Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff divorced his wife (Wife) after discovering she had had an extramarital affair with Defendant and had conceived a child (Child) with him. After Plaintiff and Wife divorced, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant, seeking damages on claims of nondisclosure, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Plaintiff sought reimbursement from Defendant for the costs he had expended in raising Child from her birth until his divorce from Wife, when Child was almost fifteen years old. The trial court concluded that although Defendant was Child's biological father, the doctrine of equitable estoppel and public policy concerns precluded Plaintiff from pursuing his claims for reimbursement and denying his paternity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court improperly found that Plaintiff was equitably estopped from pursuing his claims because there was insufficient evidence of financial harm to Child, which is required to establish the element of detrimental reliance in a case involving a denial of paternity.

Two days before his eighteenth birthday, Petitioner filed a petition seeking to have himself adjudicated as neglected and as an uncared-for youth. The trial court dismissed the petition as moot because, two days after Petitioner filed it, he reached his eighteenth birthday. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the neglect petition. The Supreme Court affirmed but on an alternate ground, holding that the trial court lacks statutory authority to adjudicate a person neglected or uncare-for pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-129(a) after the person reaches the age of eighteen years, and, therefore, the court necessarily lacks statutory authority to provide dispositional relief to such a person pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-129(j).

When she was seventeen years old, Petitioner filed a petition alleging that she was a neglected and uncared for youth. The trial court dismissed the petition as moot because, two and one-half months after Petitioner filed it, she reached her eighteenth birthday. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court lacked statutory authority both to adjudicate Petitioner neglected or uncared-for after she reached the age of eighteen years and to provide her with dispositional relief; and (2) because the court lacked such statutory authority, that court properly concluded that the petition was rendered moot when Petitioner reached her eighteenth birthday.

Plaintiff and Defendant were former husband and wife. Following the dissolution of their marriage, Defendant was granted joint custody and visitation rights of the parties' two daughters. Defendant then reported that her eldest daughter had been sexually abused by Plaintiff. As a result of the investigation, Defendant was charged with risk of injury to a child, false reporting of an incident, false statement in the second degree, attempt to commit malicious prosecution, and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Following Defendant's guilty plea, Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly improperly applied the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff's claim was time barred. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the existence of an original duty must be established before applying the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in a nonnegligence cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Brady Dougan and Tomoko Dougan entered into a stipulation for judgment dissolving their marriage that contained a provision ordering Brady to pay interest if he failed to make payments to Tomoko. Both of the parties entered into the agreement with knowledge of its terms, and the trial court found the stipulation for judgment to be fair and reasonable. When Brady later failed to render a complete payment to defendant, Tomoko moved for enforcement of the stipulation and requested that the trial court order the plaintiff to pay her interest in accordance with the terms of the judgment. The trial court held that the provision for interest was invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. On Brady's appeal to the Supreme Court, Tomoko was granted special permission to raise the alternate ground that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed because the doctrine of judicial estoppel supports the enforcement of the interest provision. The Court agreed with Tomoko and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Brady from claiming the provision was unenforceable.

The commissioner of children and families filed neglect petitions with respect to Joseph W. and Daniel W., and the trial court found the children were neglected. At the termination proceeding, the trial court found the father was not a custodial parent and therefore could not contest the issue of neglect. The court then terminated the parental rights of the father and mother with respect to both children. The parents appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly found the father was not a custodial parent. The appellate court reversed, holding that the terminations were premised on improper adjudications of neglect. The Supreme Court then granted the commissioner's petition for certification to appeal. At issue was whether a noncustodial parent is entitled to contest a neglect petition. The Supreme Court held that the father was entitled to contest the neglect adjudication regardless of whether he was a custodial parent and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court on this alternate ground.

Bruce Bedrick appeals the trial courtâs decision in favor of his wife Deborah Bedrick. Deborah filed suit seeking dissolution of her marriage in August, 2007. She sought permanent alimony, an equitable distribution of the partiesâ real and personal property, and other relief. Bruce filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce a postnuptial agreement that the parties executed in December, 1977 but most recently modified in 1989. The agreement provided that in the event of dissolution, neither party would pay alimony. Instead, Deborah would receive a cash settlement. The 1989 amendment listed the cash settlement to be $75,000. The agreement further provided that Deborah would waive her interests in Bruceâs businesses, and not be liable for Bruceâs personal and business loans. The trial court concluded that because there was not much case law addressing the validity of postnuptial agreements in Connecticut to use as a guide, it may not enforce an agreement that was not fair and equitable. The court concluded that the postnuptial agreement was not fair and equitable, and declined to enforce it. Bruce appealed the decision and lost. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable, and generally must comply with contract principles. The Court also concluded that the terms of such agreements should be both fair and equitable at the time of execution, and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution. The Court found that the terms of the Bedricksâ agreement were unconscionable, and it affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

The Appellee-Petitioner, Commissioner of Children and Families, sought to terminate the parental rights of Respondent-Father to his child, Samantha S. After trial began, Respondent entered into an agreement to terminate his rights. After examining Respondent to ensure his consent was valid and termination was in the child's best interest, the trial court terminated Respondent's parental rights. Thereafter, Respondent learned that Petitioner had agreed to consider his petition for a declaratory ruling given Petitioner's purported duty to promote open adoption, and filed a motion to reopen his case to seek that option. The lower court ruled that Respondent's imperfect knowledge of the status of the declaratory judgment could not be used as a defense against terminating his parental rights, and Respondent appealed. This Court reviewed the entire record and dismissed Respondent's appeal.