Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

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The case revolves around a dispute over the management plan for the Rio Grande National Forest (RGNF) in Colorado, particularly its impact on the Canada lynx, a species listed as threatened. The United States Forest Service (USFS), tasked with managing the RGNF, revised its Land Management Plan in response to a significant spruce beetle epidemic. The revised plan was assessed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), as required by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), to consider the plan's effects on the Canada lynx. FWS issued a Biological Opinion in 2021 concluding that the plan would not likely jeopardize the lynx's continued existence. The Defenders of Wildlife contested this conclusion, arguing that the Biological Opinion violated the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that USFS improperly relied on the opinion in preparing the plan.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Defenders’ petition. The Court held that FWS did not violate the ESA or the APA in its assessment, and that USFS appropriately relied on FWS's conclusions. The Court noted that the FWS had reasonably considered all relevant data, including information about the Canada lynx subpopulation in Colorado, and had made a reasoned decision based on this data. The Court also found that the FWS adequately addressed the potential impact of the plan on both low-use and high-use lynx habitats. The Court concluded that because the FWS's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, the USFS did not act arbitrarily in relying on the Biological Opinion. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

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The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation (MHA), an Indian nation of three affiliated tribes, appealed the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) approval of eight applications for oil drilling by the Slawson Exploration Company, Inc. next to Lake Sakakawea, MHA's sole source of drinking water. MHA challenged the approvals under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that BLM's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious due to an insufficient record and by precluding MHA from further developing the record about the threat the project posed to MHA's health and welfare.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to BLM and Slawson, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that BLM had engaged in reasoned decision-making and had evaluated all relevant factors. It noted that the agency placed the responsibility on Slawson to comply with tribal law without impeding MHA's ability as a sovereign to enforce its laws. The court also found that BLM's decision not to evaluate tribal law did not impact tribal sovereignty. The court concluded that MHA's jurisdiction over Slawson's project was not a relevant factor to the approvals and therefore further development of the record was not required.Furthermore, the court found that MHA was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as there was no dispute of material fact and MHA had adequate opportunities to submit evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that MHA had received all process required by the Constitution, laws, and agency regulation. View "Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute between the American Forest Resource Council and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over the designation of critical habitat for an endangered species of spotted owl. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service originally issued a proposed rule reducing the amount of land designated as critical habitat for the owl in the Pacific Northwest. However, after a change in presidential administrations, the Service reversed its decision and twice issued rules delaying the effective date of the proposed rule.The Council challenged the validity of the delay rules, but after the rules had expired, the district court determined the plaintiffs’ claims had become moot and dismissed the case. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the lower court's decision, affirming the judgment of the district court.The court concluded that the Council’s lawsuit against the Service was moot because both delay rules had expired and had no continuing effect. The court also rejected the Council’s claim that their case fell under the exception to mootness for matters “capable of repetition yet evading review,” as they failed to provide evidence that they would be subjected to another Service delay rule in the future. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, finding the case to be moot. View "American Forest Resource Council v. Williams" on Justia Law

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Safety-Kleen of California, Inc. appealed against the denial of its petitions for a writ of mandate, which sought to compel the Department of Toxic Substances Control (the Department) to set aside final inspection violation scores concerning Safety-Kleen’s oil and hazardous waste treatment facility. The Department had classified certain violations at Safety-Kleen’s facility as Class I violations, which Safety-Kleen argued was an abuse of discretion under the Hazardous Waste Control Law (HWCL), as these violations did not pose a “significant threat to human health or safety or the environment.”The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District disagreed with Safety-Kleen, interpreting the HWCL to permit classification of a violation as Class I under independent statutory bases, including those that do not pose a significant threat to human health or safety or the environment. The court held that the Department did not abuse its discretion in determining Safety-Kleen’s final inspection violation scores. It also rejected Safety-Kleen’s argument that a Class II violation can only be reclassified as a Class I violation if the violation is chronic or the violator is recalcitrant. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "Safety-Kleen of Cal., Inc. v. Dept. of Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to call for revisions to State Implementation Plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act because of the SIPs' inclusion of certain provisions related to emissions during startup, shutdown, and malfunction (SSM) periods. Two sets of petitioners, a group of states and a set of companies, challenged the EPA's decision. The court granted their petitions in part and denied them in part.The court ruled that EPA could not call the SIPs for including automatic exemptions and director’s discretion provisions without finding that it was necessary or appropriate for these restrictions to qualify as emission limitations under the Clean Air Act. The EPA had failed to make such a necessary or appropriate finding.As for affirmative defense provisions, the court agreed with petitioners as to certain types of affirmative defense provisions but rejected petitioners’ challenge as to other types.The court upheld EPA's call of overbroad enforcement discretion provisions on the grounds that they could be read to allow state officials to foreclose EPA enforcement actions and citizen suits.The court concluded that when EPA calls a SIP for a substantial legal inadequacy, it need only identify the deficiency and explain why it is substantial. The Act does not categorically require EPA to assess costs and benefits when calling SIPs for failure to comply with the Act’s legal requirements. View "Environ Comm FL Elec Power v. EPA" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has decided to transfer petitions for review to the D.C. Circuit. The petitions challenge a final rule by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In the contested rule, the EPA disapproved state implementation plans (SIPs) for 21 states, including Oklahoma and Utah, considering that these states failed to sufficiently address their contributions to air-quality problems in downwind states. The EPA argued that the petitions should be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit because the disputed rule is nationally applicable. The Tenth Circuit agreed, stating that the jurisdiction for review depends on the nature of the EPA's final action, not the specifics of the petitioner’s grievance. The Tenth Circuit ruled that, on its face, the final EPA action being challenged is nationally applicable, hence, any challenge to that rule belongs in the D.C. Circuit. Therefore, the court granted the EPA's motion to transfer the petitions. View "Utah v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

