Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Husband-appellant Alexander Jones appealed a Family Court order that entered the parties’ stipulation on property division, awarded wife-appellee Adriana Jones alimony, and ordered Husband to pay Wife an additional monthly amount for unpaid interim alimony. Husband also appealed another Family Court order denying the parties’ motions for reargument. After review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court found no merit to most of Husband’s contentions, but remanded on his claims regarding Wife’s medical and health insurance expenses. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

Husband Gary Glanden appealed a Family Court order dividing marital property and granting alimony to Wife Terry Quirk following their divorce after twenty-two years of marriage. The court divided the non-retirement assets 65% in Wife’s favor, and divided the remaining marital property equally. The court awarded alimony for an indefinite period.Husband argued the trial judge erred by including in the marital estate part of a January 2013 payment from his law firm received after the couple separated. Husband also claimed that the court abused its discretion by dividing the couple’s assets favorably to Wife, and in awarding Wife alimony. After review, the Supreme Court found that Husband’s argument about his law firm payment was at odds with the plain language of his employment agreement, where the disputed payment represented “the balance of [Husband’s] prior year’s base compensation,” and therefore was partially includable in the marital estate. The Court also found that Husband’s other arguments essentially asked for reconsideration of Family Court decisions which were amply supported by the evidence entered into the record. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court's decision. View "Glanden v. Quirk" on Justia Law

Dawn Locke, on behalf of minor appellant, Kimberly Foth, appealed a Superior Court final judgment in favor of Foth and minor appellee, John Barlow, III, and an order that granted Barlow's motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement wherein Foth and Barlow would each receive $7,500. The Supreme Court had vacated the Superior Court's Order entering final judgment and remanded the case for a minors' settlement hearing. On remand, the Superior Court considered testimony from both minors and their mothers, and reviewed the minors' medical records. Then the court issued a Report on Remand in which determined that an equal division of the $15,000 settlement proceeds between the minors was fair and reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Superior Court's focus should have been on whether the division of funds was fair (i.e., enforcing the settlement agreement: "Title 12, section 3926 mandates that court approval of a minor settlement always starts with a 'clean slate' by providing that no person dealing with the receiver of a minor can rely upon the receiver's authority to settle tort claims. The statute requires an independent judicial determination about whether the settlement agreement for a minor should be approved and specifically rejects the concept that such an agreement can be specifically enforced if the court has reservations." In this case, the record reflected that the Superior Court did not make an independent determination because it stated that, if it disregarded the settlement agreement and started on a "clean slate," it would have awarded Foth $10,000 instead of the $7,500 in the settlement agreement. View "Barlow, et al. v. Finegan, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Carl and Pamela Morton filed a petition for guardianship against Defendant-Appellant Terry Hanson. An in-house attorney who did not carry malpractice insurance was appointed by the Family Court to represent Defendant. The Family Court certified a question to the Supreme Court concerning in-house attorneys appointed to represent indigent parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in-house counsel appointed by the Family Court had qualified immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, lack of malpractice insurance is not "good cause" for an attorney to withdraw from court-appointed representation. View "Hanson v. Morton" on Justia Law

Mother Charlene M. Hall filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of father Christopher Moore with regard to their child born August 24, 2005. The Family Court granted the Mother's petition. The Father raised two issues on appeal: (1) the Family Court violated his right to due process under the United States and Delaware Constitutions by not appointing new counsel to represent him, after it allowed his court-appointed attorney to withdraw; and (2) the record did not support the Family Court's decision to terminate his parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Father's due process rights were indeed violated, therefore the Court reversed and remanded the case to the Family Court for a new hearing after an attorney was appointed to represent the Father. View "Moore v. Hall" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this case was the meaning of the term "regularly residing" as used in Delaware’s alimony statute. The Family Court denied appellant's petition to terminate alimony, finding that appellee and her companion were not permanently or continuously residing together. The trial court focused on the fact that appellee and her companion maintained separate homes, and the absence of evidence as to whether they spent the majority of their free time together. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the evidence: (1) the term "regularly residing" means "liv[ing] together with some degree of continuity . . . .;" (2) the fact that appellee and her companion were retirees did not change the analysis of whether they were regularly residing together; and (3) two people may be regularly residing together even though they maintain separate homes. View "Paul v. Paul" on Justia Law

A father appealed a Family Court judge's termination of his parental rights. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reaffirm that intentional abandonment requires a finding that the parent had a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims. In this case, the Court held that the record supported the judge's holding that the father abandoned his son and that termination was in the child's best interests. View "Teachem v. Terry" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the proper standard to apply when a fit parent petitions to rescind a guardianship. "Parental rights are fundamental liberties, protected by the State and Federal Constitutions. Fit parents, therefore, are entitled to a presumption that returning their children to their care and custody is in the children’s best interests." The Supreme Court held that the guardianship must be terminated at the request of a fit parent unless the guardian proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children will suffer physical or emotional harm if the guardianship is terminated. The Family Court found that Appellant’s child would not be dependent or neglected if returned to her custody. Thus, Appellant was a fit parent. The Family Court also found that the child would be happy living with appellant and that there was no concern about domestic violence. Based on this record, the presumption in favor of Appellant was unrebutted. Thus, as a matter of law Appellant’s petition to rescind the guardianship and her petition for custody of her son was due to be granted. View "Tourison v. Pepper" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Vanessa Wright appealed a Family Court decision that awarded alimony to Respondent-Appellee David Wright as a result of divorce proceedings. On appeal, Wife contended that: (1) the Family Court abused its discretion and violated her rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 1 of the Delaware Constitution by reducing her tithing when calculating her monthly expenses; and (2) the Family Court erred in its analysis under title 13, section 1512(c) of the Delaware Code by reducing the Husband's earning capacity calculation, and thus requiring the Wife to pay more in alimony. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both of the Wife's arguments were without merit. View "Wright v. Wright" on Justia Law

Scott and Vanessa Clark married on July 23, 2003 and had two children. After Father and Mother separated, Mother sought sole custody of the children. The trial judge gave joint custody to Mother and Father. Mother advanced three arguments on appeal: (1) joint custody was improper because Father was subject to an order of guardianship, (2) the findings of fact in the best interests of the child analysis were clearly erroneous, and (3) the delayed implementation of the final order constituted error. Although the Supreme Court concluded after its review of the record that this case was "a close abuse of discretion" case, it nevertheless affirmed the trial court, finding Mother did not preserve the issue of guardianship for appeal, and that the evidence on record still supported the trial court's decisions. View "Clark v. Clark" on Justia Law