Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in District of Columbia Court of Appeals
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The appellant, who is the paternal grandmother and legal custodian of her two grandchildren, sought a civil protection order (CPO) against the children’s biological mother. The grandmother alleged that the mother had repeatedly threatened her, including incidents of verbal abuse and harassment, such as banging on her door, yelling obscenities, and threatening to kill her. The mother admitted in court to actions and statements reflecting animosity towards the grandmother. The grandmother was awarded permanent sole legal and physical custody of the children, while the mother retained supervised visitation rights.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Before the biological mother was served with the CPO petition, the court dismissed the grandmother’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the grandmother was not a “family member” within the meaning of the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, as they were not related by blood, marriage, adoption, legal custody, or domestic partnership. The court was not persuaded by the argument that their relationship through legal custody sufficed under the statute.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo, focusing on statutory interpretation of “family member” under the Intrafamily Offenses Act. The court held that the relationship between the grandmother and the mother, based on their respective blood relationships to the children and the grandmother’s legal custody, is familial within the meaning of the Act. The court concluded that these connections, considered together, satisfy the statutory requirement. The main holding is that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the grandmother’s petition, and the dismissal was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between a paternal grandmother, who has permanent sole legal and physical custody of her two grandchildren, and the children’s biological mother, who retains visitation rights but no custodial rights. The grandmother alleged that the mother had engaged in repeated verbal abuse and threats, including an incident where the mother threatened to kill her. Based on these allegations, the grandmother filed a petition for a civil protection order (CPO) against the mother.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the grandmother’s petition before the mother was served, finding it lacked jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the grandmother was not a "family member" of the mother under the D.C. Intrafamily Offenses Act, and therefore the alleged conduct did not constitute an “intrafamily offense” for which a CPO could be sought. The trial court rejected the argument that the parties were family members by virtue of the legal custody arrangement, concluding they were not related by blood, adoption, custody, marriage, or domestic partnership as required by statute.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Act’s definition of “family member” includes the relationship between a grandmother with legal custody and the children’s biological mother. The Court of Appeals held that, considering both the blood relationships each party has to the children and the legal custody arrangement, the two are “family members” within the meaning of the statute. The court thus determined that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the petition and reversed its dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Allen v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

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A mother was convicted for attempted second-degree cruelty to children based on an incident involving her five-year-old son. After learning of her son’s misbehavior at school, she disciplined him by yelling at him and striking him with a lanyard. The interaction was partially captured on video by the child’s father, who was present and began recording because he believed the discipline was excessive. The recording showed the mother berating her son with harsh language for a few minutes while he cried. There was an audible striking sound, but the source was unclear. The mother made statements implying further discipline and referenced causing “severe mental damage.” The physical contact with the lanyard was not clearly visible on the video.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia conducted a bench trial. The government’s case focused on the mother’s verbal conduct as constituting nonphysical “maltreatment” under the child cruelty statute, rather than the physical contact. The trial judge found that the mother hit her son with the lanyard but concluded that this was protected parental discipline. However, the court determined that her verbal statements constituted maltreatment and exceeded the scope of reasonable parental discipline, finding her guilty of attempted second-degree cruelty to children.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and whether the parental discipline defense applied. The court held that the statute requires proof of serious and extreme emotional or mental distress to constitute criminal maltreatment. It found that the mother’s conduct, while harsh and inappropriate, did not rise to the level of extreme mental distress necessary for conviction. Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and vacated the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Akers v. United States" on Justia Law

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Petronella McKenzie sought a second extension of a Civil Protection Order (CPO) against her former husband, Paul Persaud, alleging ongoing fear and past abuse. The parties had previously lived together in Guyana, where Ms. McKenzie testified to experiencing sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. After relocating, she obtained a CPO on consent in February 2020, which was later modified due to threats and extended in 2021 following technical violations by Mr. Persaud. Ms. McKenzie argued that her continued fear, the contentious nature of an ongoing custody case, and changes in visitation arrangements for their child supported her request for another extension.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed Ms. McKenzie’s motion for a second extension. The trial judge considered transcripts from prior hearings, Ms. McKenzie’s testimony about her relationship with Mr. Persaud, and evidence from the custody case. The court acknowledged the history of abuse and threats, as well as Ms. McKenzie’s ongoing fear. However, it found that since the last extension, Mr. Persaud had not committed further violations or demonstrated a current danger to Ms. McKenzie. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish good cause for a second extension of the CPO.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the extension. The court held that the trial court did not misconstrue the legal standard for “good cause” under D.C. Code § 16-1005(d-1), properly considered the “entire mosaic” of the parties’ relationship, and made sufficient factual findings. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the second extension of the CPO. View "McKenzie v. Persaud" on Justia Law

