Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners W.M. (minor), and Amber G. (her prospective adoptive parent/de facto parent) sought an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order removing W.M. from Amber’s care and placing her with out-of-state relatives she has never met. The California Legislature enacted a "complex scheme of placement preferences," and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) conflated the considerations involved in the placement of a child with those involved in removing a child posttermination from a prospective adoptive parent’s home. "While placement with relatives is generally favored when the need arises, removal from any stable, permanent, loving home (with non-relatives or relatives), particularly after a child has been freed for adoption, is not. By failing to recognize its burden in recommending W.M.’s removal, SSA obscured the critical decision the juvenile court needed to make: Was removing W.M. from her current placement in her best interest?" After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal found SSA was obligated to do much more pursuant to the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) preference. The statute also required the court to hold a hearing and review all material evidence relating to SSA’s removal decision before approving or rejecting it. In this case, it appears the court focused on the reasons for the delay in placing W.M. with her relatives, and neglected to sufficiently consider Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26(n)’s directive. Petitioners argued there was insufficient evidence that it would be in W.M.'s best interest to remove her from the only family she has ever known, and eliminate any chance she has of connecting with her siblings, for the opportunity to live with out-of-state blood relatives who are strangers to her. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and vacated the juvenile court’s removal order. View "Amber G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed portions of the court of appeals' opinion that found error in certain portions of the trial court's order eliminating reunification as a permanent plan and ceasing further review hearings in a neglect and dependency case concerning Mother's child, holding the trial court did not err.The trial court entered the order eliminating reunification as a permanent plan only after it found that an alternate permanent plan of custody with a court-approved caretaker had been achieved and after the court had received evidence showing that the court-approved caretakers understood the legal significance of the child's placement in their home. The court of appeals vacated the order and remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the trial court erred in ceasing reunification efforts and in failing to fulfill its statutory obligations concerning verification. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court permitting Father's court-appointed counsel to withdraw from representing Father in the case proceedings and the trial court's order ceasing efforts to reunify Father with his son (Child), holding that remand was required for additional proceedings.The Chowan County Department of Social Services (DSS) petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Child on multiple grounds. Father was granted the same attorney for the termination of parental rights matter as had been allowed to withdraw at an earlier hearing. Thereafter, trial court terminated Father's parental rights, concluding that all four of the alleged grounds of the termination existed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in allowing Father's counsel to withdraw from representation without proper notice evidence in the record of the attorney's intent to withdraw and without making further inquiry into the circumstances regarding the motion. View "In re L.Z.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Industrial Commission dismissing Shannon Stocks's claim for death benefits, holding that Stocks - the decedent's alleged, cohabitating fiancee - lacked a legally-recognized relationship and thus could not file a claim for death benefits.The decedent in this case died from injuries sustained in an industrial accident at Defendant. Plaintiffs - the decedent's daughter, son, estranged wife, and Stocks - all filed claims for death benefits under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. The Commission dismissed Stocks's claim for benefits, and a consent order was entered dividing the decedent's death benefits equally among the remaining plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not file a claim for death benefits because she lacked a legal relationship with the decedent sufficient to qualify as a dependent under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-39. View "West v. Hoyle's Tire & Axle, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in this case concerning a premarital agreement to resolve disputes by binding arbitration under religious law, holding that the trial court was statutorily required to hear and determine Wife's challenges to the agreement's validity and enforceability before referring the parties' disputes to arbitration.When the parties in this case married they signed an "Islamic Pre-Nuptial Agreement" providing that "[a]ny conflict which may arise between the husband and the wife will be resolved according to the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel." When Wife sued for divorce, Husband moved to enforce the agreement. After a hearing on whether the reference to Islamic law was sufficiently ambiguous to render the agreement unenforceable the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate under the agreement. Wife moved for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court erred in compelling the parties to arbitrate. View "In re Mariam Ayad" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a spouse’s permanent disability suffered during the parties’ marriage may be considered when determining a traditional spousal support award, even if the length of the parties’ marriage does not quite meet the typical durational threshold.Jason and Erinn Mills married in 2006. Later that year, Erinn was injured while giving birth to the parties' only child, leading to her becoming permanently disabled. Jason filed for divorce in 2019. At issue on appeal was whether the fact that one spouse acquires a permanent disability during the marriage can support an award of spousal support when the length of the marriage would not otherwise support a traditional support award. The Supreme Court held (1) a court may appropriately consider a spouse's permanent disability acquired during the parties' marriage as a factor when determining a child support award; and (2) Erinn should be awarded traditional spousal support of $400 per month, but the amount should not increase upon the termination of Jason's child support obligation. View "In re the Marriage of Mills" on Justia Law

In 2014, wife filed for dissolution of her marriage to husband. At the trial to divide the parties’ assets and establish support awards for both wife and a child, wife requested, in relevant part, $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months and $750 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indeterminate period. The trial court entered a general judgment (the “original 2014 judgment”) awarding wife $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months, to begin on the date of the 2014 judgment (May 1, 2014), and $500 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indefinite period to begin immediately after the transitional support ended (June 1,2019). Wife appealed, challenging both the monthly amount and the delayed commencement of the maintenance support. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the trial court misapplied ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) and thus incorrectly calculated wife’s maintenance support and postponed the maintenance support payments until after the transition support ended. On remand, the trial court increased the maintenance support award to $1,000 per month for 60 months, after which time the maintenance award would decrease to $750 per month. The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on whether interest accrued on the support payments that were increased retroactively following the husband’s appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the award of interest was improper. The Supreme Court concluded wife was entitled to statutory interest at nine percent per annum on the additional amount that the trial court added to the monthly support award in the original judgment, calculated from the dates that those payments would have been due. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court, and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Skinner & Skinner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming several circuit court rulings in the underlying dissolution proceeding between Wife and Husband, holding that the circuit court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court erred in its division of Husband's 401(k); (2) the circuit court did not err in its valuation of Husband's ownership in a corporation but did err in its distribution of that ownership interest; (3) the circuit court erred in its rulings regarding attorney's fees; and (4) given this Court's holdings, reconsideration of maintenance was required. View "Thielmeier v. Thielmeier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court that Ky. Rev. Stat. 411.137 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 391.033, collectively known as Mandy Jo's Law, prevented Lawrence Miller from being awarded any of the settlement proceeds from the wrongful death action against the hospital where his stillborn daughter, Autumn, was born, holding that Mandy Jo's Law is not applicable when the child in question is stillborn.After Autumn was born stillborn, her mother, Brittany Bunch, filed suit against the Hospital alleging wrongful death. Miller subsequently filed a motion to intervene. After DNA testing proved Miller's paternity, the trial court allowed Miller's motion to intervene. The Hospital, Bunch, and Miller reached a settlement, and Bunch argued that Miller should not be awarded any settlement proceeds in accordance with Mandy Jo's Law. The trial court agreed and granted judgment for Bunch. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not contemplate the application of Mandy Jo's law to the facts in this case. View "Miller v. Brunch" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child Adrian L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to inquire of extended family members, including maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt, regarding Adrian’s potential status as an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded additional inquiry would not have yielded information that was likely to bear meaningfully on the question of whether Adrian is an Indian child. The court explained that its review of the record as a whole does not disclose that unquestioned extended family members were likely to have had information that would have borne meaningfully on whether Adrian is an Indian child. Accordingly, any ICWA inquiry error under section 224.2, subdivision (b), was harmless. View "In re Adrian L." on Justia Law