Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's request for a jury trial in this termination of parental rights case, holding that the district court exercised sound judgment under the circumstances.The Department of Family Services brought an action to terminate Mother's parental rights to her son. Mother failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial pursuant to Wyo. R. Crim. P. 38 (Rule 38) and later requested that the district court grant a jury trial under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 39(b). The district court denied Mother's request and subsequently terminated her parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the order denying Mother's Rule 39 motion was not a final appealable order; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's request for a jury trial. View "Gipson v. State, ex rel. Dep't of Family Services" on Justia Law

In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Wife's motion for relief filed under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 60(a) from a divorce decree entered in 2003, holding that the district court erred as a matter of law in denying Rule 60(a) motion.At issue was the provision in the parties' stipulated decree of divorce that granted Wife fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband's disposable retired pay under his military retirement plan and provided a formula to calculate the marital portion based on Husband's months of service. In her Rule 60(a) motion, Wife argued that the formula's use of the word "months" rather than the term "reserve points" prevented her from collecting her share of Husband's military retired pay. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the district court's denial of Wife's motion for relief, holding that the decree's use of "months" instead of "reserve points" was a clerical mistake requiring correction. View "Stone v. Stone" on Justia Law

Father M.M. and mother J.M. pled no contest to a dependency petition regarding their minor children, J. and M. (along with their now-adult sibling Mi.), based on the parents engaging in repeated conflicts in the children’s presence. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and removed them from both parents’ custody, finding that the ongoing conflict caused a substantial risk of harm to the children, including serious mental health issues for J. The court returned the children to mother and father in October 2020 but maintained jurisdiction. In May 2021, the court terminated jurisdiction at a section 364 status review hearing with an exit order granting shared legal custody of J. and M. to mother and father, but sole physical custody to mother. Father appeals from that exit order, arguing that the court erred in terminating jurisdiction and applied the wrong standard to remove the children from his custody.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court found no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that awarding sole physical custody to mother was in the children’s best interest, as recommended by DCFS and requested by mother and the children, and where J. stated she was not comfortable visiting or living with father at all. The court’s order was further supported by the evidence that father had failed to comply with on-demand drug testing, failed to meet with the CSW for assessment for months, blamed mother for his relationship issues with J., blamed DCFS and mother for his lack of conjoint counseling, and was frequently absent. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the petition brought by the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) to terminate the parental rights of Mother to her child, holding that Mother was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.After a hearing, the district court held that the Department of Family Services (DFS) had presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights to her child should be terminated under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v). The court further held that termination would be in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the district court's holding that DFS made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate and reunify Mother and her child under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-309(a)(iii). View "Alcorn v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court establishing paternity of twin children in Apurba Chatterjee and ordering joint legal and physical custody of the children, holding that Apurba lacked standing to seek a finding of paternity.Apurba brought this complaint seeking to establish paternity, custody, and support, alleging that Indraja Chatterjee, who was married to Indraneel Chatterjee, was pregnant with twins and that he was the biological father of the children. Apruba's motion for genetic testing of the children was granted, and results were returned indicating that there was a 99.9-percent statistical probability that Apurba was the children's biological father. The district court entered a decree finding that Apurba was the children's biological father and ordered joint legal and physical custody of the children. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that Nebraska's paternity statutes do not allow for an alleged father to establish paternity over a child born to a married couple. View "Chatterjee v. Chatterjee" on Justia Law

CC (mother) and VC (father) were driving through eastern Washington when CC went into premature labor. CC gave birth to AC in a nearby hospital. AC’s umbilical cord tested positive for cannabis. Hospital staff noted that CC was disabled, that CC and VC were homeless, and that they had no baby supplies. The hospital reported its concerns to the State, and the State sent social worker Michelle Woodward to investigate. Woodward contacted CC’s family from whom she heard reports of the couple’s domestic violence, criminal history, and drug use. The State took custody of AC and temporarily placed him with a foster family. The court later found AC dependent at a contested shelter care hearing and ordered CC to participate in random drug testing and an evidence-based parenting program. The court also ordered the State to provide regular, supervised visitation. At about this time, a new social worker, Diana Barnes, was assigned to AC. The court held another dependency hearing where Woodward, Barnes, and parenting therapist Logan Wright testified in support of AC’s dependency. Woodward and Barnes relied extensively on hearsay based largely on secondhand reports and statements rather than their own personal interactions or investigations. None of these reports were submitted into evidence, no records custodian authenticated them, and none of the out-of-court witnesses whose statements were recorded in those reports were called to testify. Counsel for VC made two unsuccessful objections to the hearsay presented through the social workers. The court ultimately found that the parents’ past history with the criminal justice system and Child Protective Services supported dependency, a finding substantially based on hearsay. CC and VC appealed. The Washington Supreme Court held the trial court’s impermissible reliance on hearsay prejudiced the parents and materially affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s dependency finding for AC as to both parents. View "In re Dependency of A.C." on Justia Law

Karena and Keith Jensen (“Jensens”), as foster parents to A.P., appealed a juvenile court’s order denying their motion to modify and order approving a transition plan. Because the Jensens were not “aggrieved parties” under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-26(1), the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Interest of A.P." on Justia Law

In these dependency proceedings, T.M. (Father) appealed from a juvenile court exit order awarding sole physical custody of minors N.M. and S.M. to E.S. (Mother), contending no substantial evidence supported the order.   The Second Appellate District agreed and therefore reversed the order insofar as it grants sole physical custody to Mother. The court explained that here, the juvenile court made no express finding that granting sole physical custody to Mother would be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the court stated, “It’s not appropriate to reward a parent who does nothing in this court, so I’m not going to make it joint legal.” The court thus granted Mother sole custody to avoid rewarding Father, who had refused to participate meaningfully in the case plan. This was an abuse of discretion because an exit order must serve the best interests of the children, not reward or punish one parent or another for failing to comply with the case plan.   The court explained that while it does not condone ignoring the court’s orders, there has been no express finding that these factors impacted the children’s interests, and no grounds appear for an implied finding. Father has never been deemed an offending parent, and no evidence suggested that his drug use, lack of a parenting class, or visitation practices impacted the children in any way. View "In re N.M." on Justia Law