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A divorced couple with three minor children, who reside full-time with their mother, entered into a child-support agreement as part of their divorce proceedings. The agreement, incorporated into a final order, calculated child support using a formula established in a prior case, which is applied when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds $240,000. Over time, both parties filed motions seeking to modify child support, compel discovery, and request sanctions, primarily due to alleged changes in income and discovery disputes. The father sought a reduction in support based on his income, while the mother sought enforcement and additional relief, including attorney’s fees and sanctions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held hearings, issued a temporary reduction in the father’s support obligation, and ultimately entered a permanent order requiring him to pay $3,817.28 per month. The court used the Holland formula to determine the support amount, declined to “gross up” the father’s nontaxable veteran’s benefit for tax purposes, and excluded a $6,000 extraordinary medical expense from the calculation due to insufficient evidence. The court also denied the mother’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions, often without detailed explanation.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s use of the Holland formula, holding that it was within the court’s discretion for high-income cases. However, the appellate court vacated the permanent support order and remanded for further proceedings. It held that the trial court erred by not grossing up the father’s nontaxable veteran’s benefit as required by statute, by not adequately considering the extraordinary medical expense, and by failing to properly address the mother’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions. The case was remanded for the trial court to address these issues in accordance with the appellate court’s guidance. View "Hershey v. Hershey" on Justia Law

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The case involves a custody dispute over a seven-year-old child, S.M. Initially, S.M. lived with his mother, Erica Ward, for the first eleven months of his life. He then moved in with his father, Samuel Mack, for the next two-and-a-half years. It is alleged that Mack killed Ward in S.M.’s presence. Following Ward’s death and Mack’s arrest, S.M. stayed with his maternal uncle, Gregory Bowlding, for eight days before moving in with Mack’s adult daughter and S.M.’s half-sister, Samaya. Bowlding sought third-party custody of S.M., despite not being S.M.’s parent or de facto parent.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Bowlding’s suit for lack of statutory standing, concluding that he did not meet any of the statutory categories under which third parties are permitted to petition for custody of a minor. The court also rejected Bowlding’s argument that he had standing to seek custody through the court’s common law or equitable powers.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Bowlding argued that he had statutory standing under D.C. Code § 16-831.02(a)(1)(C), which allows a third party to seek custody if they are living with the child and exceptional circumstances exist to prevent harm to the child. He acknowledged that he was not living with S.M. at the time he filed his suit but argued for a broad interpretation of the statute. The court disagreed, holding that the plain text of the statute requires the third party to be living with the child at the time of filing. The court also rejected Bowlding’s argument that he had standing under the court’s common law or equitable jurisdiction, noting that the legislative history of the statute did not support such an interpretation. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Bowlding’s suit for lack of standing. View "Bowlding v. Mack" on Justia Law

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A couple, who share one child, E.A., sought to modify their child support and custody arrangements following their divorce. The father, Mr. Builta, requested a reduction in his child support payments due to an increase in the mother, Ms. Guzmán’s, income and his own additional dependents. He also sought changes to the custody schedule and restrictions on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits during his custodial time. Ms. Guzmán sought sole legal and physical custody, citing Mr. Builta’s planned move to Maryland and his alleged misuse of tie-breaking authority in decision-making for E.A.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ordered Mr. Builta to pay $1,736 per month in child support and granted joint legal custody with tie-breaking authority to Mr. Builta. The court later modified the child support to $1,644 per month, using the Holland method to account for the parents' increased combined income. The court found no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify altering the custody arrangement but made minor adjustments to the custody schedule and communication requirements.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the use of the Holland method for calculating child support but found errors in the trial court’s income calculations and procedural steps. The appellate court remanded the case for recalculating child support with correct income data. It also reversed the trial court’s changes to the custody exchange day and the restriction on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits, finding no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify these modifications. The court upheld the trial court’s decision not to alter the joint custody arrangement, emphasizing the child’s best interests and the parents' ability to cooperate despite their conflicts. View "Builta v. Guzman" on Justia Law