Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals determining that the trial court's findings of fact did not support its conclusion adjudicating Glenda a neglected juvenile, holding that the court of appeals erred by requiring findings of fact from the trial court to adjudicate a juvenile neglected that are not required by statute or Supreme Court precedent.After Glenda's sibling died, the Department of Social Services filed a petition alleging that Glenda was a neglected juvenile. After the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Glenda was a neglected juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-101(15) Respondent appealed. The court of appeals vacated the adjudication and disposition order, concluding that the trial court's written findings of fact did not support its conclusion that Glenda was a neglected juvenile. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the findings of fact supported the trial court's adjudication and conclusion of law that Glenda was a neglected juvenile. View "In re G.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's adjudications of nine-year-old Margaret as an abused and neglected juvenile and her two younger siblings as neglected juveniles, holding that the trial court's order contained sufficient findings, supported by clear cogent, and convincing evidence, supporting the court's adjudications of Margaret and her siblings.In reversing the trial court's adjudications, the court of appeals held that the trial court improperly admitted some hearsay evidence and that the trial court's reasoning was so "reliant and intertwined with" the hearsay evidence that the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court's order. The Supreme Court reversed after reaffirming the proper role of an appellate court in reviewing a trial court's adjudication and disposition in a juvenile proceeding, holding that the court of appeals erred by vacating or reversing the trial court's adjudications because the court properly adjudicated Margaret as an abused and neglected juvenile and properly adjudicated her siblings as neglected juveniles. View "In re A.J.L.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied this petition for a writ of certiorari seeking to challenge the validity of a decision of the circuit court ordering attorney Helen Grinder to refund her client William Campbell $10,000 as a condition as her withdrawal, holding that Grinder had an adequate alternate remedy available.Grinder charged $10,000 to represent Campbell in an ex parte petition for a change in custody. Campbell prevailed and then fired Grinder. Grinder sought formally to withdraw as Campbell's counsel, but Campbell opposed the withdrawal on the grounds that Grinder retained unearned fees. The circuit court subsequently issued an order granting Grinder's motion to withdraw on the condition that she refund $10,000 of allegedly unearned fees to Campbell. Grinder filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and sought a stay. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was an adequate remedy other than a writ of certiorari for her to challenge the circuit court's fee adjudication. View "Grinder v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the adjudicatory and dispositional orders culminating in the termination of Petitioners' parental rights to four of the seven children at issue in this case and affirmed the termination of Petitioners' parental rights as to the remaining children, holding that the circuit court erred in part.In the underlying proceedings the circuit court terminated the parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to seven children, three of whom resided in the home at the time the abuse and neglect petition was filed and the other four of whom were in legal guardianships with various relatives. The Supreme Court vacated the orders in part, holding (1) there was ample support for the termination of Petitioners' parental rights as to the children who resided in the home; and (2) the circuit court failed to make adequate findings to support its exercise of jurisdiction over the children in legal guardianships. View "In re B.V." on Justia Law

Jennie and Christopher Zinn appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their complaint against Ashley Till. In October 2017, the Zinns filed an adoption petition with the probate court concerning an unborn child. The child was born later that month, and the probate court subsequently entered an interlocutory adoption decree. In November 2017, the Zinns filed an amended adoption petition, listing the child's name and providing the consent of the child's mother and purported father to the child's adoption. On December 18, 2017, Till, an employee of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, submitted an acknowledgment letter to the probate court stating that there was no entry in the putative-father registry relating to the child. The next day, the probate court entered a final decree of adoption. On January 25, 2018, Till submitted a corrected acknowledgment letter to the probate court, identifying an individual who was, in fact, listed in the putative-father registry regarding the child and stating that incomplete information had previously been provided "due to oversight and neglect." The next day, the probate court vacated the final decree of adoption based on the corrected acknowledgment letter. In June 2019, the Zinns filed suit against Till alleging: (1) negligence; (2) wantonness; and (3) that the defendants had "acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law ...." The Zinns' complaint sought awards of compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the Zinns argue that the circuit court erred by dismissing their claims on immunity grounds. Till moved to dismiss count one of the Zinns' complaint based on State-agent immunity, and the circuit court cited State-agent immunity as an alternative ground for dismissing counts two and three of the complaint. Insofar as the circuit court's judgment dismissing each count of the complaint was based on the doctrine of State-agent immunity, the parties appeared to agree that the judgment should have been reversed regarding each count. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Zinn v. Till" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and confirmed the existence of a common-law marriage between Margaret Heidkamp and Edward Ritter, holding that the district court's findings were supported by substantial competent evidence and that the court properly applied the rules.After Ritter died at the age of sixty-seven, Heidkamp filed a petition to declare relationship as common-law spouse. After a hearing, the district court concluded that Ritter and Heidkamp "were in a valid common-law marriage under the statute and common law of Kansas as of September 8, 2003" and that the relationship continued until Ritter's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the conclusion that the components necessary to establish a common-law marriage existed in the relationship between Ritter and Heidkamp. View "In re Common-Law Marriage of Heidkamp & Ritter" on Justia Law

Cassandra Goetz appealed a corrected amended judgment awarding her and Joshua Goetz equal residential responsibility of their minor children and awarding Joshua primary decision making responsibility. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined further findings were warranted. The Court remanded the case with instructions that the district court make specific findings regarding whether the material change in circumstances resulted in a general decline or adversely affected the children. View "Goetz v. Goetz, et al." on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed an order denying his motion to modify child support. He argued the district court erred when it applied the North Dakota Supreme Court’s vexatious litigant pre-filing order, when it allowed the State to file a response to his motion after the deadline, and when it denied his motion without a hearing. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Rath v. Rath, et al." on Justia Law

Almost 15 months elapsed from the time the juvenile court found Petitioner K.R. incompetent to stand trial and referred him for remediation until the court determined that he had been restored to competency and reinstated the proceedings. K.R. remained in juvenile hall for that entire period. He filed a writ petition arguing that the court lost jurisdiction when it failed to make a final ruling on his competency by the one-year deadline for remediation services and was required to dismiss the case at that point. In the alternative, he argues the court erred by allowing the prosecution to employ its own expert to examine him and asks us to order the juvenile court to strike the expert’s testimony.   The Second Appellate District disagreed and denied the petition. The court held that although section 709 establishes a maximum period of one year of remediation, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues for a reasonable period afterward for the court to resolve any dispute still existing at the end of that period over whether the minor has attained competency. Even if this was not the case, section 709 permits a court to keep juveniles accused of certain serious offenses (including several with which K.R. was charged) in secure confinement past the one-year remediation period for conclusion of competency proceedings. The court also found that section 709 does not preclude the parties from seeking the appointment of their own expert(s) after the initial competency hearing. View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A child was removed from his mother and placed with his grandparents out of concern that she could not care for him. Years later, the State sought to terminate that mother’s parental rights. On advice of counsel, she declined to answer questions related to her recent drug use. The trial judge chose to draw a negative inference from her assertion of that right. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether, under the Fifth Amendment, that was permissible. The Court stressed that such a negative inference could not be the only evidence supporting termination. Here, the Supreme Court concluded the trial coud did not err by drawing a negative inference from the mother’s refusal to answer specific questions about her drug use. View "In re Dependency of A.M.F." on Justia Law