Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant V.R. is the mother of now 11-year-old N.R. Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to N.R. Mother argued that the order is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness or child detriment. Specifically, she argued that termination cannot be predicated on earlier, unchallenged findings of parental unfitness or child detriment as to N.R. because, after N.R. and her younger half-sister R.L. were removed from mother’s custody, the juvenile court returned R.L. to mother. According to mother, R.L.’s return to mother “rebutted” the earlier findings as a matter of law. If these earlier findings are disregarded, mother continues, no substantial evidence otherwise supports termination of her parental rights as to N.R.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court explained that the record reflects manifest differences between N.R.’s and R.L.’s needs and mother’s ability to parent each child. Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court carefully considered this evidence and the respective risks the children faced in mother’s care. The court, therefore, rejected mother’s argument that R.L.’s return to mother rebutted or otherwise limited the vitality of prior findings of mother’s unfitness to parent N.R. or the detriment to N.R. of remaining in, or being returned to, mother’s custody. Notwithstanding its order returning R.L. to mother’s custody, due process permitted the juvenile court to rely on such findings at the section 366.26 hearing. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

Radell R. appealed a dispositional order denying him reunification services with his eight-year-old and six-year-old daughters under the bypass provision in California Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (b)(6) for infliction of severe physical harm. He argued the juvenile court failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for making a bypass finding under section 361.5 (b)(6) and the finding isn’t supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore reversed the bypass finding and remanded for the court to reconsider his entitlement to reunification services. View "In re T.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals modifying a dissolution decree to award a payee spouse seven years of transitional spousal support, holding that, under the circumstances, the court of appeals erred in modifying the decree to award transitional spousal support.Rachael and David Sokol married in 2002 and had two children. In 2019, Rachael petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. As to spousal support, the district court ordered Rachael to pay David $3,000 per month in rehabilitative spousal support for four years. After the district court entered its decree David appealed, arguing, as relevant to this appeal, that the length of the marriage warranted traditional, rather than rehabilitative, spousal support. As to spousal support, the court of appeals modified David's award from rehabilitative support at $3,000 per month for four years to transitional support at $5,000 per month for seven years. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' modification of the district court's spousal award and reinstated the original award, holding that the modification of the decree was inconsistent with caselaw regarding both the category and duration of spousal support. View "In re Sokol" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to enter an abuse protection order against Jamie P. in favor of her father, William P., following a hearing at which Jamie did not appear, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the issuance of the protection order against Jamie.William filed a petition asking police to remove Jamie from his home due to her domestic abuse. The district court entered an order to show cause. Jamie did not appear at the show cause hearing, and the district court entered a domestic abuse protection order against her. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jamie was properly served with prior notice; and (2) because this Court lacked an adequate record, it was required to presume that the evidence supported the district court's decision to grant a protection order against Jamie. View "William P. v. Jamie P." on Justia Law

D.S. and A.S. were married and have children, ages 14 and eight. A.S. filed a petition for legal separation and an ex parte request for temporary emergency orders related to child custody and visitation, property control, and “an order that all contact between Mother and Father be peaceful and neither party disparage the other, alienate the children nor discuss details of the custody case with the child.” She alleged that D.S. had a “trigger temper” and that the “children and I have had to flee the home multiple [times] when his anger has gotten out of control.” She stated that she did not have access to the family’s bank accounts. After the court denied her ex parte request, A.S. filed, and was granted, a peremptory challenge against the judge who issued the denial. A week later, A.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), which sought personal conduct orders and a stay-away order. A.S. identified two dates on which she and her children had suffered abuse. D.S. denied the allegations and appealed the DVRO. The court of appeal reversed. The family court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO without holding an evidentiary hearing compliant with Family Code section 217. View "Marriage of D.S. & A.S." on Justia Law

