Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This certified appeal arose from the termination of the parental rights of the respondent Mother to her two minor children. The appellate court affirmed the judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of Petitioner, the commissioner of children and families. On appeal, Mother asserted that the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof on the issue of personal rehabilitation to Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court correctly concluded that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Respondent. View "In re Jason R." on Justia Law

The trial court found Mother in contempt for refusing to allow Father to visit their son in accordance with a previously established visitation schedule. The trial court's contempt order required Mother to place the child in a supervised visitation program with Father and to pay for all expenses associated therewith. The appellate court dismissed Mother's appeal, concluding that the absence of a final judgment deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. Mother contended on appeal that the trial court's contempt order was a final judgment and, thus, immediately appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a civil contempt order requiring the contemnor to incur a cost or take specific action - such as paying for supervised visitation - constitutes an appealable final judgment; and (2) accordingly, the appellate court improperly dismissed Mother's appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Khan v. Hillyer" on Justia Law

This case addressed whether, during proceedings to commit a minor child who has been adjudicated neglected to the custody of the commissioner of children and families (commissioner), a respondent parent is entitled to a competency evaluation on the basis of her counsel's stated belief that such an evaluation is warranted. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court committing Kaleb H., a minor child, to the custody of the commissioner, after concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request by counsel for Kaleb's mother, the respondent, that the mother's competency be evaluated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the record in this case was insufficient to trigger the trial court's purported obligation to conduct a competency evaluation. View "In re Kaleb H." on Justia Law

The primary issue in this case was whether the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-175, applies to the placement of children with an out-of-state noncustodial parent. Respondent father and his minor children appealed to the appellate court from the ruling of the trial court that the compact applied to the placement of the children with Respondent, even though he was the children's noncustodial parent. Thereafter, the trial court awarded physical custody of the children to Respondent. The appellate court concluded the appeals were moot and dismissed them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly dismissed the appeal, as Respondent's appeal was moot but fell within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. The Court further concluded that the appellate court improperly determined that section 17a-175 applies to out-of-state, noncustodial parents. View "In re Emoni W." on Justia Law

Respondents Mother and Father were the parents of two children. After finding that the children were neglected, the trial court rendered judgments terminating Respondents' parental rights with respect to both children. The appellate court reversed and remanded he cases for further proceedings. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court. On remand, the trial court again found that both children were neglected under the doctrine of predictive neglect and committed them to the custody of the commission of children and families. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in predictive neglect proceedings, the trial court must find that it is more likely than not that, if the child remained in the current situation, the child would be denied proper care and attention or would be permitting to live under conditions injurious to the well-being of the child; (2) the petitioner is required to meet this standard with respect to each parent who has contested the neglect petition and who has expressed a desire to care for the child independently of the other parent; and (3) in this case, the trial court applied an improper standard of proof. Remanded for new neglect proceedings. View "In re Joseph W." on Justia Law

The principal issue in this appeal was whether a trial court could modify unallocated alimony and child support payments following a change in the primary physical custody of the minor children from the party receiving the unallocated payments to the party making the payments, when the dissolution judgment incorporated a provision in the separation agreement providing that such payments were nonmodifiable. The trial court granted Defendant father's motion to modify the order that he make unallocated alimony and child support payments to Plaintiff mother following the parties' decision to transfer primary physical custody of the children to Defendant two years after the judgment dissolving their marriage was rendered. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the particular circumstances of the present case, the trial court had the authority to modify Defendant's child support obligation. View "Tomlinson v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a dissolution of marriage action from Defendant. Defendant, however, was never served process. The commissioner of social services, meanwhile, filed a support petition against Defendant that was assigned the same docket number as the dissolution action. Defendant was served process for the support action, and Defendant's counsel filed an appearance in the support action. The trial court relied on Defendant's failure to file a motion to dismiss the dissolution action within thirty days of filing the appearance in the support action in concluding that Defendant had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction in the dissolution action. The appellate court vacated the trial court on basis that there was no personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the appellate court erred in giving retroactive effect to Practice Book 25a-3(f), which provides that all appearances entered on behalf of parties for matters involving Title IV-D child support matters shall be for those matters only; and (2) the trial court properly relied on Practice Book 3-3(2) in concluding that Defendant filed an appearance in the dissolution action. Remanded. View "Narayan v. Narayan" on Justia Law

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act.

Plaintiff Edward Okeke and Tamara Shockley were unmarried when Shockley gave birth to a son. Shockley affirmed an acknowledgement of paternity form the parties executed after the birth. The last name of the child on the paternity acknowledgement was stated as 'Okeke.' The official birth certificate of the child, however, listed his last name as 'Shockley-Okeke.' Plaintiff filed with the department of public health and amendment of the child's birth certificate. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request. The superior court dismissed Plaintiff's administrative appeal. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-42(d)(1), the commissioner of public health has the authority to amend a child's birth certificate where the name on the birth certificate differs from that initially agreed upon by the parents on an acknowledgement of paternity form. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner did not have the authority to amend the birth certificate under the facts of this case.

In the involuntary conservatorship action underlying this case, Daniel Gross was placed in the locked ward of Grove Manor Nursing Home. Jonathan Newman was appointed by the probate court to represent Gross in the action, and Kathleen Donovan was appointed as conservator. The superior court granted Gross's petition for writ of habeas corpus, finding that the conservatorship was void ab initio. Gross subsequently brought a complaint in U.S. District Court, asserting state and federal civil rights claims. The court dismissed it as to all defendants, finding, in relevant part, that Donovan, Newman, and Grove Manor were entitled to immunity because they were serving the judicial process. On appeal, the U.S. court of appeals submitted certified questions regarding Connecticut law to the Supreme Court. The Court held (1) absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to a conservator appointed by the probate court only when the conservator is executing an order of the probate court or the conservator's actions are ratified by the probate court; (2) absolute quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to attorneys appointed to represent respondents in conservatorship proceedings or conservatees; and (3) the function of nursing homes caring for conservatees does not entitle them to quasi-judicial immunity under any circumstances.