Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple separated after more than twenty years together and reached a settlement agreement to divide the marital portion of the husband’s Alaska Railroad Corporation pension plan equally, including a 50% survivor benefit for the wife. However, the pension plan’s terms did not allow for the precise division the parties intended. The plan only permitted three options for survivor benefits: no survivor, treating the wife as the surviving spouse (which would give her more than her marital share), or a conditional benefit that could end if the husband remarried and predeceased the wife. The husband proposed selecting the third option and, if he remarried, purchasing life insurance to protect the wife’s interest. The wife objected, expressing concern about relying on the husband to maintain life insurance and arguing for the option that would make her the sole survivor beneficiary.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, selected the third option, allowing the husband to name a future spouse as a joint survivor beneficiary, but did not require him to purchase life insurance. The court reasoned that this option most fairly allocated the risks and reflected the parties’ agreement to divide only the marital portion of the plan. The court did not address or incorporate the husband’s offer to purchase life insurance in its order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the superior court abused its discretion by not requiring life insurance or otherwise protecting the wife’s survivor benefit interest. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by failing to explain why it did not require the husband to purchase life insurance or otherwise ensure the wife’s interest was protected. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider the life insurance offer and explain its decision. View "Sandvik v. Frazier" on Justia Law

Two minor children were removed from their parents’ care after their father was incarcerated for felony convictions and their mother was unable to care for them due to drug addiction and homelessness. The children were placed in foster care after the Kansas Department for Children and Families determined that neither parent could provide adequate care. The father, while incarcerated, had limited contact with the children and did not complete most tasks in the reintegration plan, citing the constraints of his imprisonment. The children exhibited significant behavioral and emotional issues while in foster care, and potential placement with a maternal grandmother was being considered.The Leavenworth County District Court adjudicated the children as in need of care and, after 16 months without progress toward reintegration, found both parents unfit. The court based its finding regarding the father on his felony conviction and imprisonment, failure of reasonable efforts by agencies to rehabilitate the family, and failure to carry out a reasonable reintegration plan. The court concluded that the father’s unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future and that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests, given their need for permanency and the availability of a stable placement with a relative.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, focusing primarily on the father’s imprisonment as a statutory ground for unfitness and agreeing that the unfitness was unlikely to change soon. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and held that clear and convincing evidence supported the findings of unfitness and that the conduct or condition rendering the father unable to care for his children was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination was in the children’s best interests. The judgments of both lower courts were affirmed. View "In re K.W.D." on Justia Law

A woman and her former husband divorced in 2011, entering into a detailed stipulation that was incorporated into a final divorce order by the Vermont family division. The order awarded her sole legal parental rights for their three minor children and required the husband to pay spousal maintenance for a set period. It also required him to maintain a $400,000 life insurance policy naming her as the sole beneficiary for at least fifteen years or until his maintenance obligation was paid in full, whichever was later. After remarrying, the husband obtained new life insurance policies naming his new wife as beneficiary and assigned part of one policy to a lender as collateral. Upon his death, the ex-wife discovered she was not a beneficiary on these policies and sued, seeking the insurance proceeds based on the divorce order.The Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division, denied the ex-wife’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court found that Vermont law prohibited courts from ordering postmortem spousal maintenance or requiring life insurance to secure such maintenance, and concluded the life-insurance provision in the divorce order was invalid and unenforceable. The court ordered the insurance proceeds to be distributed to the new wife and the lender, and granted interpleader relief to one insurer.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Vermont law recognizes an equitable cause of action to recover life insurance proceeds based on a divorce order, and that parties may agree to secure maintenance with life insurance, even if the court could not impose such a requirement unilaterally. The Court affirmed the interpleader relief but reversed the remainder of the judgment, remanding for further proceedings to determine the ex-wife’s equitable entitlement to the insurance proceeds and the priority of competing claims. View "diMonda v. Lincoln National Corp." on Justia Law

