Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the husband filed for an absolute divorce, and the wife counterclaimed. The parties attempted mediation but did not reach a settlement. The wife’s counsel later sent a settlement package to the husband’s counsel, which included a Voluntary Separation and Property Settlement Agreement, a promissory note, and a guaranty. The cover letter specified that the husband needed to sign the agreement and note by the end of the day on September 25, 2020. The husband signed the documents on September 28, 2020, and filed an amended complaint for divorce based on mutual consent, incorporating the agreement.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that the husband had timely accepted the wife’s offer and that a binding settlement agreement was formed. The court granted the husband’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and entered a judgment for absolute divorce based on mutual consent, incorporating but not merging the agreement into the judgment. The wife appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s judgment, finding that the husband had not timely accepted the wife’s offer and that no contract was formed.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The court held that the wife’s offer was conditioned on the husband signing the agreement and note by September 25, 2020, and that the husband’s failure to meet this deadline meant that no contract was formed. The court also found no evidence that the wife had waived the deadline. The court concluded that the husband’s signing of the documents on September 28, 2020, constituted a counteroffer, which the wife was not obligated to accept. View "Pattison v. Pattison" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that A.K., a three-year-old child, was in need of care. Both parents entered no contest statements, and the court found A.K. to be a child in need of care. The father later died, leaving the mother as the sole subject of the termination proceedings. The State filed a motion to terminate the mother's parental rights, and during a pretrial conference, the mother did not appear, but her attorney did. The court set a date for a "proffer trial" under K.S.A. 38-2248(f). At the proffer trial, the mother was absent, and her attorney objected to proceeding by proffer, leading the court to set a full trial date. The mother did not appear at the trial, and her substitute counsel did not object to proceeding by proffer. The court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence.The Johnson District Court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence. The mother appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to proceed by proffer because she had instructed her counsel to object. She also argued that K.S.A. 38-2248(f) violated procedural due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the mother's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court misapplied K.S.A. 38-2248(f) by terminating the mother's parental rights based on a proffer alone. The court clarified that while K.S.A. 38-2248(f) permits a proffer against an absent party who has not instructed their counsel to object, it does not allow the district court to make a finding of unfitness or terminate parental rights based solely on the proffer. The court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re A.K. " on Justia Law

Stacy L. Jones and Joshua Colgrove were in a relationship and had a child, B.C. After their separation, Stacy moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, with B.C. and her other children. Joshua, who was diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome, did not initially seek custody. Stacy was later convicted of felony child abuse and placed on probation, leading to juvenile court proceedings where B.C. was placed in foster care. Joshua's request for B.C.'s placement with him was denied due to his non-compliance with DHHS requests. The juvenile court eventually found Stacy rehabilitated and awarded her custody of B.C., issuing a bridge order transferring jurisdiction to the district court.The district court entered a custody decree consistent with the juvenile court's order. Joshua filed a petition for modification, and the State filed a complaint to establish child and medical support. The district court overruled Joshua's motion to dismiss the State's complaint and required him to pay child support. The court also issued an amended custody decree after the juvenile court corrected minor errors in its bridge order. Joshua's motions to reconsider and strike the amended orders were denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court's findings, including Stacy's compliance with rehabilitative measures and her ability to protect B.C., were supported by evidence. The court also held that the State's intervention to establish child support was permissible under the relevant statutes. The court determined that the issue of the amended orders was moot and did not warrant further review. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to Stacy, requiring Joshua to handle transportation for parenting time, and not awarding Joshua the child tax credit. View "Jones v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

