Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a series of postjudgment motions related to the parties’ dissolution of marriage. Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for an upward modification of Defendant’s child support obligation, motion for attorney’s fees, and motion for contempt. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion. The trial court, however, granted Defendant’s motion for modification of child support and modified Defendant’s child support obligation by decreasing his weekly obligation. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s rulings on all issues. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) improperly relied on Dan v. Dan in determining that both alimony and child support orders are subject to the same modification requirements under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-86 and improperly concluded that Plaintiff was required to show additional circumstances, beyond the increase in Defendant’s income, to justify modification of the child support award; (2) improperly upheld the trial court’s decision to exclude Defendant’s exercised stock options and restricted stock from its calculation of his gross income during the years in question; and (3) properly upheld the trial court’s decision to omit Defendant’s alleged employment perquisites from its calculation of Defendant’s gross income. View "McKeon v. Lennon" on Justia Law

In 2002, the marriage of Beverly Studer and John Studer was dissolved in Florida. In 2003, John moved in Connecticut Superior Court to modify the amount of his child support and alimony obligations. The superior court granted the judgment. In 2010, Beverly filed two postjudgment motions for postmajority support for the parties’ child, who had autism. The trial court granted the motions and ordered John to pay child support indefinitely, concluding that Florida law controlled the duration of John’s child support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Florida was the first state to enter a child support order in the present case, the trial court did not err in concluding that Florida law governed the duration of John’s child support obligation. View "Studer v. Studer" on Justia Law

After an investigation, the Department of Children and Families found that an alleged perpetrator was responsible for sexual abuse and emotional neglect of Plaintiff and placed the alleged perpetrator’s name on the central registry. After an administrative hearing, the hearing officer found there was insufficient evidence to support the Department’s finding of substantiation and, therefore, removed the alleged perpetrator’s name from the central registry. Plaintiff subsequently requested that the hearing officer reconsider the decision reversing the substantiation finding. The hearing officer denied Plaintiff’s request, finding that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, and the trial court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action. View "Isabella D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Sharon DeNunzio and Peter DeNunzio were the parents of Douglas DeNunzio, who for many years has manifested symptoms of mental distress. Sharon and Peter divorced when Douglas was a minor. Shortly after Douglas’ twenty-first birthday, Peter filed an application in the probate court seeking to be appointed as Douglas’ conservator. The probate court found by clear and convincing evidence that Douglas needed a conservator and appointed Defendant as conservator. The trial court and appellate court affirmed the probate court’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) to the extent that the probate court considered Douglas’ “best interests” in these conservatorship proceedings, in addition to the statutory factors adopted in P.A. 07-116, Sharon’s substantial rights were not prejudiced because the statutory factors were considered and supported the probate court’s selection of Defendant as conservator; and (2) Plaintiff’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the probate court’s consideration of the guardian ad litem’s report, which was not admitted into evidence. View "DeNunzio v. DeNunzio" on Justia Law

Mother’s minor child (Child) was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of The Commissioner of Children and Families. Child has been in her current foster placement since 2011. In 2013, the Commissioner petitioned for termination of parental rights on behalf of Child. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights, finding that the Commissioner had made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that Mother was unable to benefit from the reunification services. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Commissioner had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unable to benefit from reunification services. View "In re Gabriella A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an ex parte restraining order application against Defendant and requested a hearing on the application. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s application and request for a hearing. Plaintiff subsequently filed a second application for a restraining order. The trial court also denied this application without a hearing. Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Appellate Court and an application for certification to appeal pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-265a. The Supreme Court granted the section 52-265a application. The trial court then held a hearing on the applications. The applications were denied after the hearing. Thereafter, the Supreme Court ordered the parties to address whether Plaintiff’s appeals were moot. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that there was no practical relief the Court could afford Plaintiff, and this case did not meet the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. View "Wendy V. v. Santiago" on Justia Law

As a result of Defendants’ negligence, Margaret Mueller was mistakenly diagnosed with the incorrect type of cancer. Mueller and her domestic partner of twenty-one years, Charlotte Stacy, brought this medical malpractice action against Defendants, seeking damages for Mueller’s personal injuries and Stacey’s loss of consortium. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s claims on the ground that Stacey and Mueller were not in a civil union or married before or during the dates of the negligent acts. The Appellate Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to state a legally sufficient claim for loss of consortium because they had not alleged that they would have married or entered into a civil union before the dates of Defendants’ negligent acts if they had not been barred from doing so under state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment on grounds distinct from those of the trial court instead of remanding the case to provide Stacey with an opportunity to amend her complaint; and (2) if, on remand, Stacey amends her complaint to allege that she and Mueller would have been married when the underlying tort occurred if they had not been barred from doing so under state law, the trial court must deny Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s loss of consortium claims. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Tepler " on Justia Law

Catherine Whelan was appointed as the attorney for the minor children of the parties in a dissolution action and continued to represent the children during postjudgment proceedings. Whelan filed a motion seeking payment of outstanding fees and an allowance to participate in an appeal, which the trial court granted. Whelan then sought to recover the fees she owed to Arnold Rutkin, who represented her in the previous proceeding. The trial court granted the motion in part. Thereafter, Whelan filed a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees for alleged litigation abuses, which the trial court denied. Whelan sought to appeal on behalf of the minor children, without success. These two appeals and writ of error followed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whelan’s motion for permission to appeal on the minor children’s behalf after properly concluding that an appeal was not in the children’s best interests; (2) the trial court erred in awarding Rutkin’s fees; and (3) the trial court failed to apply the proper standard to Whelan’s claim of litigation misconduct. View "Perry v. Perry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former wife of Defendant, filed a postjudgment motion to open, on the basis of fraud, a 2001 judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant had failed to disclose the existence of an accrued but unvested pension either on his financial affidavits or otherwise. The trial court denied the motion after finding that Defendant had orally disclosed the existence of the pension to Plaintiff during the parties’ marriage and during settlement negotiations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly concluded that Defendant’s unvested pension, at the time of the dissolution judgment, was not distributable marital property under Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-81; and (2) improperly excluded evidence of the pension’s value on the basis that the evidence was irrelevant, thus tainting the court’s findings regarding disclosure. Remanded. View "Reville v. Reville" on Justia Law

Mother, who resided in Connecticut, and Father, who resided in Florida, were divorced pursuant to a decree that awarded primary physical custody of the parties' child to Mother and ordered Father to pay alimony and child support. Father later filed a motion to modify the alimony and child support order, alleging that his relocation from Florida to Connecticut in order to be closer to his son resulted in his decreased income, which constituted a substantial change in circumstances. The trial court denied Defendant's motion, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in deciding whether to grant a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether the moving party has established a substantial change in circumstances, and in making this determination, if a party's voluntary action gives rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances, the court must assess the motivations underlying the voluntary conduct in order to determine whether there is culpable conduct foreclosing a threshold determination of a substantial change in circumstances; and (2) the trial court in this case improperly denied Father's motion for modification solely on the basis that Father's voluntary relocation gave rise to the alleged substantial change in circumstances warranting modification. Remanded. View "Olson v. Mohammadu" on Justia Law