reversed the family court’s order and directed the court to determine the amount of arrearages, if any, Defendant owes Plaintiff.  The court explained that based on the language and legislative history of section 5241, we conclude that, where an employer is subject to an earnings assignment order, section 5241 protects obligors only from being held in contempt or subject to criminal prosecution for nonpayment of the support. Contrary to the family court’s ruling the statute does not preclude an obligee like Plaintiff from seeking arrearages or a determination of arrearages from an obligor like Defendant. Which in turn means Plaintiff’s request for an order determining arrearages was not frivolous for the reasons stated by the family court and did not support an award of sanctions against Appellant. View "Brubaker v. Strum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court on Appellant's complaint for divorce from Appellee, holding that the trial court's findings were insufficient to support the parental rights portions of the judgment and that the court erred in determining Appellee's income.On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the court's orders concerning parental rights and responsibilities, the parties' child's residence, and Appellee's contact with the child constituted an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and vacated the judgment below, holding (1) remand was required for the trial court to issue an amended judgment that included additional findings as necessary to set forth the basis for the same or different determinations regarding parental rights and responsibilities, contact, and residence; and (2) the record did not support the court's finding that Appellee's annual gross income was only $24,666. View "Whitmore v. Whitmore" on Justia Law

Ross Lamm and Leslie Preston each began separate businesses during their marriage. After Lamm filed for divorce from Leslie Preston, they stipulated to a custody and support order for their children, as well as the division of most of their marital estate; however, they could not reach an agreement on the valuations of their respective businesses. Following a bench trial, the magistrate court determined that the couple’s 25% interest in one of those businesses, Black Sage Acquisition, LLC, was worth $163,373 based on its fair market value. All remaining value was found to be Lamm's personal goodwill. Preston first appealed the magistrate court’s valuation and division of certain business assets in her divorce proceedings to the district court, which upheld the magistrate court’s ruling. She then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's order. View "Lamm v. Preston" on Justia Law