G.L.A. (“Mother”) brought L.S., who was one year old at the time, to the hospital for medical treatment. Hospital staff conducted a skeletal survey, which revealed that L.S. had a broken tibia; two additional fractures that were healing; severe bruising and swelling to his groin; and significant bruising on his back, face, and genitals. The hospital sent a referral to the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, and the state filed a petition for dependent or neglected children in district court, alleging that Mother had physically abused L.S. The district court adjudicated L.S. dependent or neglected. About a month later, the court found that an appropriate treatment plan couldn’t be devised for Mother based on L.S.’s serious bodily injury(“SBI”), and Mother appealed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State satisfies its burden of proving that an appropriate treatment plan can’t be devised for a respondent parent in a dependency and neglect case when the State establishes by a preponderance of evidence a single incident resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. To this, the Court concluded that it did: the district court erred by imposing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the State at the dispositional hearing. Because there was no dispute L.S. sustained a serious bodily injury, the district court’s order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in the interest of L.S." on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, G.F., on the ground that he failed to correct, within twelve months, the conditions that led to the court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C (2022) that G.F. was neglected by G.F.’s mother. In January 2020, father did not attend mother’s adjudicatory or dispositional hearings. Mother entered into a consent agreement acknowledging that neglect occurred due to her drug use. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court adopted a case plan and dispositional orders, which also applied to father. Father was not served with these documents. At the three-month review hearing, father's counsel received the case plan, dispositional orders and related discovery. Two days after the six-month review hearing, father was arrested for felony second degree assault and other domestic violence charges involving his then girlfriend and her minor child. He pled guilty to at least two of the charges. In September 2020, a nine-month review hearing was held. In January 2021, the trial court held the first permanency hearing in the neglect case while father was incarcerated. The trial court found father was not in compliance with dispositional orders. The trial court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and specified that “DCYF is no longer required to provide reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification between [G.F.] and mother [and] father, but shall make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan.” In September 2021, the circuit court held a second permanency hearing; again the court found father was not in compliance with the dispositional orders and concluded G.F. could not be safely returned to his care. DCYF filed a new petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in October 2021. In December 2021, the father was released from incarceration. In February 2022, the circuit court granted DCYF’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. Assuming without deciding that, during the nine months in which DCYF was ordered by the court to make reasonable efforts to reunify G.F. with his father, those efforts were reasonable, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that DCYF failed to meet its burden because the court did not order DCYF to make such efforts for the remaining three months. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights over G.F. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred sufficient to warrant modification of Appellee's alimony obligation, holding that there was no error.When the parties divorced, Appellee was earning $162,000 per year. Appellee was earning $200,000 per year when he was terminated. After the loss of his employment and the subsequent starting of his consulting firm, Appellee filed a motion for modification of his alimony obligation, also citing Appellant's increased income. The district court found a material change in circumstances and entered a new alimony schedule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Mackiewicz v. Mackiewicz" on Justia Law

In 2015, appellant Destiny C. (Mother) petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to her husband Justin C. (Father). Six years later, following a six-day trial on custody and visitation issues, the family court made final custody orders, directing both parents to share joint legal and physical custody of the couple’s then-seven-year-old daughter. Mother disputed that order, relying primarily on the Family Code section 3044 presumption against the award of joint legal or physical custody to a party who is found to have committed domestic violence “within the previous five years.” She contended the five-year period provided for in section 3044 ran backwards from the filing of the dissolution petition, not from the date of the family court’s custody ruling. The trial court rejected this "impractical construction." The Court of Appeal also rejected appellant's construction and affirmed the custody order. View "Marriage of Destiny C. & Justin C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal dismissing Father's appeal of the determination of the juvenile court that it had jurisdiction over D.P. under former Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1), holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition claiming that D.P. and his sister were at risk of neglect. The juvenile court dismissed all but one of the counts and found that it had jurisdiction over D.P. under former Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1). Parents challenged this jurisdictional finding on appeal. While Parents' appeal of the jurisdictional finding was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction, finding that D.P. was no longer at risk. The court of appeals then dismissed Parents' case as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father's appeal was moot; and (2) the court of appeals had discretion to review Father's case even though it was moot. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law