Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the circuit court that it lacked the authority to amend the Military Pension Division Order (MPDO) it issued earlier memorializing the parties' negotiated agreement regarding the division of Defendant's military retirement pay, holding that the court of appeals erred.After the final decree was entered in this case, Husband moved to amend the final decree, the equitable distribution order, and the MPDO. The circuit court dismissed the motion on the ground that the court had no authority to amend the MPDO because more than twenty-one days had passed since the order was entered. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that federal law preempted Virginia law on questions involving the divisibility of military retirement benefits. The Supreme Court adopted the holding of the court of appeals in Owen v. Owen, 14 Va. App. 623 (1992), with regard to the division of military retirement benefits and reversed, holding that federal law did not bar the parties' in this case from upholding the MPDO. View "Yourko v. Yourko" on Justia Law

While their marriage dissolution proceeding was pending in Virginia, David and Joanna filed dueling requests for domestic violence restraining orders in Marin County Superior Court under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Family Code section 6200. After a trial, the family court found both parties had committed domestic violence and issued mutual restraining orders. The court also found that Joanna had obtained orders temporarily excluding David from his residence under false pretenses, and then damaged and confiscated substantial amounts of David’s property, so it conducted a second hearing on restitution and issued a substantial award.The court of appeal affirmed. The court rejected Joanna’s arguments that the restraining order did not include findings, required by section 6305(a)(2), to support mutual restraining orders; that the court exceeded its authority under section 6342 in awarding restitution for confiscated items; that the court’s decisions were driven by bias (in violation of Joanna’s right to due process) and a lack of “informed discretion”; and that the court intruded on the jurisdiction of the Virginia court presiding over the parties’ dissolution case and failed to accord “full faith and credit” to its orders. She also, unsuccessfully, asserted that certain findings are not supported by substantial evidence, View "Rivera v. Hillard" on Justia Law

In October 2016, the mother filed a request to reinstate joint legal and physical custody of her minor daughter, after a lengthy period in which the father exercised sole legal and physical custody based on a child welfare referral that, according to the mother, had recently been “overturned.” The parents had a long-running custody battle. In May 2019, she was ordered to share in the expense of a court-ordered child custody evaluator who was appointed under Evidence Code section 730. The payment order was entered over the mother’s continuing objection that she cannot afford to pay any of the evaluator’s fees. She argued that, given her financial condition, the court erred when it reallocated a portion of that expense to her after the fact.The court of appeal remanded, In allocating the costs of a court-appointed child custody evaluator, the court must consider the parties’ ability to pay, whether the child custody evaluator is appointed by the court under Evidence Code section 730 or the more specific provisions of the Family Code (sections 3111-3112). The record does not indicate that the trial court considered all of the mother’s expenses before ordering her to contribute to the costs. View "Peterson v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court refusing to adjudicate Father as an abusive and neglectful parent and remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Father did not abandon Child.Father was identified as the father of Child, who was removed from the home of his mother because of drug use and other conditions, and the pending abuse and neglect petition was amended to add him as an alleged neglectful parent. The circuit court declined to make a finding of abandonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence showed that Father demonstrated a settled purpose to forgo his responsibilities and duties to Child and thus abandoned him. View "In re C.M.-1" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the family division’s order transferring custody of thirteen-year-old Z.P. to father, who was previously the noncustodial parent. In 2020, Z.P. was adjudicated a child in need of care or supervision, for which a case plan was approved with the goal of reunification with mother, who had been the sole custodial parent. Department for Children and Families (DCF) placed Z.P. with his maternal grandmother. In November 2021, DCF determined that it could not fully license grandmother as a foster parent and indicated that it planned to move Z.P. to a different placement. Z.P. and mother moved jointly for a conditional custody order (CCO) transferring custody to grandmother. The State opposed the request. After a hearing, the family division granted the motion in December 2021, but stated that this was a “close call” and indicated that it would reconsider its decision if grandmother failed to work with DCF to exercise protective supervision of Z.P. After a hearing, however, the court found that mother had failed to engage in any aspect of the case plan and lacked insight into the reasons Z.P. was in DCF custody. Further, the Court found that over the course of the case, father had shown that he was committed to caring for Z.P. and was able to do so. Z.P. was accepted in father’s home and had become active and engaged with father’s family. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family division did not err in its findings that it was in Z.P.'s best interests to be placed with his father. View "In re Z.P." on Justia Law

Appellant M.B., mother of minor L.J., appealed the termination of her parental rights which freed L.J. for adoption. Mother contended the juvenile court erred by: (1) denying her request to admit self-made recordings of her visits with the minor to support her argument that the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parental relationship exception applied and to impeach the evidence of the visits; and (2) finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply to prevent the termination of parental rights. The Court of Appeal concluded after review that the juvenile court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no detriment to termination of parental rights. View "In re L.J." on Justia Law

Unhappy with a Virginia court’s order regarding the custody of his minor daughter, appellant Paul Fishbein sought to modify that order only one month later in California family court. When the California court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to do so, Fishbein appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the California court was correct: the Virginia court that entered the governing child custody order had initial home state jurisdiction, and it never lost that jurisdiction. View "Segal v. Fishbein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by A.S. and A.S. (together, Relatives) challenging the decision of the trial court to overrule their motion for a new trial following an adjudication hearing on the juvenile officer's neglect petition under Mo. Rev. Stat. 211.031, holding that Relatives lacked standing to appeal.After Child's motion consented to the termination of her parental rights, Relatives filed a petition seeking transfer of custody and adoption of Child. The court granted Relatives temporary custody. Later, the juvenile officer filed a petition alleging that the persons legally responsible for Child's care refused to provide the proper support necessary for Child's well being. After the court ordered that Child be placed in the temporary protective custody of the Children's Division the court found the facts set forth in the neglect petition were established by clear and convincing evidence and committed Child to the custody of the Children's Division for appropriate placement. Relatives appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Relatives had no statutory right to appeal. View "In re L.N.G.S." on Justia Law

Jeremiah Sullivan, III, appeals a stipulated judgment of dissolution of marriage. He challenged a 2018 order that was incorporated into the stipulated judgment, in which the family court found that it lacked jurisdiction to divide his ex-wife Lisa Sullivan’s military pension under the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act (FUSFSPA). Jeremiah argued the court erred because Lisa “consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of the Court.” The Court of Appeal concluded the stipulated judgment was not appealable because it did not resolve all issues between the parties. At the parties’ joint request, however, the appellate court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. On the merits, it rejected the trial court’s ruling that a service member had to explicitly and specifically consent to the court’s authority to divide her military retirement under the FUSFSPA. Furthermore, the Court concluded Lisa did consent to the jurisdiction of the court within the meaning of the FUSFSPA by voluntarily filing her dissolution petition in California, seeking a judicial confirmation of “all” her separate property acquired before marriage, asking the court to determine “any” community property assets, and requesting the appointment of an expert under California Evidence Code section 730 to determine a proposed division of the parties’ retirement accounts. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted appropriate writ relief directing the family court to vacate the stipulated judgment and the relevant portion of the 2018 order. View "Marriage of Sullivan" on Justia Law

After Richard Cohen (Richard) filed a request to modify his child support and spousal support obligations, Lauralin Anderson Cohen (Lauralin) moved to dismiss Richard’s motion under the disentitlement doctrine as Richard was delinquent on his support obligations. The trial court granted Lauralin’s motion and on its own, conditioned the filing of any future modification requests on Richard being current on his support obligations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Lauralin’s motion to dismiss, but erred in conditioning the filing of future modification requests on Richard being current on his support obligations. View "Marriage of Cohen" on Justia Law