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This case involves an appeal by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and Tintina Montana Incorporated (Tintina) of a district court's order revoking a permit granted to Tintina to construct and operate the Black Butte Copper Mine. The district court revoked the permit on the grounds that the DEQ failed to adhere to two statutory schemes governing the state permitting process: Montana’s Metal Mine Reclamation Act (MMRA) and the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The Supreme Court of Montana found that DEQ demonstrated compliance with both laws and accordingly reversed the district court's order and reinstated Tintina's permit.The Supreme Court held that DEQ satisfied MMRA and MEPA in approving Tintina’s proposed cemented tailings facility. The court concluded that DEQ had evaluated the science and made a reasoned decision, supported by substantial evidence, that the surface tailings at the Black Butte Copper Mine would be stable and non-flowable.The court also held that DEQ satisfied MEPA by rationally evaluating the environmental impact of the mine’s total nitrogen discharges into Sheep Creek. After considering relevant data, DEQ articulated a reasoned explanation for its rationale, and its determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, random, or seemingly unmotivated based on the existing record.Furthermore, the court held that DEQ satisfied MEPA when it considered and dismissed alternatives to the proposed action. DEQ had appropriately had its independent consultant take a deeper look when Tintina’s working group emphasized cost considerations in dismissing the depyritization alternatives. ERM identified technical feasibility issues it suggested be considered more carefully, and DEQ’s final review shows that the agency considered those challenges and decided to accept the cemented paste tailings option (with modification) as the preferred action. MTU has not demonstrated that DEQ failed its responsibility under MEPA to consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.The case was remanded to the district court to reinstate DEQ’s decision to grant Tintina’s permit. View "Montana Trout Unlimited v. Tintina" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, addressed an appeal from Hilltop Group, Inc., and ADJ Holdings, LLC (Hilltop Group), regarding a dispute with the County of San Diego (County), over the proposed North County Environmental Resources Project (NCER Project), a recycling facility. The Hilltop Group applied to develop the NCER Project on a parcel of land that was designated for industrial use by the County as part of its General Plan Update (GPU) in 2011. However, the project faced significant opposition from community members, homeowners associations, and the nearby City of Escondido due to concerns over potential environmental impacts.The County staff initially required Hilltop Group to conduct environmental studies. Based on these studies, the County concluded that the NCER Project qualified for a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) exemption under section 21083.3, meaning that no further environmental review would be needed. However, this decision was appealed to the Board of Supervisors, who voted to grant the appeals and require further environmental review. The Hilltop Group challenged this decision in court, arguing that the NCER Project did not have any significant and peculiar environmental effects that were not already evaluated by the program Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for the GPU.The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Hilltop Group, finding that the Board of Supervisors did not proceed in a manner required by law when they denied the exemption and failed to limit further environmental review to those effects enumerated in Guidelines section 15183, subdivision (b)(1) through (4). The court concluded that the Board of Supervisors' findings of peculiar environmental effects in the areas of aesthetics, noise, traffic, air quality, and GHG emissions were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, the court held that the Board of Supervisors' decision denying the CEQA exemption and requiring the preparation of an EIR constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and directed it to enter a new judgment granting the petition and issuing a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to set aside its decision granting the administrative appeals and requiring the preparation of an EIR. View "Hilltop Group, Inc. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

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In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC (Lazy S) filed a lawsuit against Defendants-Appellees Valero Terminaling and Distribution Company and related entities (collectively, Valero), alleging that Valero's pipeline leaked and caused contamination on Lazy S's property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Valero.Lazy S runs cattle operations on a large property in Oklahoma, beneath which several pipelines transport hydrocarbons. In 2018, a representative of the ranch noticed a diesel fuel odor emanating from a cave near a water source on the property. Samples were taken and tested, and these tests revealed trace amounts of refined petroleum products in soil, surface water, groundwater, spring water, and air on the ranch.Lazy S brought several claims against Valero, including private nuisance, public nuisance, negligence per se, and negligence. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valero, holding that Lazy S did not present sufficient evidence to establish a legal injury or causation.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Lazy S had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to legal injury on its claims of private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence per se. The court noted that Lazy S had presented evidence of a strong odor emanating from a cave near a water source on the property, headaches suffered by individuals due to the odor, and changes in behavior due to the odor. As such, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the odor injured the ranch.The Tenth Circuit also found that Lazy S had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The court noted that the pipeline was a major source of potential contamination beneath the ranch, that it had leaked in the past, and that a pathway existed for hydrocarbons to travel from the pipeline to the water source.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lazy S's claims of constructive fraud and trespass, finding that Lazy S had not presented sufficient evidence to support these claims.The court remanded the case to the district court for trial on the issues of negligence per se, private nuisance, and public nuisance, including Lazy S's claims for damages. View "Lazy S Ranch Properties v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled in a complex environmental case involving an entity known as the Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust (RACER), which was created to manage the environmental cleanup of former General Motors (GM) properties. RACER sought recovery of costs related to environmental cleanup under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from multiple defendants who had also contributed to the pollution. The district court had dismissed RACER's claims, concluding that a 2011 consent decree had resolved RACER's liability for the area in question. On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the decision, ruling that the 2011 consent decree did not resolve RACER's liability for the entire area. The court held that the extent of RACER's liability under the 2011 consent decree is a factual question that could not be resolved at the pleading stage. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust v. National" on Justia Law