Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Father's parental rights to his two minor children were terminated based on the trial court's determination that Father failed to rehabilitate. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly terminated his parental rights because court-ordered specific steps were statutorily required as a prerequisite to termination for failure to rehabilitate and the Commissioner of Children and Families did not provide him with such steps. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's conclusion that the prior provision of specific steps is not required in termination proceedings for failure to rehabilitate was legally incorrect; but (2) under the particular circumstances of this case, the failure to provide specific steps was harmless error. View "In re Elvin G." on Justia Law

The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two minor children and awarded permanent guardianship to the children's paternal great-aunt and her husband. Mother appealed, claiming that the trial court's application of Conn. Gen. Stat. 71a-112 violated her rights under the substantive due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions because the trial court was required to determine that termination was the least restrictive permanency plan to protect the children's best interests, and the standard was not met in this case. Specifically, Mother argued that termination was not required when permanent guardianship was sufficient to protect the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the standard was met in this case where the trial court necessarily found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was the least restrictive alternative to protect the children's best interests. View "In re Brayden E.-H." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Children and Families filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to her son and daughter. The trial court granted the petitions pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 17a-112. Mother sought review, contending that the trial court's application of section 17a-112 to her was unconstitutional. Respondent failed to preserve her claim at trial and therefore sought to prevail under State v. Golding. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Mother's claim failed under the first prong of Golding for lack of an adequate record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that Mother's unpreserved constitutional claim was unreviewable due to an inadequate record. View "In re Azareon Y." on Justia Law

Upon their divorce, Father and Mother agreed to a parenting plan governing the care and custody of their minor child. Father subsequently sought increased visitation and parenting time. The matter was referred to the Family Relations Office (family relations), which scheduled a child custody evaluation with the parties. When family relations declined Father's request to complete the evaluation with the assistance of counsel, Father filed a motion to order family relations to allow him to proceed with the assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Father appealed, contending that the family relations policy of barring counsel from its child custody evaluations violates procedural due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that family relation's existing procedures were constitutionally sufficient. View "Barros v. Barros" on Justia Law

The family court magistrate ordered Defendant to pay $1440 in weekly child support based on Defendant's eighty-six percent proportionate share of the parties' combined net weekly income of $14,154. In determining the appropriate method for assessing child support, the magistrate noted that the guidelines schedule stops at $4000 of combined weekly net income. The magistrate then calculated Defendant's child support on the same percentage basis as that assigned to a combined net weekly income of $4000. Defendant appealed, claiming that the magistrate's order contravened the principle that as income level rises, the proportion of income dedicated to child related spending decreases. The trial court affirmed the magistrate's decision with one modification to the arrearage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the magistrate properly ordered Defendant to pay child support in an amount equivalent to his proportionate share of 11.83 percent of the parties' combined net weekly income, the same percentage under the schedule for a combined net weekly income of $4000. View "Dowling v. Szymczak" on Justia Law

Upon Plaintiff and Defendant's divorce, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant unallocated alimony and child support for fourteen years, concluding that Plaintiff had an earning capacity far Plaintiff his current income. After Plaintiff obtained employment, Father filed a motion to modify the child support order, contending that his current salary constituted a fraction of the earning capacity previously attributed to him by the trial court. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion without specifying the amount of Plaintiff's estimated earning capacity. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a trial court has based a financial award on a party's earning capacity, the court must determine the specific dollar amount of the party's earning capacity; and (2) because the trial court in this case could not reasonably have concluded there had been no substantial change in Plaintiff's earning capacity between the time of the original financial award and the motion for modification without having determined Plaintiff's specific earning capacity, the court erred when it denied the motion for modification. Remanded for a new hearing on Plaintiff's motion for modification. View "Tanzman v. Meurer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Spouse divorced in 1979. In postdissolution proceedings during which Plaintiff sought modification of the alimony award, Spouse was represented by several different attorneys (Defendants). All defendants failed to disclose the true financial circumstances of Spouse. In 2008, the trial court ruled that information concerning Spouse's inheritance had been concealed from Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to incur more than $400,000 in legal expenses and other costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against Defendants for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that such claims against attorneys for conduct that occurred during judicial proceedings were barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute immunity. The appellate court affirmed, determining that the claims were precluded by the litigation privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that attorneys are protected by the litigation privilege against claims of fraud for their conduct during judicial proceedings; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was derivative of his claim of fraud, was also properly rejected. View "Simms v. Seaman" on Justia Law

Husband brought this dissolution action in which he sought a dissolution of his marriage to Wife. Following a trial, the judge dissolved the parties' marriage, adopting the parties' agreed parenting plan and setting forth its financial orders. Wife appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly awarding her an insufficient amount of child support. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to the financial orders and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by failing to articulate its reasons for deviating from the child support guidelines. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded child support without mentioning or applying the guidelines or making a specific finding on the record as to why it was deviating from the guidelines; and (2) because the trial court did not make any findings as to the particular facts or circumstances of the S corporation of which Wife was a shareholder, remand was appropriate for a determination of what portion of Wife's income was available income for purposes of fashioning alimony and child support orders. View "Tuckman v. Tuckman" on Justia Law

After the trial court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage, Wife filed a motion for clarification asking the court to reconfirm its previous order requiring that Husband equally split his pension accounts with Wife. The trial court granted the motion and ordered Husband to divide his pension accounts equally with Wife. The appellate court reversed, determining that the trial court's judgment granting the motion constituted an improper modification of the judgment of dissolution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court properly clarified ambiguity in the judgment rather than impermissibly modified or altered the substantive terms of the judgment. Remanded. View "Bauer v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Daniel King, the substitute defendant and administrator of the estate of David Berzins (administrator), appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, Mary Berzins. The administrator appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on Ramin v. Ramin to grant the plaintiff's motion for sanctions and attorney's fees. Ramin held that a court has discretion to award attorney's fees to party who incurs those fees due to the other party's egregious litigation misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney's fees did not fall within the scope of Ramin, as the phrase "egregious litigation misconduct" was limited to discovery misconduct; and (2) the court did not act within its inherent authority in awarding attorney's fees for filing frivolous and duplicative postjudgment motions because it failed to make a finding that the administrator had acted in bad faith as defined in Maris v. McGrath. View "Berzins v. Berzins" on Justia Law