A married couple with three minor children separated after more than a decade together, with the wife returning to Maine with the children and the husband remaining in the marital home in Atlanta. The wife, who had been the primary homemaker, filed for divorce, seeking division of property, spousal support, child support, and attorney fees. The husband, who had a significantly higher income, continued to pay the mortgage on the marital home, which had substantial equity.The Maine District Court in Calais held a contested hearing and entered a divorce judgment. The court awarded shared parental rights, primary physical residence of the children to the wife, and divided the marital property by awarding the home to the husband but granting the wife half the equity. The husband was ordered to pay spousal and child support, as well as the wife’s attorney fees. The husband filed post-judgment motions seeking clarification and amendment, particularly regarding the calculation of spousal support and attorney fees. The court reaffirmed its findings, including imputing minimum-wage income to the wife and finding the attorney fee award reasonable. The husband then appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found a clerical error in the District Court’s property distribution table, which double-counted the equity in the marital home. This error potentially affected the determinations of spousal support and attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment as to the property distribution calculations and remanded for correction and reconsideration of spousal support and attorney fees in light of the corrected figures. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The Court denied the wife’s request for appellate attorney fees as sanctions but allowed her to seek such fees in the trial court. View "Newman v. Riser" on Justia Law

A woman sought a protection order against her former partner, with whom she shares two minor children, alleging that his actions caused her and the children to fear imminent physical harm. The petition described several incidents, including one where the former partner allegedly pointed a laser through a window at her and one of the children, and another where he handled a firearm after consuming alcohol. The woman also testified to past physical and emotional abuse directed at both her and the children. The former partner denied threatening them with a firearm or laser, asserting that any lasers involved were harmless pointers for the children.The Seventh Judicial Circuit Court in Pennington County, South Dakota, held a hearing and found the woman’s testimony credible. The court determined that the former partner’s conduct, particularly the laser incident, constituted domestic abuse by inflicting fear of imminent physical harm. The court issued a five-year protection order prohibiting all contact between the former partner and the woman and their children. When the former partner later moved to modify the order to allow contact with the children, the court denied the request, despite both parties expressing willingness for supervised visitation and acknowledging that the facility typically used for such visits would not participate due to the nature of the allegations.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding domestic abuse and did not abuse its discretion in issuing a five-year protection order covering the woman and the children. However, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion by prohibiting all contact between the father and his children for five years without considering the children’s best interests or the parties’ wishes for supervised visitation. The Supreme Court affirmed the protection order in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings to provide for appropriate contact and visitation. View "Wagner v. Tovar" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with three minor children, who reside full-time with their mother, entered into a child-support agreement as part of their divorce proceedings. The agreement, incorporated into a final order, calculated child support using a formula established in a prior case, which is applied when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds $240,000. Over time, both parties filed motions seeking to modify child support, compel discovery, and request sanctions, primarily due to alleged changes in income and discovery disputes. The father sought a reduction in support based on his income, while the mother sought enforcement and additional relief, including attorney’s fees and sanctions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held hearings, issued a temporary reduction in the father’s support obligation, and ultimately entered a permanent order requiring him to pay $3,817.28 per month. The court used the Holland formula to determine the support amount, declined to “gross up” the father’s nontaxable veteran’s benefit for tax purposes, and excluded a $6,000 extraordinary medical expense from the calculation due to insufficient evidence. The court also denied the mother’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions, often without detailed explanation.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s use of the Holland formula, holding that it was within the court’s discretion for high-income cases. However, the appellate court vacated the permanent support order and remanded for further proceedings. It held that the trial court erred by not grossing up the father’s nontaxable veteran’s benefit as required by statute, by not adequately considering the extraordinary medical expense, and by failing to properly address the mother’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions. The case was remanded for the trial court to address these issues in accordance with the appellate court’s guidance. View "Hershey v. Hershey" on Justia Law

