Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Delaware Supreme Court
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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reversed a lower court’s decision to terminate a biological father’s parental rights to his child. The father, Jack Mitchell, had consented to the child's guardianship by Rachel and Joshua Thayer, following the unexpected death of the child's mother. Six months later, the Thayers petitioned to terminate Mitchell’s parental rights on grounds of intentional abandonment. The Family Court granted their petition, finding clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and deciding termination was in the child’s best interests. However, the Supreme Court found that the evidence did not meet the high standard of clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment required to terminate Mitchell's parental rights. The court noted that Mitchell had expressed a desire for reunification with his child and had taken steps toward that goal. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Family Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding Mitchell's petition to rescind the Thayers' guardianship. View "Mitchell v. Thayer" on Justia Law

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In Delaware, a father challenged the termination of his parental rights over his youngest child, J.M., who was born in November 2021. The mother, V.H., passed away a few weeks after giving birth, leaving the father, Jack Mitchell, to care for J.M. and his two older siblings. Due to various circumstances including Mitchell's brief incarceration and struggles with housing and employment, J.M. was placed in the guardianship of Rachel and Joshua Thayer, who were also the petitioners in the termination of parental rights case. The Thayers filed for termination of Mitchell's parental rights six months after assuming guardianship, asserting that Mitchell had intentionally abandoned J.M. The Family Court of the State of Delaware granted the petition, finding that the Thayers had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mitchell had intentionally abandoned J.M. and that it was in the child's best interest for his parental rights to be terminated.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found the evidence insufficient to support the Family Court's conclusion that Mitchell intentionally abandoned J.M. The Supreme Court noted situations where Mitchell expressed a desire and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of J.M., and evidence that showed Mitchell's improvements in his personal circumstances, such as creating his own business, moving into a house, and caring for his other children. Consequently, it determined that the Family Court erred in its decision to terminate Mitchell's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the Family Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Thayer" on Justia Law

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A Delaware Family Court terminated Carter Ralston’s parental rights in his daughter who, at the time, had been in the State’s custody for over a year. The court’s decision was based primarily on Ralston’s failure to make progress on a case plan established by the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (the “Department”). Ralston was incarcerated throughout most of the proceedings, but the case plan aimed to reunify him with his daughter. After the court terminated his parental rights, Ralston moved for relief from the order on the grounds that, since the order’s issuance, he had been released from prison and had completed the requirements of his case plan. The Family Court denied that motion, concluding that evidence of Ralston’s post-termination compliance with the case plan did not constitute “newly discovered evidence” under Family Court Civil Rule 60. Ralston appealed. Having considered each of Ralston’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Family Court’s decision should be affirmed. "Although disposing of the guardianship petition before terminating Mr. Ralston’s parental rights would have been the better practice, the procedural sequence was not so deficient that it violated Mr. Ralston’s due process rights. As to the remaining issues, the Family Court correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion." View "Ralston v. Division of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families" on Justia Law

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Respondent-appellant Michael Killen appealed a Family Court order awarding alimony to his ex-wife, Candice Alben, and directing Killen to maintain a pre-existing life insurance policy during the alimony period with Alben as the sole beneficiary. Killen challenged aspects of both rulings on appeal. With respect to the alimony award, Killen argued the Family Court designated the incorrect date for his payment obligations to begin. The parties continued to reside in the marital residence after their divorce and through the date of trial. Before the matter was submitted, the parties agreed to sell the home and to divide the proceeds at the court’s direction. The court’s order directed the parties to continue to split household expenses while they resided together and required Killen to begin making alimony payments upon the residence’s sale. Killen argues that his alimony obligations instead should commence on the divorce date. With respect to the insurance policy, Killen argues the Family Court directed the policy’s continued maintenance based on an inadequate record: the Family Court ordered the policy’s maintenance sua sponte. Regarding Killen's first contention, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded the Family Court did not abuse its discretion. On the other hand, the Family Court did not have a sufficient factual record to order Killen to maintain the policy with Alben as the sole beneficiary. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Killen v. Alben" on Justia Law

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Adria Brock (“Mother”) appealed a Family Court decision terminating her parental rights over her daughter (“K.C.” or “child”). In its decision, the Family Court found that the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (“DSCYF”) established one of the statutory grounds for terminating the Mother’s parental rights: that the Mother’s parental rights over K.C.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding. At the time of the termination hearing, this statutory ground was found at 13 Del. C. 1103(a)(6) and provided for termination where “[t]he respondent’s parental rights over a sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition [had] been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding.” The Family Court also found that termination of the Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. On appeal, Mother argued Section 1103(a)(6) violated her right to due process under the federal and state constitutions because “it creates a presumption that she is unfit to parent any child presently solely because her parental rights [over] older children were previously terminated in North Carolina.” Mother also claimed that “[t]he statutory ‘best interest’ of the child factors set out under 13 Del. C. 722 do not sufficiently address a parent’s present ability to provide adequate care for the child”; that “DSCYF did not present evidence or argument during the trial to support a finding under 11 Del. C. 1103(a)(6) that the Appellant was unfit and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest”; and that “[t]here is insufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard to demonstrate that the parent is unfit under a best interest of the child analysis.” After considering each of Mother’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court’s decision should have been affirmed. View "Brock v. Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families" on Justia Law