Sharon and Kieran Cunningham were married in 1994 and divorced in 2021. They entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree. The MSA included provisions about the use and sale of their home in Middletown, Rhode Island, which were modified twice by mutual agreement. In January 2024, Kieran's counsel offered to purchase the home, leading to a dispute over whether the Family Court could modify the MSA to allow an appraisal of the property.Kieran filed a motion in the Family Court to have the home appraised, which Sharon opposed, arguing that the MSA did not provide for such an appraisal. Kieran amended his motion to request an inspection and appraisal, citing Rule 34 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure. The Family Court held a hearing and ultimately ruled that Kieran had no right to purchase the property under the MSA and sanctioned him for filing an improper motion, awarding Sharon $6,125 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The Court held that Kieran's motion was not well-grounded in fact or law and that he sought relief not permitted by the MSA. The Court found that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the fees were reasonable and supported by an affidavit from a Rhode Island Bar member. The Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions and attorneys' fees were appropriate given the circumstances. View "Cunningham v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter Lowes and Amy Thompson, formerly Amy Lowes, regarding a nondisparagement clause in their stipulated divorce judgment. Lowes alleged that Thompson breached this clause by describing him as her "abuser" during a political campaign interview. Thompson filed a special motion to strike the breach of contract claim under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which aims to quickly dismiss nonmeritorious claims arising from protected speech. The trial court granted Thompson’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the nondisparagement clause waived Thompson’s right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections.The Deschutes County Circuit Court initially granted Thompson’s special motion to strike, finding that her statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that Lowes failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the nondisparagement clause constituted a waiver of Thompson’s anti-SLAPP protections, thus making it unnecessary to evaluate whether Lowes could prevail on his claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the nondisparagement clause did not clearly indicate an intention to waive the procedural protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore, the clause alone could not defeat Thompson’s special motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Lowes met his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on his breach of contract claim. View "Lowes v. Thompson" on Justia Law

William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law

Pamela J. (Tower) Weinle appealed a divorce judgment from the District Court (Skowhegan), which divided marital property and awarded Alan R. Tower spousal support and attorney fees. Weinle contested the spousal support, property distribution, and attorney fees. Tower died after the judgment and during the appeal process.The District Court awarded Tower $2,000 per month in general spousal support, $500 per month in reimbursement spousal support, and $12,325 in attorney fees. The court found that Weinle had engaged in economic misconduct by purchasing and selling property without Tower's knowledge and failing to comply with discovery obligations, which increased litigation costs. The court also noted that Weinle had a substantial income and financial resources, while Tower had limited income and poor health.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court overruled its previous decision in Panter v. Panter, which required dismissal of an appeal if a party died during its pendency. The court held that the death of a party does not moot the appeal regarding property rights. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding no error in the spousal support award, property distribution, or attorney fees. The court noted that the spousal support obligation ceased upon Tower's death, as the divorce judgment did not specify that the support survived the death of either party. View "Weinle v. Estate of Tower" on Justia Law

Robin Niceta, a former caseworker with the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, was assigned to investigate allegations of child abuse against Paul Berryman. Niceta allegedly made false statements during the investigation and custody proceedings, which led to the removal of Berryman’s daughters from his custody for a year and a half. After the Berrymans regained custody, they sued Niceta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming her conduct violated their procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied Niceta’s motion to dismiss the claim, rejecting her assertions of qualified immunity and absolute testimonial immunity for statements made at a custody hearing. Niceta then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court that Niceta was not entitled to qualified immunity because she failed to adequately raise the defense. However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court regarding absolute testimonial immunity. The court held that Niceta is entitled to absolute immunity for statements made during her testimony at the custody hearing but not for statements made outside of that hearing.The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether any of the Berrymans’ claims could survive without considering Niceta’s testimonial statements made at the custody hearing. View "Berryman v. Niceta" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Robert and Etleva Stratoberdha, filed a lawsuit in Superior Court against Clements Properties, LLC, Robert P. Rucando, and officials from the Town of Portsmouth. They alleged that Clements Properties caused continuous trespass by creating an illegal drainage structure, Rucando failed to disclose flooding issues when selling the property, and the Town neglected to enforce ordinances. During the prolonged litigation, Etleva filed for divorce, and the Family Court issued orders related to the sale of the marital home and the settlement of the Superior Court action.The Family Court appointed a Commissioner to sell the marital home and authorized her to settle the Superior Court action. Robert did not appeal these orders. The Family Court later approved a settlement agreement where Clements Properties would buy the marital home for $870,000, and the Town would pay $75,000 in damages. The Family Court's orders and the settlement agreement were incorporated into the interlocutory decision pending entry of final judgment in the divorce case. Robert's appeal of this decision was dismissed as untimely.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order approving the settlement agreement. The Court held that the Family Court's orders were final and could not be challenged in the Superior Court. The Superior Court's approval of the settlement agreement was a ministerial act based on the Family Court's final decrees. The Court found no merit in Robert's arguments and concluded that the Superior Court properly relied on the Family Court's orders. View "Stratoberdhav. Clements Properties, LLC" on Justia Law