A child, J.B., was removed from her mother’s care in 2015 after reports of drug use by the mother. The Department of Public Health and Human Services initially dismissed its petition in 2018 after the father completed a treatment plan and J.B. was cared for by her paternal grandmother. In 2021, J.B. was again removed, this time from her paternal grandmother’s home due to allegations of sexual abuse by an uncle. Over the next several years, J.B. experienced multiple placements, including with relatives and in therapeutic foster care, while the Department attempted to provide services and reunification efforts. The mother’s engagement with the Department and her appointed counsel was sporadic, and she struggled with substance abuse and unstable living conditions.The Seventeenth Judicial District Court adjudicated J.B. as a youth in need of care and approved a treatment plan for the mother, who failed to comply with its requirements. The Fort Belknap Indian Community, recognizing J.B. as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), moved to transfer the case to tribal court. The father objected to the transfer, and the District Court denied the motion. The court later terminated both parents’ rights, finding that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that continued custody by the mother would likely result in serious harm to J.B. The mother appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, improper denial of the transfer to tribal court, and insufficient evidence for termination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decisions. It held that under ICWA, either parent’s objection to transfer to tribal court is an absolute bar, and the father’s written objection was sufficient. The Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as the mother’s lack of engagement prevented effective advocacy. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights, as the statutory and ICWA requirements were met by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Matter of J.B., YINC" on Justia Law

Erica Hall and Nicholas Houser married in 2012 and have one minor child, C.H., born in 2018. In 2020, both parties sought an absolute divorce. On the trial day, they presented agreements to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, including one to waive child support and arrears. The court requested justification for this waiver, but the parties only argued their fitness as parents and their constitutional rights. The court found the waiver in the parents' best interest, not the child's, and ordered Mr. Houser to pay child support and arrears to Ms. Hall, who had primary custody of C.H.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's decision, rejecting the parents' agreement regarding child support and upholding the child support and arrears order. Both parties then petitioned the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that parents cannot waive the issue of child support because it is a legal obligation, and the right to receive support belongs to the child, not the parents. The court also held that a parent's fundamental right to determine the care, custody, and control of their children does not include waiving child support, as it is a parental obligation. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the parents' agreement to waive child support, as the parties failed to provide sufficient justification for the waiver. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court, maintaining the child support and arrears order. View "In re: Marriage of Houser" on Justia Law

A couple divorced, and the superior court awarded them joint legal custody of their minor child, with primary physical custody to the mother. The court also divided the couple’s marital estate. The father, representing himself, appealed, arguing that the division of the marital estate was inequitable. He claimed errors in the court’s determinations, including not crediting him for post-separation payments, not allowing him to apply for the child’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), not allowing him to claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, and its custody decision.The superior court held a one-day trial by videoconference, where both parties testified. The court issued a decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding joint legal custody to both parties and primary physical custody to the mother. The court divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, taking into account the father’s child support arrearage and an escrow shortage. The court also divided the couple’s vehicles and assigned debts based on testimony and the mother’s spreadsheet. The court ordered that the mother would be responsible for the child’s PFD and could claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. The court ordered that the father’s 401(k) be divided equitably according to the mother’s spreadsheet.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It vacated the superior court’s division of the marital estate, finding that the court’s treatment of the father’s 401(k) was unclear and lacked clarifying findings. It also found legal error in the court’s failure to address post-separation payments when dividing the marital estate. The court remanded for further proceedings on these issues. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s decisions, including the custody award and the decisions regarding the child’s PFD and tax dependency. View "Wolffe v. Wolffe" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old boy lifted his grandmother, causing her to fall and suffer pain. The boy’s father, in response, pushed the boy to the ground to show him "how it felt to be Grandma." The boy’s mother sought a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against the father on the boy’s behalf. The superior court granted the order, finding that the father had assaulted the boy and rejected the father's argument that the push was reasonable parental discipline.The superior court found that the father's actions amounted to an assault and were not reasonable corporal discipline. The court noted that the father should have calmed down and had a mature conversation with his son instead of pushing him to the ground. The court granted a long-term DVPO against the father. The father moved for reconsideration, arguing insufficient evidence of assault and permissible corporal discipline. The court denied reconsideration.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the superior court’s finding of assault, as the father’s actions caused the boy physical pain and were reckless. The court also affirmed the superior court’s rejection of the reasonable corporal discipline defense, finding that the father’s actions were not reasonable or appropriate and were motivated by retribution rather than a desire to promote the child’s welfare. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Peter R. v. B.M.R." on Justia Law