Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In August 2020, police went to a motel room to investigate child abuse. Three children were present: K.H. (an eight-year-old boy), A.H. (a five-year-old girl), and P.A. (an 18-month-old girl). The boy had visible bruises on his face and arms; the older girl had multiple bruises on her legs. Police arrested S.A. (“Mother”), and A.A. (“Husband” and father of the younger girl), who had brought the three children from Texas to California about three weeks prior. At that time, A.H. (“Father” of the two older children) was incarcerated in Texas for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The children were taken into protective custody. The next day, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a dependency petition, and the juvenile court took “emergency jurisdiction . . . pursuant to UCCJEA.” About a week later, the court phoned a Texas state court judge who “cede[d] jurisdiction to the state of California.” SSA placed the children in foster care with Dana C. (“Caregiver”). Mother pleaded guilty to two counts of child abuse, served a 120-day jail sentence, and returned to Texas. Husband’s disposition and whereabouts were unknown. Father was no longer incarcerated and lived in Texas. In March 2021, the juvenile court sustained the dependency petition, declaring the children to be dependents of the court. Six months later, Mother moved to transfer the matter to Texas. In July 2022, the juvenile court again spoke to a Texas judge and found the state continued to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Father appealed, contending the California juvenile court never had subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and all the juvenile court’s orders had to be reversed. The Court of Appeal denied the parents' requests, finding substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's ruling. View "A.H. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a trial court’s determination that C.C. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). She argued that the court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements by C.C. concerning alleged sexual abuse by mother’s boyfriend. The Vermont Supreme Court did not reach mother’s arguments because, even excluding this evidence, the court’s decision was amply supported by its remaining findings. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests.After Mother and Father, the parents of three children, were divorced, Father received full legal and physical custody of the children. Mother later filed a complaint for modification of custody or parenting plan, alleging that Father had not complied with the divorce decree. Father filed a responsive pleading requesting termination of Mother's parental rights. The trial court found that, as to all three children, Father presented sufficient evidence to support three of the alleged statutory grounds for termination and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. View "Benjamin S. v. Crystal S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the decision of the court of appeals applying the active appreciation rule to agricultural land in a marital property division, holding that the rule applies to such land.After the district court divided the marital estate Wife appealed, challenging the district court's classification, valuation, and division of the marital estate. The court of appeals reversed the district court's determinations regarding five parcels of land, determining that the active appreciation rule applies to farmland. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the court of appeals properly applied the active appreciation rule to agricultural land; and (2) the court of appeals' decision is modified to decrease the marital value of one parcel by $20,000. View "Parde v. Parde" on Justia Law

John and Sandra Davis, then-married, had two children in the 1980s. In 2018, John discovered the possibility that the children were not biologically his, but that they may have been the biological result of Sandra’s extramarital relations with Porter Horgan. Almost immediately after discovering this possibility, John sued Sandra and Horgan for fraud, alienation of affection, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury ultimately awarded John $700,000 in damages. Because some of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and because John completely failed to request proper jury instructions on damages, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict and rendered judgment in favor of Sandra and Horgan on John’s claims against them. View "Davis, et al. v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided them with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition for visitation.On appeal, Grandparents argued that the requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.050 that "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child" was satisfied in this case because one parent denied them visitation entirely and that the district court's finding that the visitation they received was reasonable was incorrect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Grandparents' visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably restricted to warrant relief in a petition for visitation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Grandparents' visits with the children in this case were not denied or unreasonably restricted. View "Ramos v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Michael Brockmeyer appealed a district court order denying his motion to modify his joint residential responsibility to primary residential responsibility. He argued the district court erred: (1) as a matter of law by finding best interest factors a, b, d, f, g, and k favored neither party; (2) by applying the endangerment standard of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6 after the parties waived that provision in their stipulated divorce agreement; (3) by declining to modify residential responsibility because of facts unknown to the court at the time the court entered the original divorce judgment based on their stipulated agreement; and (4) by allowing various witnesses to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at trial. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brockmeyer v. Brockmeyer, et al." on Justia Law

Miguel Andrews appealed a divorce judgment dividing the marital estate between Candice Crichlow and him. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court conclude the district court clearly erred by including in the marital estate the value of Andrews’s financial accounts opened after the agreed upon valuation date. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Crichlow v. Andrews" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the family court's parental termination order in this case and remanding the action for a new trial, holding that Parents received a fundamentally fair trial and that due process was satisfied.During the underlying termination proceedings, the family court appointed attorneys for Parents, but Parents failed to appear at a court hearing and so the court discharged counsel. When Parents reappeared, the court reappointed counsel, and eventually, after a trial, the family court terminated Parents' parental rights. The ICA vacated the termination order and remanded for a new trial, finding structural error in the discharge of Parents' counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding (1) a family court's discharge of counsel does not necessarily make a trial fundamentally unfair in Child Protection Act proceedings; and (2) Parents received a fair procedure in this case. View "In re JH" on Justia Law

Stephanie Owens appealed a district court’s order affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the “Board”) in which it determined that Owens was an “applicant” under the Medical Indigency Act (the “Act”) and, therefore, required to pay reimbursement for the medical expenses incurred by her two children at public expense. In 2017, Owens’s children were involved in a serious car accident and suffered substantial injuries, which later resulted in the death of one of the children. Because the children’s father, Corey Jacobs, was unable to pay for the children’s medical bills, he filed two applications for medical indigency with the Board. Owens and Jacobs were never married and did not have a formal custody agreement for their children. At the time of the accident, the children resided with their father. The Board determined that Owens and her children met the statutory requirements for medical indigency. Although Jacobs filed the applications for medical indigency, the Board concluded that Owens was also an “applicant” under the Act and liable to repay the Board. As a result, the Board “recorded notices of statutory liens” against Owens’s real and personal property and ordered Owens to sign a promissory note with Ada County to repay the medical bills. Owens refused to sign the note and instead challenged the sufficiency of her involvement with the applications via a petition for reconsideration with the Board and a subsequent petition for judicial review. Both the Board and the district court ultimately concluded that Owens was an “applicant” and liable for repayment of a portion of the children’s medical bills. Owens timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed: because she never signed the medical indigency applications for her children and she did not affirmatively participate in the application process, Owens was not an "applicant" as defined by the Act. As a result, the Board acted outside its authority when it ordered Owens to reimburse Ada County for its expenses and when it placed automatic liens on her property. View "Owens v. Ada County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law