Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Petronella McKenzie sought a second extension of a Civil Protection Order (CPO) against her former husband, Paul Persaud, alleging ongoing fear and past abuse. The parties had previously lived together in Guyana, where Ms. McKenzie testified to experiencing sexual, physical, and emotional abuse. After relocating, she obtained a CPO on consent in February 2020, which was later modified due to threats and extended in 2021 following technical violations by Mr. Persaud. Ms. McKenzie argued that her continued fear, the contentious nature of an ongoing custody case, and changes in visitation arrangements for their child supported her request for another extension.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed Ms. McKenzie’s motion for a second extension. The trial judge considered transcripts from prior hearings, Ms. McKenzie’s testimony about her relationship with Mr. Persaud, and evidence from the custody case. The court acknowledged the history of abuse and threats, as well as Ms. McKenzie’s ongoing fear. However, it found that since the last extension, Mr. Persaud had not committed further violations or demonstrated a current danger to Ms. McKenzie. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish good cause for a second extension of the CPO.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the denial of the extension. The court held that the trial court did not misconstrue the legal standard for “good cause” under D.C. Code § 16-1005(d-1), properly considered the “entire mosaic” of the parties’ relationship, and made sufficient factual findings. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the second extension of the CPO. View "McKenzie v. Persaud" on Justia Law

A divorced couple with three minor children, who reside full-time with their mother, entered into a child-support agreement as part of their divorce proceedings. The agreement, incorporated into a final order, calculated child support using a formula established in a prior case, which is applied when the parents’ combined adjusted gross income exceeds $240,000. Over time, both parties filed motions seeking to modify child support, compel discovery, and request sanctions, primarily due to alleged changes in income and discovery disputes. The father sought a reduction in support based on his income, while the mother sought enforcement and additional relief, including attorney’s fees and sanctions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held hearings, issued a temporary reduction in the father’s support obligation, and ultimately entered a permanent order requiring him to pay $3,817.28 per month. The court used the Holland formula to determine the support amount, declined to “gross up” the father’s nontaxable veteran’s benefit for tax purposes, and excluded a $6,000 extraordinary medical expense from the calculation due to insufficient evidence. The court also denied the mother’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions, often without detailed explanation.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s use of the Holland formula, holding that it was within the court’s discretion for high-income cases. However, the appellate court vacated the permanent support order and remanded for further proceedings. It held that the trial court erred by not grossing up the father’s nontaxable veteran’s benefit as required by statute, by not adequately considering the extraordinary medical expense, and by failing to properly address the mother’s requests for attorney’s fees and sanctions. The case was remanded for the trial court to address these issues in accordance with the appellate court’s guidance. View "Hershey v. Hershey" on Justia Law

The case involves a custody dispute over a seven-year-old child, S.M. Initially, S.M. lived with his mother, Erica Ward, for the first eleven months of his life. He then moved in with his father, Samuel Mack, for the next two-and-a-half years. It is alleged that Mack killed Ward in S.M.’s presence. Following Ward’s death and Mack’s arrest, S.M. stayed with his maternal uncle, Gregory Bowlding, for eight days before moving in with Mack’s adult daughter and S.M.’s half-sister, Samaya. Bowlding sought third-party custody of S.M., despite not being S.M.’s parent or de facto parent.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Bowlding’s suit for lack of statutory standing, concluding that he did not meet any of the statutory categories under which third parties are permitted to petition for custody of a minor. The court also rejected Bowlding’s argument that he had standing to seek custody through the court’s common law or equitable powers.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Bowlding argued that he had statutory standing under D.C. Code § 16-831.02(a)(1)(C), which allows a third party to seek custody if they are living with the child and exceptional circumstances exist to prevent harm to the child. He acknowledged that he was not living with S.M. at the time he filed his suit but argued for a broad interpretation of the statute. The court disagreed, holding that the plain text of the statute requires the third party to be living with the child at the time of filing. The court also rejected Bowlding’s argument that he had standing under the court’s common law or equitable jurisdiction, noting that the legislative history of the statute did not support such an interpretation. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Bowlding’s suit for lack of standing. View "Bowlding v. Mack" on Justia Law

A couple, who share one child, E.A., sought to modify their child support and custody arrangements following their divorce. The father, Mr. Builta, requested a reduction in his child support payments due to an increase in the mother, Ms. Guzmán’s, income and his own additional dependents. He also sought changes to the custody schedule and restrictions on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits during his custodial time. Ms. Guzmán sought sole legal and physical custody, citing Mr. Builta’s planned move to Maryland and his alleged misuse of tie-breaking authority in decision-making for E.A.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially ordered Mr. Builta to pay $1,736 per month in child support and granted joint legal custody with tie-breaking authority to Mr. Builta. The court later modified the child support to $1,644 per month, using the Holland method to account for the parents' increased combined income. The court found no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify altering the custody arrangement but made minor adjustments to the custody schedule and communication requirements.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the use of the Holland method for calculating child support but found errors in the trial court’s income calculations and procedural steps. The appellate court remanded the case for recalculating child support with correct income data. It also reversed the trial court’s changes to the custody exchange day and the restriction on Ms. Guzmán’s school visits, finding no substantial and material change in circumstances to justify these modifications. The court upheld the trial court’s decision not to alter the joint custody arrangement, emphasizing the child’s best interests and the parents' ability to cooperate despite their conflicts. View "Builta v. Guzman" on Justia Law