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A father appealed a Family Court order denying a Petition for Parental Visitation. Father Bryce Wilcox had been imprisoned since his son (“C.R.”) was two. C.R.’s mother, Marissa LaClaire (“Mother”) did not permit telephone contact between Father and C.R., and has withheld all letters Father has sent C.R. In denying Father’s Visitation Petition, the Family Court declined to order any change in this status quo, and ordered Mother to keep letters Father sent to C.R. should C.R. ever desire to read them. The Family Court justified the rejection of his petition based on the lack of relationship between Father and C.R. and Mother’s testimony that Father’s contact with C.R. would impair C.R.’s emotional development. On appeal, father argued: (1) the Family Court erred when it denied his request for contact with his son by telephone and mail because there was insufficient evidence that such contact would significantly impair C.R.’s emotional development; and (2) the Family Court erred when it justified that denial based upon a lack of relationship between Father and C.R. when that lack of relationship was a result of Mother and the Family Court not permitting Father to have contact with his son since August 2015. The Delaware Supreme Court determined Father's arguments had merit: (1) Mother did not argue Father’s requested contact by telephone and mail would place C.R. in any physical danger, and the only support in the record for impairment to C.R.’s emotional development was Mother’s speculative lay opinion; and (2) the Family Court’s decision overlooked the Supreme Court's prior opinion involving these same parties wherein the Court addressed Mother’s successful effort to block contact with Father. As a result, the Family Court’s decision lacked substantial evidence in the record to support it, was not the product of an orderly and logical process, and was thus reversed. View "Wilcox v. LaClaire" on Justia Law

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Appellant Laura Allen appealed a Family Court Ancillary Order determining the division of property following her divorce from Appellee Charlene Scott. Allen claimed the trial court abused its discretion in designating funds used to purchase real property in Colorado as “marital” because the parties’ Ancillary Pretrial Stipulation described the funds as “premarital.” Allen further contended the Family Court abused its discretion in dividing certain pieces of marital property in the marital estate 60/40 in Scott’s favor contending that the court’s decision was not based on a logical or orderly process and was tainted by the court’s error on the first issue. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court held: (1) because both parties stated in the Ancillary Pretrial Stipulation that the funds used to purchase the Colorado property were premarital in character, and because neither party moved to amend the stipulation to revise that characterization until after the evidentiary record had closed, there was no triable issue on that question; and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s distribution of the remaining marital property. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for consideration of Scott’s alternative contention that the down payment for the Colorado property was a gift unto the marriage. The Family Court retains the discretion to adjust that distribution to the extent its decision on remand regarding the Colorado down payment funds affects the other 11 Del. C. 1315 factors. View "Allen v. Scott" on Justia Law

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William Fletcher, Jr. challenged a Family Court denial of his petition to modify or terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife, Melissa Feutz. Fletcher argued the Family Court erred by ruling that: (1) Feutz was appropriately employed; (2) there was not a substantial change in circumstances that warranted the termination or modification of alimony; (3) Feutz was not cohabitating with her paramour; and (4) Feutz was entitled to the attorney’s fees awarded. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court held the Family Court did not err in finding that Feutz was properly employed and that she was not cohabitating with her paramour. The Court remanded the issue of whether there was a substantial change in circumstances. In addition, the Court found the Family Court erredin awarding Feutz attorney’s fees for the defense of Fletcher’s Motion to Modify or Terminate Alimony. View "Fletcher v. Feutz" on Justia Law

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Mother and Father appealed a Family Court order terminating their parental rights to Giselle, who was four months old when the Family Court first ordered her removed from the parents’ care. The court found Giselle was at risk of chronic and life threatening abuse based on the previous unexplained serious injuries to her older sibling. The Family Court also found Mother and Father failed to plan for Giselle’s physical needs and her mental and emotional health and development. Mother and Father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of parental rights and raised a number of constitutional arguments on appeal. Finding the arguments lacked merit, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s judgment. View "Sierra v. DSCYF" on Justia Law

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Appellant, husband Mitchell Garrison appealed a family court debt-division order issued after his divorce from Appellee, wife Tamika Downing. Before the Delaware Supreme Court, Husband argued: (1) the family court erred by ordering him to pay premarital debts incurred by Wife to pay for the parties’ wedding; and (2) the family court erred by finding that the parties’ prenuptial agreement barred his claim to half of the value of the Wife’s business which she operated during their marriage. After carefully considering the question presented by the Husband’s first claim, the Supreme Court concluded the equitable exception for property acquired in contemplation of marriage should have been construed narrowly to apply only as originally intended. “Due regard must be given to the fact that the rule is an exception to the Family Court’s statutory jurisdiction. In the future, the Family Court should limit the equitable exception to cases involving real property where the evidence shows that it was the parties’ intention that the property, although acquired in the name of one party prior to marriage, was to become marital property upon their marriage. Any enlargement of the equitable exception beyond that must come from the General Assembly.” Regarding Husband’s second claim, the Supreme Court found no error in the family court’s denial of his request for division of Wife’s business. View "Garrison v. Downing" on Justia Law